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Abstract 
 
In synaesthetic personification, personality traits and other human characteristics 
are attributed to linguistic sequences and objects. Such non-perceptual concurrents 
are different from those found in most frequently studied types of synaesthesia, in 
which the eliciting stimuli induce sensory experiences. Here, subjective reports 
from synaesthetes were analysed and the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlying personification were investigated. Specifically, the neural bases of 
personification were examined using functional MRI in order to establish whether 
brain regions implicated in social cognition are involved in implementing 
personification. Additional behavioural tests were used to determine whether 
personification of inanimate objects is automatic in synaesthesia. Subjective 
reports describing general characteristics of synaesthetic personification were 
collected using a semi-structured questionnaire. A Stroop-like paradigm was 
developed in order to examine the automaticity of object personification, similarly 
to the previous investigations. Synaesthetes were significantly slower in 
responding to incongruent than to congruent stimuli. This difference was not 
found in the control group. The functional neuroimaging investigations 
demonstrated that brain regions involved in synaesthetic personification of 
graphemes and objects partially overlap with brain areas activated in normal 
social cognition, including the temporo-parietal junction, precuneus and posterior 
cingulate cortex. Activations were observed in areas known to be correlated with 
mentalising, reflecting the social and affective character of concurrents described 
in subjective reports. Psychological factors linked with personification in previous 
studies were also assessed in personifiers, using empathy, mentalising and 
loneliness scales. Neither heightened empathy nor mentalising were found to be 
necessary for personification, but personifying synaesthetes in the study felt 
lonelier than the general population, and this was more pronounced in those who 
personified more. These results demonstrate that personification shares many 
defining characteristics with classical forms of synaesthesia. Ascribing humanlike 
characteristics to graphemes and objects is a spontaneous and automatic process, 
inducer-concurrent pairings are consistent over time and the phenomenological 
character of concurrents is reflected in functional neuroanatomy. Furthermore, the 
neuroimaging findings are consistent with the suggestions that synaesthetes have a 
lower threshold for activation brain regions implicated in self-projection and 
mentalising, which may facilitate the personification processes in synaesthesia. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
1.1   Overview 
 
The broad aim of this thesis is to investigate personification synaesthesia (also 
known as sequence-personality synaesthesia), its phenomenology, cognitive and 
neural mechanisms. Personification synaesthesia is a special form of synaesthesia, 
in which inducers are usually linguistic sequences, whereas concurrents belong to 
the social and interpersonal domains, including personality traits, mental states, 
and social relationships between personified items. In order to understand 
investigations into the mechanisms underlying this form of synaesthesia, it is 
important to review not only the current state of research on synaesthesia, but also 
research on social cognition, with particular focus on mentalising processes.  
The first part of the Introduction provides a general overview of synaesthesia 
followed by a review current state of research on personification synaesthesia 
(Section 1.3), including both theoretical accounts and empirical investigations. 
The cognitive and neural models for understanding other people are presented in 
Section 1.4. Although, the scope of research for social cognition includes many 
different topics, such as empathy, mentalising, anthropomorphism, morality, 
recognizing oneself, self-knowledge and more, the focus of this section is on the 
most relevant aspects of social cognition for understanding personification in 
synaesthesia, namely on mentalising (understanding mental states), empathy and 
anthropomorphism.   
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1.2  A general introduction to synaesthesia 
 
1.2.1 Definition 
 
The term synaesthesia originates from Greek and means the ‗union of the senses‘ 
(Sagiv, 2005). In psychology, synaesthesia is defined as a heritable, perceptual 
condition, in which one stimulus evokes a subsequent sensory experience in 
another perceptual system or processing stream. For example, in colour-sound 
synaesthesia, seeing a colour may induce an additional sensory experience of 
sound or in personification synaesthesia seeing a number may co-occur with a 
belief that this number is an old man who is married to another number.  
Synaesthesia can be induced not only by an external stimulus, but also can be 
produced by an internally generated mental image of an eliciting stimulus (Spiller 
and Jansari, 2008). This means that synaesthetic experience can be induced not 
only by hearing or seeing an inducer, but also by visualising it.  
To be included in the spectrum of synaesthesia, the cross-modal correspondences 
have to be consistent over time, involuntary and idiosyncratic (Cytowic, 1997; 
Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009). This means that synaesthetic pairings between 
inducer and concurrent are consistently linked with each other (e.g., ‗A‘ is always 
green), specific for a particular synaesthete (e.g., ‗A‘ for a particular synaesthete 
is green, whereas for another one is yellow), and are elicited without conscious 
effort.   
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1.2.2   Frameworks for understanding synaesthesia 
 
Three main groups of accounts of synaesthesia can be found in the literature. The 
first emphasizes associative learning as an important factor facilitating 
synaesthesia, second explains synaesthesia from the developmental perspective, 
whereas the third one investigates it within a neurocognitive framework.   
1.2.2.1   Associative learning accounts 
 
Associative learning accounts of synaesthesia emphasize the importance of an 
early childhood exposure to repeatedly presented pairings. This hypothesis has 
been put forward as early as 1893 by Mary Calkins who noted that all variants of 
synaesthesia may result from ―forgotten childhood associations‖ (Calkins, 1893, 
p. 455). For example, synaesthetic redness of ‗A‘ would be likely to arise as a 
result of playing with coloured set of letters in childhood, where ‗A‘ was coloured 
red, ‗B‘ was yellow, ‗C‘ was green etc. More recently, associative learning was 
proposed as a plausible account explaining the weak variant of synaesthesia 
(Martino and Marks, 2001). Associative learning by itself cannot explain 
synaesthesia given that synaesthesia has genetic basis (Baron-Cohen, 1996; Asher 
et al., 2009), but it can be helpful in understanding some aspects of this 
phenomenon; specifically, the pattern of correspondences between inducing 
stimuli and the concurrent induced experiences. 
1.2.2.2   Developmental accounts 
 
Developmental accounts of synaesthesia suggest that all people are born as 
synaesthetes (the neonatal hypothesis). Non-synaesthetes lose synaesthesia as a 
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result of the development of modularity in the brain, whereas in synaesthetes this 
process is disrupted which consequently leads to synaesthetic sensations (Maurer, 
1997). Developmental investigations into synaesthesia also highlight the 
importance of genetic factors in explaining synaesthesia.  Synaesthesia has been 
shown to have a genetic basis and to be a heritable trait. Based on the observation 
that synaesthesia occurs more often among females than males, Baron-Cohen et 
al. (1996) has postulated that synaesthesia is a dominant trait inherited via the X 
chromosome. The genetics of synaesthesia have been recently investigated by 
Asher and co-workers (2009). They examined over forty families, all of which 
contained members with auditory-visual synaesthesia and concluded that there is 
linkage between auditory-visual synaesthesia and chromosomes 5q33, 6p12, and 
12p12. The results of the study by Asher et al. (2009) contradicted the hypothesis 
of Baron-Cohen et al., and implied that synaesthesia is linked to the X 
chromosome, since the study reported two cases of male-to-male transmission of 
synaesthesia. Although genetic basis of auditory-visual synaesthesia have been 
suggested, further examinations of synaesthesia genetics are necessary. Currently, 
research on the genetic basis of synaesthesia has moved away from trying to 
identify a single synaesthesia gene and towards identifying more complex way of 
inheriting synaesthesia with multiple genes involved and different ways of 
inheritance (Asher, submitted).   
 
1.2.2.3   Neurocognitive accounts 
 
Neurocognitive accounts for synaesthesia propose two main alternative 
explanations for synaesthesia. The first, the structural (hyperconnectivity) 
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hypothesis, assumes the existence of additional cross-wired connections between 
brain areas involved in inducer and concurrent processing (Hubbard and 
Ramachandran, 2005; Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001). The second 
explanation, the so-called functional hypothesis, posits that the synaesthetic 
experience arises due to functional differences at the neural level (for example, via 
disinhibition of normal connections) with the connections between brain areas 
being the same as in the brains of non-synaesthetes (Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 
2001; Ward et al., 2006).  
Arguments supporting the functional hypothesis are based on research on cross-
modal correspondences in non-synaesthetes, together with studies reporting 
pharmacologically induced synaesthetic-like experiences as well as synaesthetic 
experiences induced by meditation and hypnosis in non-synaesthetes.  
Research on cross-modal correspondences in the general population includes 
correspondences between various senses and cognitive streams. Touch-vision, 
pitch-lightness and spatial-numeral correspondences have been reviewed recently 
by Sagiv and Ward (2006). Although cross-modal correspondences frequently 
involve sensory experiences, correspondences between affective characteristics 
and shapes have also been described. Lyman (1979) asked 60 students to judge 
curly and sharp shapes with the given list of adjectives. The participants tended to 
assess the sharp shape as angry, brave, frustrated, jealous, nervous, and resentful, 
whereas the smooth, rounded shape was associated with such concepts as calm, 
friendly, good, happy, home, kind etc. Lyman (1979) proposed that the 
relationship between shapes and affective characteristics may result the 
similarities between physiognomic expressions of emotional states and shapes of 
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lines. Affective states can be also evoked by verbal sounds, musical sounds and 
moods (Odbert, Karwoski and Eckersson, 1942). Among cross-modal 
correspondences between linguistic sound and shape, ‗maluma‘ and ‗takete‘ effect 
(a contemporary version of which is ‗buba‘ and ‗kiki‘) constitute a cross-modal 
correspondence that has been reported to occur both in children and adults 
(Kohler, 1947; Irwin and Newland, 1940). When subjects are presented with two 
curves and two names (―takete‖ and ―maluma‖), they tended to name a sharp 
curve ―takete‖, and the smooth curve - ―maluma‖ (Kohler, 1947). This 
correspondence has been found to occur in childhood and to produce the inverse 
effect – when children asked to draw linear representations of these words, they 
tend to create rounded shapes for ―maluma‖ and sharp for ―takete‖ (Marks, 1978). 
Another peculiar phenomenon relating to the cross-modal correspondences in 
language was presented by Sapir (1929) who showed that words with the vowel 
‗a‘ are thought of as indicating larger objects that words containing the vowel ‗i‘.   
Synaesthetic experience can be induced in non-synaesthetes pharmacologically by 
psychedelic drugs, such as mescaline or ayahuasca (Klüver, 1966; Shanon, 2002), 
and also in the state between sleep and wakefulness (Sagiv and Ben-Tal, 
submitted). This supports the notion of the functional hypothesis that the 
disinhibition of normal neural connections can induce synaesthetic experience. 
Additional evidence for the functional model has been provided by research on 
posthypnotic suggestion and meditation (Walsh, 2005) inducing cross-modal 
synaesthetic experiences. Cohen-Kadosh and co-workers (2009) showed that it is 
possible to hypnotically induce synaesthetic-like experiences and behaviour in 
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non-synaesthetes. This supports the notion that synaesthesia is functionally 
mediated rather than hardwired via additional neural connections.     
However, recent neuroimaging studies provide evidence that there are structural 
differences between synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic brain. Rouw and Scholte 
(2007) used DTI to measure fractional anisotropy and found increased structural 
connectivity for the white matter underlying the parietal cortex and the fusiform 
gyrus in grapheme-colour synaesthetes. Recently Weiss and Fink (2009) 
conducted the first VBM study in synaesthetes. The authors investigated whether 
there are changes in grey matter in grapheme-colour synaesthetes. The VBM 
study of eighteen grapheme-colour synaesthetes confirmed the presence of 
increased grey matter volumes in the left caudal intraparietal sulcus and the right 
fusiform gyrus.  Moreover, Hänggi, Wotruba and Jäncke (2011) carried out a 
study examining global brain connectivity patterns in synaesthetes and controls, 
and showed differences between global network typology between those groups 
implying the existence of hyperconnectivity in the brains of synaesthetes. Sinke et 
al (2012) provided evidence for functional connectivity between the left parietal 
cortex (BA7) and primary visual areas (BA18) in grapheme colour synaesthesia. 
The VBM, DTI and global connectivity patterns data delivered evidence 
suggesting structural differences in the synaesthetes‘ brains may be the primary 
cause of congenital synaesthesia, and additionally supported the hypothesis that 
the synaesthetic experience mechanism arises from direct, feedforward 
connections between adjacent cortical areas. Bargary and Mitchell (2008) 
suggested three possible developmental mechanisms leading to the increased 
inter- and intra-areal feedforward connectivity – failure in axon guidance, border 
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formation and/or pruning. Mitchell (submitted) listed Ephrins and Eph-receptors, 
semaphorins and their receptors, netrins, slits and Robos, cadherins, neurotrophins  
and cell adhesion molecules from the L1 family as receptors mediating path 
finding of thalamocortical connections and border formation between cortical 
areas. The mutations of genes associated with these functions have been suggested 
to produce synaesthesia. Also, disruptions in the normal developmental pruning of 
transient cross-modal connections might result in synaesthesia (Maurer and 
Mondloch, 2004).  
Considering the evidence supporting anatomical differences in synaesthetic brain 
provided by the VBM and DTI studies described above, the question arises as to 
whether these structural differences precede or result from synaesthetic 
experiences. Future developmental neuroimaging studies seem to be necessary to 
answer this question.  
 
 1.2.3 Classifications of synaesthesia  
 
Synaesthesia is a highly heterogeneous condition. According to Sean Day (2012), 
synaesthetic experiences can be classified into at least sixty-five different variants 
of synaesthesia. 
Depending on criteria such as the number of sensory modalities and cognitive 
systems involved, the type of eliciting stimuli and its direction, the time of onset 
of synaesthesia in lifetime and its vividness, types of synaesthesia can be 
classified in various ways. Classification schemes include: 
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1. Classification according to on the number of sensory modalities and 
cognitive systems involved (see Figure 1.1): 
 Intramodal synaesthesia – inducer and concurrent occur within the same 
modality. For example, colour-grapheme synaesthesia could be considered 
as an intramodal type of synaesthesia if the concurring colour is induced 
by a visual representation of a grapheme.  
 Bimodal synaesthesia – in this synaesthetic experience, inducer and 
concurrent belong to different modalities, as, for example, in the case of 
colour-sound synaesthesia. 
 Polymodal synaesthesia – this occurs in complex synaesthetic experiences 
when more than two concurrents occur in response to inducer at the same 
time; for example, as occurring in the complex synaesthesia of 
Shereshevskii (Luria, 1969) who when hearing sounds saw colours, felt 
tastes and experienced touch.  
 Inter-system synaesthesia – these forms of synaesthesia may engage a 
motor system or affective system in response to perceptual system. This 
could be illustrated with an example of synaesthete who experienced tastes 
in response to movement (Grossenbacher, 1997). 
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Figure 1.1 A schematic representation of synaesthesia types based on the sensory 
modalities and cognitive systems involved 
 
2.  Classification according to the type of the eliciting stimulus: 
 Perceptual – hallucinogenic-like synaesthetic experiences, such as 
synaesthetic experience in congenital synaesthesia. For example, coloured 
hearing is a perceptual variant of synaesthesia that occurs when 
synaesthetes hear sounds and see colours induced by them at this same 
time. 
 Conceptual – non-perceptual synaesthesia, usually generated by thinking 
about concepts, metaphoric.  
3. Classification according to the directionality of synaesthesia: 
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 Unidirectional – most types of synaesthesia have been found to be 
unidirectional.  For example, graphemes will induce genders but not vice 
versa. 
 Bidirectional – Cohen Kadosh (2007) reported a synaesthete with bi-
directional colour-grapheme synaesthesia. 
4. Classification according to the onset of synaesthesia in lifetime: 
 Congenital – usually appears early in childhood and lasts throughout the 
lifespan; this type of synaesthesia is heritable, involuntary and specific. 
 Acquired – synaesthesia can develop as a result of biochemical or 
neurological brain dysfunctions, e.g. the acquired synaesthesia in retinitis 
pigmentosa (Armel and Ramachandran, 1999), or coloured hearing, which 
occurred after lesion of the ventrolateral nucleus of the thalamus in the 
right hemisphere (Ro et al., 2007).  
 Transient – a temporary synaesthesia induced by using hallucinogenic 
drugs or hypnotic suggestion. 
5.  Classification according to the vividness in  synaesthesia experienced: 
 Strong synaesthesia – this is inborn, experienced from an early childhood, 
vivid, perceptual, more common among women than among men, and 
usually unidirectional (Martino and Marks, 2001). Subjective reports 
suggest that the intensity of synaesthetic experience may vary, and 
sometimes include vivid, perceptual experiences, but sometimes include 
weaker and less vivid associations.  
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 Weak synaesthesia – this is common, contextual, metaphorical and 
bidirectional (Martino and Marks, 2001).  
Considering the criteria described above under which different synaesthetic 
categories can be described, it can be seen that sequence-personality 
synaesthesia is inter-system (as it involves general cognitive stream and social 
cognitive stream of processing) with conceptual type of the eliciting stimulus 
(graphemes, concepts etc), unidirectional and strong, vivid synaesthesia that 
appears in an early childhood. A more detailed overview of the sequence-
personality synaesthesia is provided in Section 1.3.  
6. Classification according to the spatial extent of  synaesthesia experienced: 
 Projector – the concurrent is experienced ‗in the mind‘s eye‘ (e.g. 
synaesthetic colour elicited by grapheme may be ‗placed out there on 
the page‘)  
 Associator  - the synaesthetic concurrent is experienced in ‗external 
space‘, usually in the personal space (e.g., synaesthetic colour may be 
perceived as ‗inside the head‘) (Dixon, Smilek and Merikle, 2004). 
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1.3 Synaesthetic personification  
 
1.3.1  Introduction1 
 
Synaesthetes attribute not only colours to graphemes and linguistic sequences, but 
may also attribute genders and personality traits. This automatic attribution is 
common among synaesthetes and seems to be as involuntary, and in many cases is 
relatively stable over time, similarly to colour associations. Moreover, 
synaesthetes who experience this form of personification often attribute not only 
genders and personality traits but also a whole range of social and personal 
attributes to letters, numbers, other sequences, concepts and certain objects. These 
may include family relationships, mental states, moods, and more. It is now 
recognised that such instances of personification may qualify as a type of 
synaesthesia in their own right (Amin et al., 2011). This is in line with modern 
definitions of synaesthesia. For example, Hubbard (2007) defines synaesthesia as 
a condition in which stimulation of one sensory or cognitive stream induces an 
involuntary and idiosyncratic experience in one or more additional modalities or 
streams that remains consistent over the time
2
. Sequence-personality synaesthesia 
fulfils these requirements: The inducer and concurrent belong to different 
cognitive streams; the correspondences are idiosyncratic, involuntarily elicited, 
and consistent over time (although some synaesthetes reported maturation of 
grapheme personalities together with their own maturation).  
                                                          
1 A modified version of this chapter has been submitted for publication in the Oxford Handbook of 
Synaesthesia (forthcoming, 2013).  
2 For further discussion on the issue of defining synaesthesia, the reader is referred to Simner (2010) or Sagiv, 
Ilbeigi, and Ben-Tal (2011). 
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Such variants of synaesthesia involving some sort of personification have been 
referred to using overlapping or partially-overlapping terminologies, including: 
Letter dramatisation (Calkins, 1895), ordinal linguistic personification (OLP) 
(Simner and Holenstein, 2007), sequence-personality synaesthesia (Simner, 
Gärtner
 
and Taylor, 2011) and social synaesthesia or simply personification 
(Amin et al., 2011).  
Letter dramatisation is a term coined over a hundred years ago by Mary Calkins 
(1893) to describe the personification of graphemes among synaesthetes. As 
contemporary research has extended the concept to include other inducers (e.g. 
objects, body parts, weekdays, months, seasons, etc.), this phrase is not used in the 
modern synaesthesia literature. Instead, Julia Simner and Karen Holestein (2007) 
emphasised the ordinal and linguistic nature of inducers evoking synaesthetic 
personifications (letters, numbers, weekdays, months, seasons etc.), labelling it 
ordinal linguistic personification. Given that the range of reported synaesthetic 
inducers is wider than just ordinal linguistic sequences and include everyday 
objects, (Simner, Gartner
 
and Taylor, 2011) recently suggested the new term 
sequence-personality synaesthesia. A different feature of this phenomenon has 
been highlighted in the last of these designations – social synaesthesia (Amin et 
al., 2011), in which emphasis is placed not on the nature of inducer but rather on 
the social aspect of co-occurring synaesthetic experiences involving concepts 
from social cognition/perception, such as personality traits, mental states, moods, 
social roles, etc.  For clarity, in this chapter, I will refer to this variant of 
synaesthesia as sequence-personality synaesthesia or simply personification. 
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1.3.2  Historical background 
 
Historical reports on synaesthetic personifications appeared as early as the end of 
nineteenth century. At the time, two prominent figures in Psychology were 
working on personifications in synaesthesia: the American psychologist and 
philosopher Mary Calkins and the Swiss professor of psychology - and friend of 
Carl Jung – Theodore Flournoy. The first studies of synaesthetic personifications 
were mostly explorative and descriptive, primarily resulting in phenomenological 
descriptions of synaesthetic experiences (Calkins, 1893; Flournoy, 1893; Patrick, 
1893). In a group study of 'dramatization' of letters, numbers and musical notes, 
Calkins (1895) attempted to identify the rules governing this type of synaesthesia. 
Personality/number associations were found twice as frequently as 
personality/letter associations. Calkins hypothesised that numbers are more likely 
than letters to be the subject of emotional associations due to the greater level of 
‗intellectual engagement‘ involved in number processing compared to letter 
processing. In her research, Calkins noted that synaesthetes not only attribute 
personalities to graphemes, but also tend to like and dislike them. For example, 
the numbers 2 and 5 are often perceived as more likable than prime numbers such 
as 7, 11 and 13, and this may result from ―the actual experience of facility in the 
use of even numbers, and of difficulties with the unyielding indivisibility of prime 
numbers‖ (Calkins, 1895, p.101). In the twentieth century, sequence-personality 
synaesthesia is mentioned (though not identified as a distinct phenomenon) by the 
eminent Russian neuropsychologist Aleksander Luria in The Mind of a Mnemonist 
(1969), an elaborate case study of Solomon Shereshevskii, a synaesthete who had 
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at least fivefold synaesthesia. In the chapter dedicated to mental images, there is a 
passage in which Shereshevskii describes his personifications: 
"Take the number 1. This is a proud, well-built man; 2 is a high-spirited woman; 
3 is a gloomy person (why, I don't know); 6 a man with a swollen foot; 7 a man 
with a moustache; 8 a very stout woman - a sack within a sack. As for the number 
87, what I see is a fat woman and a man twirling his moustache" (Luria, 1969, 
p.31). 
The historical account of sequence-personality synaesthesia provided some 
observations about its phenomenology, but systematic empirical studies were not 
carried out. Although a cognitive mechanism underlying affective associations 
(positive versus negative) to graphemes was suggested (Calkins, 1895), there was 
no widely accepted framework for explaining personifications in synaesthesia. 
 
1.3.3  Characteristics of sequence-personality synaesthesia 
 
The first contemporary investigations into sequence-personality synaesthesia have 
focused not only on providing phenomenological descriptions of synaesthetic 
personifications (Cytowic, 2002; Sagiv, 2005), but have also aimed to verify 
empirically the reality of cross-modal correspondences by testing for their 
involuntary character and consistency over time – both considered core qualities 
of synaesthesia (Rich et al., 2005). A number of recent studies have employed 
behavioural congruity paradigms as well as consistency tests similar to those used 
to study other forms of synaesthesia (see below). Neuroimaging methods have 
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also been employed to uncover the neural basis of the phenomenon (Amin et al., 
2011).   
1.3.3.1 Automaticity and the involuntary nature of personification  
 
Most paradigms used to objectively assess the automaticity and involuntary nature 
of personification reports rely on the fact that personifications tend to be 
consistent over time, at least in some cases. In other words, some synaesthetes 
show relatively consistent mappings between at least some inducers (e.g., 
graphemes) and concurrents (e.g., gender). Thus before turning to examine the 
automaticity of personification, the consistency of inducer-concurrent pairings 
needs to be demonstrated. Indeed the consistency of these reports has been 
confirmed in both individual cases (Simner and Holenstein, 2007; Smilek et al., 
2007) and group studies (Amin et al., 2011; Simner, Gartner
 
and Taylor, 2011). 
The automatic and involuntary character of sequence-personality synaesthesia has 
been tested using innovative variants of the Stroop (1935) and Navon figure 
paradigms, as shown in Table 1.1. In the variant of Stroop test, the synaesthetic 
gender of the letter either matches the gender of the target stimulus (congruent 
trial) or mismatches the target gender (incongruent trial). For example, a 
synaesthete, having seen a letter A (which to this particular synaesthete is 
feminine), will be presented with a picture of a female‘s face in the congruent 
trial, whereas in the incongruent trial, the letter A will be followed by a masculine 
face (which does not match with the letter‘s gender). When synaesthetes are asked 
to make speed judgments of the target face gender, it is expected that synaesthetes 
will be faster to respond in congruent trials than in incongruent trials (Dixon et al., 
2000; Smilek et al., 2001). Simner and Holenstein (2007), using a modified 
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Stroop paradigm, presented a synaesthetic participant AP with girl and boy names 
to assess whether semantic gender judgments can be affected by synaesthetic 
genders, and whether this occurs automatically. In the experimental task, the 
synaesthetic gender of the first letter of the English names used was congruent 
with the semantic gender of the words in half of the trials; the other half were 
incongruent. The aim was to establish whether the synaesthetic gender associated 
with the first letter is processed automatically and interferes with gender 
judgments for whole words (English names). A congruency effect was indeed 
observed; reactions times where faster when the synaesthetic gender of the first 
letter matched the name gender, suggesting automatic processing. Simner and 
Holenstein (2007) could employ this type of Stroop-like paradigm only after they 
verified that for AP, the genders of words (in this case name) are likely to take the 
gender of the first letter (a similar effect is noted in grapheme-colour synaesthesia, 
where the colour of initial letters spreads throughout the whole word, giving the 
word its colour; Rich et al., 2005). To determine this, AP was asked to indicate 
how feminine/masculine a particular name is on a line scale from extremely 
female to extremely male when seeing female/male names whose initial letter‘s 
synaesthetic gender was congruent/incongruent with semantic gender of the word 
(English name). The experiment showed that AP‘s semantic 
masculinity/femininity were influenced by the synaesthetic genders: AP perceives 
as more feminine female names starting with a feminine synaesthetic gender 
(congruent condition) compared with female names starting with a masculine 
synaesthetic gender (incongruent condition). This same effect occurred with 
masculine synaesthetic gender. For example, if presented with name Betsy, AP 
thought of Betsy as less feminine than controls, because for her, the synaesthetic 
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gender of b is male and interferes with semantic gender. Although this type of 
letter-to-word transfer applies to genders of names, it does not apply to linguistic 
sequences such as days of the week, months of the year. Such frequently used 
words are often associated with their own synaesthetic gender (or colour for that 
matter), that is independent of the gender associated with the first letter.  
Table 1.1 Studies on the automaticity of personification in synaesthesia 
Study Personification 
Type 
Testing Method Study Size 
Amin, 2005 Grapheme-gender  Navon figure  (letter 
gender discrimination) 
Group study 
 (6 synaesthetes) 
Simner and 
Holenstein, 2007 
Letter-gender Stroop paradigm (name 
gender discrimination) 
Case study of AP 
Amin et al., 
2011 
Grapheme-gender Stroop paradigm (face 
gender discrimination) 
Group study 
 (5 synaesthetes) 
 
Another Stroop-like task for studying the automaticity of gender-letter pairings 
was developed by Amin et al. (2011). The authors presented a target face 
preceded by a letter prime. Participants were asked to judge whether the presented 
face was a female or a male face. As predicted, synaesthetes had significantly 
slower average reaction times in incongruent trials compared with congruent 
trials, even though the grapheme primes were irrelevant to the task. This effect 
was not found in non-synaesthetes, even when they chose the letters that were 
most masculine/feminine in their opinion to be included into experimental trials. 
The results from the study provide converging evidence that synaesthetic gender-
grapheme associations are involuntary and automatic, which differentiate 
synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic personifications of graphemes.   
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An alternative way of testing for automaticity of grapheme-gender utilised a 
variant of a Navon-type figure – using male or female stick figures made of 
graphemes (Amin, 2005; Sagiv, Olu-Lafe, Amin, and Ward, 2006). The gender 
synaesthetes associated with the graphemes making up the stick figures were 
either congruent or incongruent with the gender depicted by the stick figure. A 
congruity effect was observed here too, demonstrating once again that 
synaesthetes find it hard to ignore the gender associated with graphemes, even 
when it is irrelevant and sometimes detrimental to the task. Of course, the 
innovative use of established testing techniques provided compelling objective 
evidence not only for the automaticity but also for the reality of synaesthetic 
personification.  
1.3.3.2 Prevalence of sequence-personality synaesthesia 
 
While sequence personality synaesthesia is recognised as a relatively common 
type of synaesthesia (Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009; Simner et al., 2011), as yet no 
large-scale study of the general population has been conducted that would provide 
an estimate of its prevalence. In 2007, Simner and Holenstein carried out a survey 
of 219 individuals. In this group they found three synaesthetic personifiers, 
suggesting that about 1 in 73 people have personifications for ordinal sequences 
or objects. A similar prevalence (about 1.4%) can be found in a historical text 
showing that among 75 men and women, there was one female synaesthete 
associating personalities to numbers (Patrick, 1893).  
Among the population of synaesthetes, personification is fairly common: 33% of 
the 248 synaesthetes studied by Amin et al. (2011) reported experiencing genders 
and/or personalities to graphemes. More than three quarters of the synaesthetes 
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who attribute personalities and genders to graphemes also personified objects, 
such as fruit and vegetables, computers, household objects and others. Graphemes 
and objects are personified on a daily basis, and the attribution of social and 
affective characteristics is conceptually driven although some of the synaesthetes 
testified that colour
3
, shape, number parity and sound of graphemes may play a 
role in determining the specific pattern of associations of personalities and 
genders. For example, in descriptions provided by synaesthetes responding to the 
questionnaire employed by Amin et al. 2011, 26% of synaesthetes indicated that 
grapheme shape influenced the gender associated with them (e.g., they quote two 
synaesthetes who indicate that rounded letters were often thought of as more 
feminine). According to self-reports gathered by Amin et al. (2011), sequence-
personality synaesthesia has been experienced by individuals when they were as 
young as seven years old – around the time when they acquire reading and writing 
skills.  
1.3.3.3 Categories of inducers and concurrents  
 
Although synaesthetic experiences can be induced by many different types of 
stimuli – emotions, flavours, musical sounds, temperature and others, the most 
common inducers are linguistic constructs, including letters, numbers, weekdays 
and months. We can differentiate between two different types of inducers in 
personification: Linguistic inducers, such as graphemes, weekdays, months, and 
non-linguistic inducers, including body parts, inanimate objects, geometrical 
shapes, plants, colours, spatial concepts (e.g. left-right) and so on. In contrast to 
                                                          
3 This is consistent with Simner and Hubbard‘s (2006) observation that graphemes‘ colours and genders 
interact. For example, they find that synaesthetes are slower to state the synaesthetic gender of letters if 
these are printed in colours from other letters with mis-matching (but not matching) genders. 
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non-linguistic inducers, linguistic inducers often have a conventional order (e.g. 
alphabetical sequence) that may influence how synaesthetes personify them (e.g., 
friendships or kinship relations; Simner and Holenstein, 2007). For example, 1 
and 2 are more likely to have a relationship (play together or parenting to 3) than 
with 8 or 9. Similarly, anecdotal evidence suggests that personified non-linguistic 
inducers (e.g., inanimate objects) tend to have some sort of relationship with their 
own kind; for example, coffee mugs might miss a broken mug from the same set 
(Amin et al. 2011). Another synaesthete tested by Sobczak, Sagiv, and Williams 
(2011) described a family of mushrooms consisting of mother mushroom, father 
mushroom and their children, which she perceived as having mental lives and 
interactions. A similar picture can be seen in linguistic inducers: For example, one 
of the synaesthetes we tested noted that: “The personalities of all my letters and 
numbers centre around a „pecking order‟ based on age and leadership 
relationships.... All are „nice‟ personalities, quiet, confident, respectful, staying 
within their order. No moods. i.e., my letters, numbers, months and days have 
more „relationship‟ to one another than personalities.”  
This description, and our discussion thus far of personifications, show that the 
concurrent experiences are not purely sensory (i.e., they are not only colours, 
tastes, and so on), but rather, they are conceptual categories (e.g., personality 
types). Moreover, they are at times social descriptions and this suggests that, in 
sequence-personality synaesthesia, the concurrents belong to the interpersonal 
domain: They may reflect individual characteristics (gender, personality, physical 
appearance, cognitive abilities, occupation, mental states, moods, attitudes, 
interests, inclinations) as well as ‗social interactions‘ between inducers (e.g., 
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emotive and behavioural responses to other units; Simner and Holenstein, 2007; 
Amin et al., 2011). Smilek et al. (2007) classified the social and affective 
characteristics attributed in sequence personality synaesthesia into four more 
specific types: Physical (gender, physical appearance), personal (cognitive 
abilities, occupation, personality, mental states, moods, attitudes, interests, 
inclinations), relational (emotive and behavioural responses to other units) and 
social role (occupation, familial and non familial relationships). From the 
comparison between the social attributes to graphemes in the historical and 
contemporary literature, it can be concluded that although synaesthesia is 
congenital, life experiences can influence the personality traits that are being 
attributed to graphemes and other sequences (Simner and Holenstein, 2007). 
Concurrents such as ―society girl‖, ―policy girl‖, ―housekeeper‖ (Patrick, 1893, 
p.509) are rather uncommon among synaesthetes today.  
 
1.3.4  Theories of sequence-personality synaesthesia 
 
After establishing the genuineness of sequence-personality synaesthesia, 
researchers are attempting to provide an explanatory framework for the 
phenomenon. In order to explain how it arises, researchers look at the underlying 
neural mechanisms in addition to the phenomenological characteristics and 
behavioural consequences. One neurobiological framework for understanding 
sequence-personality synaesthesia focuses on the cross-activation hypothesis 
(Hubbard, Brang, and Ramachandran, 2011), whereas a more functional 
alternative approach describes the condition as a by-product of the developmental 
mechanisms for social cognition. These two approaches will be discussed below.  
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1.3.4.1 Neural cross-talk and neural over-excitation as models proposed for 
explaining sequence-personality synaesthesia 
 
Cross-activation has been proposed as a plausible brain mechanism of 
synaesthesia. Cross-activation in synaesthesia denotes the process of the inducer 
activating not only inducer-specific brain areas but also cross-activating brain 
areas that are involved in concurrent processing. For example, in grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia the experience of the grapheme activates the grapheme processing 
specific area and also cross-activates the colour-selective area the brain of 
synaesthete, which is not observed in non-synaesthetes. This may results from 
either direct (Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2005; Rich and Mattingley, 2002) 
and/or indirect cross-talk between brain areas (Smilek et al., 2001; Grossenbacher 
and Lovelace, 2001). These may be facilitated by either structural or functional 
differences in connectivity in synaesthetes‘ brains. The functional model of cross-
talk assumes that there are no structural differences in the brains of synaesthetes 
and non-synaesthetes, with synaesthetic cross-activations arising as a result of 
disinhibition of normal connections (Ward, Huckstep, and Tsakanikos, 2006). 
Conversely, the structural explanation of synaesthetic cross activation highlights 
anatomical differences between the synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic brain, i.e., 
additional feedforward neural pathways connecting the particular brain areas 
involved in processing the inducers and concurrents in a given type of 
synaesthesia.  
While functional neuroimaging studies showed that such explanation for 
grapheme-colour synaesthesia is plausible, (Hubbard and Ramachandran, 2005), 
more recent studies provided direct evidence for hyper-connectivity (Rouw and 
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Scholte, 2007; Weiss and Fink, 2009) using Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI), 
suggesting that there are structural differences between ‗synaesthetes‘ and ‗non-
synaesthetes‘ brains. However, future developmental neuroimaging studies seem 
to be necessary in order to clarify whether hyper connectivity precedes function 
specialisation and what the role of learning and practice is.  
Could sequence-personality synaesthesia be also explained within this 
framework? Simner and Hubbard (2006) argue that sequence-personality 
synaesthesia is likely to arise as a result of cross-talk between the left inferior 
parietal lobule (in particular the angular gyrus) and temporo-parietal junction that 
mediate sequence information, and the ‗social brain‘ regions associated with 
mental states and personality trait attribution, such as the amygdala, 
somatosensory cortex, frontal and parietal regions. It is suggested that the angular 
gyrus is a crucial area in inducing cross-modal pairings in sequence personality 
synaesthesia due to its importance in processing ordinal sequence information, 
which has been well documented in neuropsychological studies of semantic 
agnosia and acalculia (Dehaene and Cohen, 1997; Turconi and Seron, 2002; 
Cappeletti, Butterworth and Kopelman, 2001). Synaesthetic concurrents in this 
variant of synaesthesia include social and affective associations, therefore it is 
likely that neural correlates involved in generating these experiences overlap with 
the neural systems involved in implementing general social cognition. Previous 
neuroimaging experiments (e.g. Castelli et al., 2002; Martin and Weisberg, 2003; 
Schultz et al., 2003) provided evidence that personification of non-randomly 
moving shapes (similar to Heider and Simmel‘s animations, 1944) activates some 
of the same brain areas that have been found to be active during interaction with 
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or observation of other human beings. The inferior frontal cortex is crucial for 
personality judgments (Herberlein and Saxe, 2005). Additionally, the temporo-
parietal junction, posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus, the amygdala, prefrontal 
cortex and fusiform gyrus may also play a role in generating social and affective 
concurrents reported in sequence-personality synaesthesia. The first case study 
examining empirically the neural substrates of sequence mapping synaesthesia 
provided only partial support for these predictions. Amin et al (2011) tested AA - 
a 38 year female synaesthete who attributes genders to letters - using functional 
MRI. The study identified the medial part of the superior parietal lobule – the 
precuneus - as a possible brain region mediating the attribution of gender to 
letters. Aiming to establish whether personification in synaesthesia arise 
automatically, Amin et al. asked AA to perform a letter repetition detection task 
(rather than to focus on the synaesthetic experiences of genders). Given that the 
synaesthetic gender of letters was irrelevant to the task, the authors argue that the 
observed differences in precuneus activity when AA was presented with letters 
with genders and letters without genders, may indeed reflect automatic processes 
associated with synaesthetic personifications. As the precuneus is associated with 
self-referential processing (information related to oneself) as well as with mental 
imagery (e.g., Cavanna and Trimble 2006), Amin et al. (2011) proposed two 
corresponding possible mechanisms for synaesthetic personification. One 
possibility is that synaesthesia is an extraordinary manifestation of mental 
imagery that is elicited automatically, and has well defined inducers and 
concurrences.  The second hypothesis emphasises the self-processing functions; it 
was suggested that this variant of synaesthesia may reflect as an unusual 
projection of one‘s own mental states onto letters and numerals. Similar 
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explanation for the precuneus activation has been also proposed in another case 
study of a synaesthete who personifies inanimate objects (Sobczak, Sagiv and 
Williams, 2011). The self-projection hypothesis is in line with current theory in 
social neuroscience on how we get to know the minds of others: We never 
perceive the minds of others directly since mental states are unobservable 
constructs, but we infer intentions, feelings and personality traits of others using 
self-referential accounts, by accessing one‘s own mental states that serve as a 
model of the minds of others, and then project them on the target (Mitchell, 2008). 
Could this suggest that the attribution of social and affective characteristics to 
graphemes in synaesthesia is merely an extension of normal social cognition, in 
which projection of one‘s own mental states includes not only other humans but 
also non-humans entities as targets? The hypothesis that sequence-personality 
synaesthesia is a misattribution of self-referential processing will be presented 
further in the following section.   
 
1.3.4.2 Personification synaesthesia as a misattribution of self-referential 
processing 
 
According to the neonatal synaesthesia hypothesis (e.g., Maurer and Mondloch 
2005), all newborn babies experience synaesthesia or, at the very least, some sort 
of sensory confusion; they experience uni-sensory stimuli with all their senses as a 
consequence of having a cortex that is not fully developed. This ability disappears 
with the development of the nervous system as cortical areas acquire functional 
specialisation. Could this also apply to synaesthetic personification? Young 
children assign life and conscious mental states to non-living objects and 
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concepts; this was referred to as ‗animism‘ in the early literature (Piaget, 1929). 
Animistic thought in early childhood gradually decreases during cognitive 
development and is ultimately replaced by more logical thought. According to this 
model of development, a child‘s progression from perceiving all functional 
objects as endowed with conscious life, passes through a stage of assigning these 
attributes to objects that are in any motion, and a few years later only to things 
that move on their own accord, to reach the stage in which animate characteristics 
are only attributed to living things. After this stage, the animistic mode of 
cognition (similar to that of personification) is almost completely replaced by 
logical reasoning and human-like qualities are not longer attributed explicitly to 
inanimate objects. Piaget (1929), studying animistic thought in children, 
hypothesised that the excessive animistic mode of thinking (including 
personification) serves  as a mechanism that is used to construct reality with the 
self as a model. This links with contemporary research into the way we construct 
social reality. The discovery of mirror neurons demonstrates this well. Mirror 
neurons fire both when we observe others performing an action and when we 
perform the same action ourselves. This constitutes a neural, mirror-like 
mechanism enabling understanding of the actions, emotions and feelings of other 
people,  presumably through a simulation process (for a review, see Bastiaansen et 
al., 2009). Personification in synaesthetic adults may represent an excessive 
manifestation of the human tendency to perceive reality using the self as a model, 
which in turn derives from younger children‘s animistic thought which children 
use as an undeveloped filter through which they learn about social world. In other 
words, synaesthetic personification could represent a residual expression of 
childhood animism. 
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The brain areas associated with self-referential processing such as the insula, the 
precuneus, the inferior frontal cortex, the posterior cingulate, have been found to 
be involved in implementation of animistic thought (Sobczak, 2009; Sobczak, 
Sagiv, and Williams, 2011). Furthermore, evidence from neuropsychology 
suggests that lesions of the right (and sometimes left) parietal cortex may result in 
peculiar misattributions of agency, which might itself sometimes involve 
animistic attributions. Specifically, patients with such lesions frequently display 
delusional misidentifications of body parts, thinking that their left arm or left leg 
does not belong to them. They often attribute their limbs to other people - their 
wife, examiner, or fellow patient. This condition - somatoparaphrenia is a subtype 
of asomatognosia (unawareness of one's limb ownership). Interestingly, some 
patients also assign personalities to their limbs and give misidentified arms or legs 
nicknames such as ―George‖, or ―Silly Billy‖ (Critchley 1955, p. 286). 
Misattribution of animacy and agency has also been found after frontal lobe 
damage. For example, Feinberg and Keenan (2005) describe a peculiar case of 
personification known as ―phantom child syndrome‖ which is thought to represent 
a delusional reduplication of self. The patient believed that he is in the process of 
adopting a child with ―problems‖. Such patients deny that they have certain 
problems themselves, instead attributing them to the ―phantom child‖.  
In summary, evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsychology is consistent with 
the idea that misattribution of the self could explain synaesthetic personification, 
however, this framework for understanding personification remain tentative and 
needs to be tested directly in future studies involving synaesthetes.  
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1.3.5  Similarities and differences between synaesthetic personifications and 
non-synaesthetic personifications 
 
Personification and animism involving the attribution of human-like social and 
affective characteristics to non-human entities can be observed not only in 
synaesthesia, but also in non-synaesthetes‘ everyday life. Examples include 
personification of objects, both in childhood and in adulthood (Piaget 1929;  
Bouldin and Pratt 1999; Epley, Akalis, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2008), the 
attribution of masculine/feminine genders to nouns in many languages (Corbett, 
1991), as well as the attribution of agency, personality traits and moods to body 
parts (usually limbs) following brain injury (Critchley, 1955). Personification is 
widespread in various cultures in metaphors, folk legends and myths (Guthrie, 
1993). For example, according to one Russian superstition, if you drop a fork 
(masculine) a male guest will visit your house, but if you drop a spoon (feminine) 
– this will be a female guest (Corbett, 1991). Personification is also utilised in 
design and ‗human factors engineering‘, in which social rules are used when 
designing human-computer interactions (Nass et al., 1997), as well as in 
advertising, where, in the field of marketing, consumers are frequently invited to 
assign a human personality to branded objects (Ouwersloot and Tudorica, 2001).  
Young children often think of inanimate objects as if they were humans, 
endowing them with life-like features (animism). It has been suggested that 
children‘s tendency to personify is a normal stage in cognitive development 
(Piaget, 1929), but can also be linked with social isolation; solitary children 
frequently create imaginary friends. Often these imaginary companions exist 
entirely in their imaginations, but sometimes the focus of their imaginations are 
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physical objects such as dolls or other toys that have ascribed to them elaborate 
personalities and biographies (Bouldin and Pratt, 1999). Additionally, among 
adults, loneliness and inability to create social bonds may be compensated by 
attaching social and affective characteristics to animals, inanimate objects and 
also religious agents (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, and Cacioppo, 2008). 
In many languages, nouns have masculine/feminine grammatical genders that 
influence the way people think about inanimate objects: objects with feminine 
linguistic genders are thought to be more feminine, and objects with masculine 
grammatical gender are perceived as more masculine (Boroditsky, Schmidt and 
Phillips, 2003). This effect can be observed already in children of 8-9 years, who, 
when asked to assign voices to inanimate objects (presented together with their 
labels), ascribe voices to presented objects congruent with their grammatical 
genders (Sera, Berge, and de Castillo, 1994). Boroditsky and her colleagues found 
that the adjectives used to describe nouns tend to be feminine when the noun 
concerned has feminine grammatical gender and more masculine when noun has 
masculine gender. Furthermore, adjectives usually associated more with 
femininity (such as calm, friendly, good, happy, kind) tended to be used for 
descriptions of rounded shapes, whereas  adjectives associated with masculinity 
(e.g., angry, brave, frustrated, jealous, nervous, and resentful) were used when 
describing a spiky shape (Lyman, 1979). Thus, shapes may be associated with at 
least implicitly with some social and affective characteristics. Additional, musical 
sounds can evoke attributions of moods (Odbert, Karwoski and Eckersson, 1942), 
and letters can induce associations of personality traits (Simner, Gartner
 
and 
Taylor, 2011). Simner and her colleagues examined whether synaesthetes and 
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non-synaesthetes exhibited similar patterns of letter-personality correspondences. 
While non-synaesthetes‘ personifications of letters were less elaborated and less 
consistent over time compared with synaesthetes, both groups seem to share the 
underlying rules for the personality trait attribution to letters. Using Goldberg‘s 
Big Five personality traits questionnaire, Simner et al. (2011) found that both 
synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes tend to associate frequently occurring letters 
(e.g., the letter A compared with the letter Z) with personalities low in neuroticism 
and high in agreeableness; the main difference between the groups is therefore 
that in synaesthetes, the personality-letter associations occur explicitly, whereas in 
non-synaesthetes, they are implicit. 
 
1.3.6  Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide a broad overview of personifications 
including the phenomenology, as well as behavioural and neural characteristics. 
Sequence-personality synaesthesia appears to be consistent over time. 
Furthermore, the associations between inducer and concurrent are automatically 
and involuntarily elicited. The variety of inducers in this variant of synaesthesia 
include linguistic (graphemes, weekdays, months, etc) and non-linguistic inducers 
(inanimate objects, colours, body parts, etc). The concurrent synaesthetic 
experiences have affective and social characteristics, and fall into following 
general groups: physical, personal, relational, and social role descriptions. Several 
lines of evidence suggest that some forms of personification occur in non-
synaesthetes too; examples include childhood animistic thought, mild forms of 
personification in everyday life, personifications of body parts, as well as gender 
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attributions to linguistic constructs (i.e., grammatical gender). Synaesthetes and 
non-synaesthetes alike think of the letters that are more frequently used as rather 
agreeable and not neurotic. However, non-synaesthetes do so only implicitly, 
compared with synaesthetes, for whom these pairings occur involuntarily and they 
are aware of them explicitly in everyday life. A similar pattern is found when 
considering object personification. Preliminary neuroimaging evidence suggests 
that grapheme personification depends on the posterior parts of parietal cortex, 
namely the precuneus, which is involved in mental imagery and self-referential 
processing. Synaesthetic personification may therefore represent a special case of 
mental imagery or the involuntary projection of one‘s own mental states onto 
graphemes and/or inanimate objects. As in other forms of synaesthesia, it is 
conceivable that cross-activation of brain areas could underlie personification 
(e.g., cross-talk between the angular gyrus and some of the ‗social brain‘ areas). 
At the developmental level, it has been proposed that sequence-personality 
synaesthesia may represent a residual expression of childhood animism, an early 
stage in social cognitive development (Amin et al., 2011). Although there are 
many differences between the accounts described here for sequence-personality 
synaesthesia, they all seem to point to the observation that (as in other types of 
synaesthesia) this variant may be utilising a universal mechanism (e.g., Sagiv and 
Ward, 2006). Admittedly, the study of synaesthetic personification using 
cognitive neuroscience methods is only in its infancy. It would therefore be wise 
to regard these frameworks for understanding synaesthetic personification as 
tentative, at least until further evidence becomes available.  
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1.4  Understanding other people 
 
Person-related knowledge includes psychological predispositions, appearance, 
feelings, mental states, social functioning and others. However, the main 
difference between human and object perception is the presence of mind (Harris 
and Fiske, 2009) in humanised (people) perception and its absence in 
dehumanised (object) perception. Since in synaesthetic personification, letters, 
numbers and objects are perceived as having ‗mental lives‘ (humanized 
perception), the following section provides an overview of mechanisms that are 
involved in thinking of minds of other people.  
 
1.4.1  Introduction to reasoning about other people 
 
In our everyday life, we observe others‘ behavior and interpret it in terms of 
intentions, beliefs, desires, goals and reasons. Mental states, personality traits and 
feelings that we recognise in others are not directly accessible but rather inferred 
indirectly from observable behaviour. The process of understanding one‘s own 
mental states and mental states of others has been referred to as mentalising 
(Shany-Ur and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011) or theory of mind (ToM) (Premack and 
Woodruff, 1978). Mental states usually refer to intentions, beliefs, attitudes, 
emotions, feelings and so on. However, in developmental and cognitive 
psychology, ToM is defined in a narrower way, where ascribed mental states 
include only knowledge and beliefs, but not affective mental states.   
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1.4.2 Models for understanding the self and others 
 
In cognitive psychology, there are two main groups of explanatory models for 
understanding the self and others: theory theories and simulation theories. The 
theory-theory approaches imply that humans contain implicit theories describing 
the rules that govern our own behaviour and the behaviour of others (Wellman, 
2002). Accordingly to the theory-theory, understanding the mind is based on a 
folk psychological theory. Broadly speaking, we get to know what other people 
think and intend using sets of rules for constructing theories that are innate to 
humans (Carruthers, 1996) or that developed them in an early childhood 
(Churchland, 1991). A type of the theory-theory - the modularity approach - 
implies that mentalising processes are governed by a module or mechanism that is 
specialised and dedicated for  mind reading (Leslie, 1987) and therefore is 
sometimes considered as a domain-specific account (Ward, 2012).  This approach 
was inspired by the false belief tasks research in children with autism. In 1985, 
Baron-Cohen, Frith and Leslie conducted a false belief task study on normally 
developing children, children with autism and children with Down syndrome, 
showing that only the group of autistic children failed the false-belief task test. 
Drawing inferences from false-belief experiments involving participants with 
autistic spectrum disorder, researchers concluded that if autism impairs only the 
ability to infer mental states of others, whereas the ability to create coherent 
behavioural or mechanical stories is intact, there must be a special module 
dedicated to understanding minds of other people (Baron-Cohen, Frith and Leslie, 
1985). Therefore, the modular approach to mentalising implicates that theory of 
mind module is a separate from other neurocognitive abilities but simultaneously 
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builds on other mental abilities. The modular approach consists of four 
interrelated components (Baron-Cohen, 1995): intentionality detector (ID), eye 
direction detector (EDD), shared attention mechanism (SAM), and theory of mind 
mechanism (ToMM). ID is a mechanism involved in the interpretation of 
animated stimuli in terms of volitional mental states such as desires and goals, and 
is activated whenever one perceives (not necessarily visually) that another person 
or object is in motion. A good illustration of ID is the classical agency attribution 
experiment, in which  subjects  attribute intentions and desires to moving 
geometric shapes, interpreting their movement as motivated by mental states 
(Heider and Simmel, 1944). The EDD (eye direction detection) function is an 
evolutionary produced mechanism developed for the rapid detection of eyelike 
stimuli in the environment (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Already at the early age of two 
months, infants tend to look significantly much longer at eyes than other facial 
parts (Maurer, 1985).  Eye direction detection is a form of dyadic representation 
as it relates only to two entities that are in relation to each other.  SAM (shared 
attention mechanism) is defined as the ability to follow the gaze of other agents 
and by doing so to identify the objects seen by the agent. The shared attention 
mechanism is usually developed by the age of nine months (Butterworth, 1991; 
Baron-Cohen, 1995). The shared attention mechanism requires constructing 
triadic representations of self, other and the target perceived by the other, to form 
joint attention. ToMM is an innate capacity to engage in folk psychology and infer 
‗epistemic‘ mental states, including pretending, imagining, dreaming, believing, 
thinking and so on (Baron-Cohen, 1995).  
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In contrast to the theory-theory models, simulation theory (ST) accounts do not 
require using prior knowledge or psychological laws to infer mental states. 
Instead, they imply that people understand mental states of others through the use 
their own mental apparatus by simulating another person‘s mental states. To infer 
third person mental attributions one has to imaginatively simulate the same 
feelings, intentions or desires as the other person and then is able to predict the 
behaviour of that person. Goldman (2008) illustrates the simulation process with a 
chess player who, to predict the next move of the opponent, needs to imagine 
what next steps the opponent has to take to win the game. To do so, the player 
needs to switch to the opponent‘s perspective by pretending his desire to win, and 
in this way the player is able work out what decisions his opponent will 
potentially make to win. Accordingly to simulation theory, people understand the 
minds of others through the use of their own minds to imitate (or ‗mirror‘) the 
minds of others. After simulating the mental states of others, people assign 
(project) their own, recreated mental states onto others.  
Waytz and Mitchell (2011) distinguish two different types of simulation – 
mirroring and self-projection. These two simulation types are employed in 
inferring mental states differently, and which of them is used in any particular 
situation is strongly dependent on the physical presence of the person whose 
mental states one wants to infer. Mirroring would usually occur when one can 
perceive observable cues suggesting what the observed person is experiencing. 
These perceived cues induce similar experiences in the observer and this is also 
reflected in neural responses.  Self-projection is a type of simulation that is used 
to infer mental states of others when they are not physically present and in the 
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absence of behavioural cues. This means that when people can rely on using 
perceptual cues such as bodily movement, facial expressions, tone of voice and 
other observable information that are used in mirroring for inferring mental states 
of others, they will use mirroring rather than self-projection. Conversely, when 
parents wonder how their children are feeling when they are at school, when 
people gossip about others or when they try to predict the boss‘s mood at work 
before asking for promotion, they use the self-projection mechanism to do so. 
Therefore Waytz and Mitchell (2011) suggest that self-projection and mirroring 
are dissociable functions that operate in different contexts. At the neural level, the 
brain mirror neuron system has been found to be involved in mirroring for the 
simulation of mental states. Although mirror neurons were discovered first in 
primates (di Pellergino et al., 1992) and only later in humans (Iacoboni et al., 
1999), contemporary research provides evidence that observation of another‘s 
action elicits somatotopic activations in premotor cortex (Buccino et al., 2001), 
lateral prefrontal cortex (inferior frontal gyrus) or inferior parietal gyrus, but also 
in brain regions mediating pain (Singer et al., 2004), touch (Keysers et al., 2004) 
and facial expressions of emotions (Carr et al., 2003), including disgust (Wicker 
et al., 2003). Findings considering mirror properties of neurons in humans are 
mostly recorded using fMRI, however there is also evidence from single-cell 
recordings conducted on epileptic patients. Mukamel et al. (2010) observed 
activity in 21 patients from neurons located in the cingulated cortex, 
supplementary motor area and medial temporal cortex. The examination was 
limited to only these regions as the main focus of the clinical intervention was to 
identify seizure foci, and the mirror-neuron study was only an additional 
investigation. The experiment included observation, activity and control phases. 
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During the observation phase, participants were presented with short film clips of 
facial expressions (frowns and smiles) and films of hand actions with precision 
grips. During the action phase, participants were asked to perform the types of 
actions they had previously seen when prompted by the written words describing 
them (for example, ―smile‖, ―hand‖). The researchers found that activity in eleven 
neuronal cells increased during both observation and the execution of an action, 
and no significant change in activity occurred during viewing of the word 
describing these actions. This suggests that mirror neurons are not just purely 
visual neurons responding to the picture of an action or a word describing an 
action.  
Self-projection mechanism for mental states understanding has been associated 
with the brain‘s default mode network, which includes the medial prefrontal 
cortex, precuneus and posterior cingulated and lateral parietal cortex (Raichle et 
al., 2001). These regions have been shown to be involved in implementing the 
ability to imagine one‘s own mental states outside of one‘s current situation and 
also in the ability to imagine the mental states of others (Waytz and Mitchell, 
2011). Therefore, being able to reflect on the contents of one‘s own mind appears 
to be inseparable from the capacity to understand the minds of others. In the light 
of this theory, it appears plausible that synaesthetes who personify objects and 
linguistic sequences tend to misidentify their own emotional and mental states as 
belonging to objects and letters (Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, in press).   
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1.4.3  Anthropomorphism in social cognition 
 
Simulation theories assume that one has to imitate (mirror) mental states of 
another in order to understand them. Once a particular mental state has been 
recreated, it is projected on another and assigned to them as the other‘s own 
mental states. There are instances in which the projected emotions or beliefs are 
egocentrically biased by one‘s own non-corresponding mental states. This occurs 
when the person who tries to understand mental states of others fails to monitor 
their own genuine mental states and exclude them from the simulated, projected 
mental states. This happens, for example, in anthropomorphism - humans‘ 
tendency to attribute distinctively human traits (mental states, including 
intentions, feelings and/or physical appearance) to non-human agents (Guthrie, 
1993; Waytz, Cacioppo and Epley, 2010).  
Humans frequently anthropomorphise the entities surrounding them and this 
tendency appears to be much stronger in early childhood than in adulthood. For 
children, nearly all that surrounds them has consciousness - trees, clouds, animals, 
plants, rocks, the wind, the moon and other non-human things have human-like 
qualities (Piaget, 1929). Anthropomorphic processes have been suggested to be an 
early, developmental mechanisms reinforcing the development of theory of mind 
(Amin et al., 2011; Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, in press), and therefore animism 
could be considered as a basic psychological mechanism underlying social 
cognition (Sobczak, 2009).  
This mode of thought is still present later in life and occurs in metaphors, folk 
legends, myths and religion (Guthrie, 1993). Anthropomorphic attribution of 
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human-like characteristics is also found in many languages that have grammatical 
gender. For example in the Polish language, in which gender is assigned to all 
nouns, a moon has masculine grammatical gender and a cloud has a feminine 
grammatical gender. As noted earlier (Section 1.3), anthropomorphic thought is 
also utilised in design and human factors engineering, (Nass et al., 1997) and 
advertising (Ouwersloot and Tudorica, 2001; Delbaere, McQuarrie and Phillips, 
2011). This widespread anthropomorphic mode of thinking has been proposed to 
be a failure in the universal function of perception, namely in generating 
interpretations to perceived stimuli (Guthrie, 1993). Accordingly, 
anthropomorphic perception endows objects and events with life-like features, 
such as anger, anxiety or different social clues indicating danger, and is adaptive 
in the sense that it promotes the survival and reproductive prospects of the 
organism. Highlighting its adaptive role, Guthrie (1993) implies that over-
attribution of mental states to inanimate things and events is preferable to a more 
restricted attribution which may result in missing some social clues indicating 
danger.  
Empirical psychological investigations into anthropomorphism focus on the 
cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in anthropomorphism, and also on 
variety of factors that increase the tendency to anthropomorphise (Waytz, 
Cacioppo and Epley, 2010). There are three major factors increasing 
anthropomorphism. The first relates to the knowledge elicited by the agent. As 
young children initially develop a concept of the self and only later in 
development acquire more complex knowledge about different agents, they 
therefore exhibit an egocentric bias in reasoning when explaining less well-known 
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stimuli, which increases their propensity to anthropomorphise. The 
egocentric/homocentric knowledge is more easily accessible when the perceived 
stimulus morphologically resembles a human. People frequently attribute their 
own beliefs and desires to others that seem to be similar to them (Epley et al., 
2004). Considering that the self often serves as a pattern for reasoning about 
unfamiliar others, Waytz and colleges (2010) hypothesised that 
anthropomorphism is more likely to occur when perceiving unfamiliar agents. 
Social motivation is a second of the factors increasing anthropomorphism. 
Humans have a basic need to affiliate and create social connections with others. 
Lack of social connections and social isolation can be compensated by 
anthropomorphising animals, gadgets and religious agents (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, 
and Cacioppo, 2008). Effectance motivation, described as a need to understand, 
control and predict one‘s own environment has been proposed as a third 
determinant of anthropomorphism. This account considers anthropomorphism as a 
mechanism fullfilling the need to understand and control non-human agents in 
environment by endowing them with human-like qualities.  
The neural correlates of anthropomorphism have been examined in functional 
imaging studies using variations of stimuli. Brain function in response to 
anthropomorphism was tested using variations of classic Heider-Simmel 
animations (Castelli, Happe, Frith and Frith, 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happe and 
Frith, 2002; Tavares, Lawrence and Barnard, 2008), point-light walkers 
(Herberlain and Saxe, 2005) and also by asking participants to make dispositional 
attributions to objects (Harris and Fiske, 2009). Although brain activations 
between studies varied, in all of them anthropomorphic processes activated some 
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of the social brain regions, including PFC, TPJ, STS and temporal poles adjacent 
to the amygdale. Patients with Asperger‘s Syndrome had difficulties in giving 
anthropomorphic descriptions while watching animated shapes, and also did not 
show activations in brain areas involved in social cognition (Castelli, Frith, Happe 
and Frith, 2002) supporting the notion that anthropomorphism might be one of the 
mechanisms underlying mentalising. Similar deficits in anthropomorphism were 
observed in patients with bilateral amygdala damage (Herberlein and Adolphs, 
2004).   
 
1.4.4   Neural correlates for understanding self and others 
 
Social neuroscience seeks to investigate and understand in neural terms many 
social phenomena and their impact on our everyday behavior. The scope of this 
section, however, will be limited to reviewing the neural mechanisms underlying 
our ability to understand mental states, such as intentions, beliefs and desires, 
known in literature as mentalising (Frith and Frith, 2003), mind-reading (Baron-
Cohen, 1995) or theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978).  
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Figure1.2 Brain regions important in mentalising. Areas implicated in the understanding 
one‘s own mental states are marked in green. On the lateral surface, these include the 
inferior posterior gyrus (IPG), comprising Brodmann areas 39 and 40, and on the medial 
surface, the precuneus (PC), comprising of Brodmann area 7, the posterior cingulated 
gyrus (PCG), consisting of Brodmann areas 23, 31, and the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC) comprising of Brodmann areas 11, 12, 25, and also 10 and 32 (on the 
ventral surface). Areas implicated in the understanding mental states of others are marked 
in blue. On the lateral surface, these include the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), 
comprising Brodmann areas 39, 40, 22, superior temporal sulcus (STS), consisting of 
Brodmann area 22, and on the medial surface, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
(DMPFC), comprising Brodmann areas 8, 9, and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
consisting of Brodmann areas 11 and 12.   
 
Functional neuroimaging has indentified various brain regions involved in mental 
states understanding (see Fig. 1.2). Social brain regions involved in mentalising 
can be classified into two groups depending on whether agency is internally or 
externally attributed; that is, understanding oneself or others.  
The right parietal posterior areas, namely the inferior parietal gyros, posterior 
cingulate cortex, precuneus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex and dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex have been associated with implementing one‘s own mental 
states, which has been confirmed by studies on the neurophysiology of the self 
generated acts (Ruby and Decety, 2001; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Chaminade and 
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Decety, 2002), and studies on self reflection (Lombordo, 2010; Mitchell, Macrea, 
and Banaji, 2006). Studies on self generated acts frequently include schizophrenic 
patients experiencing passivity phenomena, in which they have the delusional 
belief that their thoughts and actions are not internally/self generated by them, but 
rather are under external control often attributed to aliens. In these patients, 
Spence et al. (1997) observed hyperactivation in the right inferior parietal cortex 
during execution of the joystick movement after hearing the sound. Similarly, in 
healthy individuals, the right inferior parietal cortex has been identified as a 
neural correlate of agency, allowing people to distinguish between self-generated 
actions and those produced by others, which was shown in Ruby and Decety, 
(2001) in a study where participants were asked to imagine that they were 
performing a given action (first-person perspective) or to imagine the 
experimenter was carried out that action. Being aware of not causing the action 
and assigning it to somebody else is linked with activation in the inferior parietal 
cortex (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Chaminade and Decety, 2002). The inferior 
parietal cortex is also implicated in bodily awareness, since lesions to this area 
frequently result in somatoparaphrenia (Berlucchi and Aglioti, 1997) or its 
stimulation may cause out of body experience (Blanke et al., 2002). TMS 
experiments confirm these findings. Uddin et al. (2006) showed that rTMS over 
the right IPL impairs the ability to discriminate self-faces from other-faces. The 
precuneus has been proposed to be a nodal structure for self-reference (Abu-Akel 
and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011) as it has functional connections with the inferior 
parietal lobule and medial prefrontal cortex. Additionally, the precuneus has been 
named a neural correlate of consciousness due to its high resting metabolic rate 
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). The precuneus, together with the posterior 
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cingulated cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, have been associated with 
explicit and implicit self-referential processing (Rameson, Satpute and Lieberman, 
2010). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex has also been found to be active during 
autobiographical memory encoding (for review, see Gilboa, 2004) and not during 
episodic memory encoding. Lieberman (2007) suggests that this DLPFC 
activation in response to autobiographical events may be linked with ones‘ own 
mental states and feelings experienced during the events. The VMPFC in studies 
on understanding mental states has been activated when subjects were thinking 
about similar others (Mitchel et al., 2006), as well as when judging one‘s owns 
traits (Kelley et al., 2002) or mentally triggered thoughts reflecting on one‘s own 
personality traits (Kjaer, et al., 2002).   
Brain regions that are found to be selectively active in understanding mental states 
of others include the superior temporal sulcus and orbitofrontal cortex (Abu-Akel 
and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). The orbitofrontal cortex has been linked with 
implementing affective mental states of others (Hynes et al., 2006; Kana et al., 
2009). The superior temporal sulcus has been reported to be involved in 
perception of eye gaze, mouth movement, and also goal-directed actions, such as 
grasping, tearing reaching and so on. Primate studies additionally showed that the 
superior temporal sulcus is sensitive to movements generated by others and not by 
themselves (Oram and Prett, 1994; Hietanen and Perrett, 1993).  
 
1.4.4.1 Cognitive and affective mental states 
 
Mentalising processes (self- and other-related) include cognitive and affective 
mental states. The ability to infer cognitive and affective mental states requires 
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cognitive understanding of the difference between another person's knowledge 
and that of the one‘s own, but to infer affective mental states requires in addition 
an emotional appreciation of another‘s emotional state. The processing  of 
cognitive mental states has been experimentally measured using cognitive theory 
of mind tasks, such as the false belief tasks, whereas to measure the processing of 
affective mental states researchers have used affective theory of mind tasks, such 
as irony or the faux pas task. Dorsal MPFC and DLPFC are brain areas involved 
in processing cognitive mentalising (Kalbe et al., 2010; Sommer et al., 2007). The 
brain regions that implement affective mentalising are PFC, vMPFC, OFC and 
ILFC (Hynes et al., 2006; Kipps and Hodges, 2006; Andreasen, Calage, and 
O‘Leary, 2008; Hooker, Verosky, Germinea, Knight, and D‘Esposito, 2008; 
Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, and Humphreys, 2005; Vogeley et al., 
2001). Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory (2011) pointed out that the listed areas for 
affective mental states processing have many anatomical connections with the 
amygdale, which itself is strongly involved in affective processing, whereas brain 
areas linked with cognitive processing do not have direct anatomical connections 
with the limbic brain areas involved in the processing of emotional states. 
 
1.4.4.2 How does the brain utilises mechanisms to distinguish between self 
and other mental states? 
 
It has been argued that the capacity to distinguish between self and other mental 
states is processed by the right fronto-parietal network (Decety and Sommerville, 
2003; Uddin et al., 2006; Uddin et al., 2007) that include right lateral prefrontal 
cortex, mirror neurons in inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and inferior frontal gyrus 
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(IFG). Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory (2011) proposed that this distinction is 
mediated by the ventral and dorsal attention systems. The first, the ventral system, 
consists of the right TPJ and right IFG and is involuntary involved in attentional 
reorientation in response to silent perceptual stimuli. The dorsal system is 
involuntary and includes bilaterally the intraparietal sulcus and the superior 
parietal lobe (BA5, 7), and also dorsal parts of frontal cortex (BA6 and 8). This 
system regulates goal-driven, top-down orientating attention. Both systems are 
functionally interactive – when the dorsal stream directs attention towards specific 
stimuli, the ventral stream filters signals and selects information. Anatomically, 
this interaction could occur through direct connections between the IPL and the 
precuneus (Lou et al., 2004) or/and through the middle frontal gyrus and the ACC, 
mediated via neural paths with the frontal eye field (dorsal system) and inferior 
frontal gyrus (ventral stream). Pointing towards the anatomical overlap (in TPJ 
and ACC) between mentalising and attentional systems, Abu-Akel and Shamy-
Tsoory (2011) emphasized that the TPJ as is involved in both attentional and 
mentalising processing and responds to self and other mental states, suggesting 
that the attention signals in this region might act as a switch between self and 
other mental states. Similarly, the authors suggested that the anterior parts of ACC 
could be involved in navigating attention towards self and other mental states due 
to its connections with ventral and dorsal attention networks and being implicated 
in directing attention to mental states. Studies of neurological and psychiatric 
patients suggested that the misattribution of one‘s own mental states to others 
could be one of the mechanisms explaining delusions in schizophrenia. Crespi and 
Badcock (2008) proposed that there is over-mentalising in schizophrenia, and this 
may result from a hyper-associative cognitive style, linked to oversensitivity in 
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mental states attributions. The oversensitivity for mentalising in psychotic patients 
does not necessarily result in superior mentalistic skills, but frequently leads to 
inaccurate understanding of social world, which is manifested in delusional 
thinking.    
1.4.5 Empathy 
 
Broadly, empathy denotes our capacity to share feelings of other people (Singer 
and Lamm, 2009; Ward, 2012). However, in order to distinguish empathy from 
mentalising and other related concepts, researchers constructed more precise 
definitions of empathy.  In 2004, Decety and Jackson proposed consisting of three 
parts model, in which all factors – affective sharing, emotion understanding and 
self-regulation interact with each other. Similarly, de Vignemont and Singer 
(2006) defined empathy as an affective state in a person that is isomorphic with 
observed or imagined affective state in another person, which require 
comprehension that the source of the affective state in oneself is in another 
(observed or imagined) person.  These definitions make it possible to distinguish 
between empathy and mentalising by putting an emphasis on the presence of an 
affective state that is shared with another; this does not occur in mentalising (as it 
only regards drawing inferences about other people affective and cognitive mental 
states, without sharing affective response). This separation of empathy and 
mentalising in understanding mental states is used in psychopathology as an 
explanatory framework for understanding neurodevelopmental disorders, 
including psychopathic disorder (Blair, 2005), autistic spectrum disorder (Crespi 
and Badcock, 2008), schizophrenia with passivity phenomena (Shur, Shamay-
Tsoory and Levkovitz, 2008) and Williams syndrome (Troisi, 2008: in Crespi and 
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Badcock, 2008), in which mentalising processes and empathy processes may be 
differently impaired (or not) within the same disorder.   
The supporting evidence from research demonstrates that people with autistic 
spectrum disorder and Williams syndrome have deficits in understanding mental 
states but not in empathy (Blair, 2005;  Crespi and Badcock, 2008; Shur, Shamay-
Tsoory and Levkovitz, 2008; Troisi, 2008:in Crespi and Badcock, 2008). The 
inverted pattern of mentalising and empathy skills occurs in psychopaths, who are 
excellent in mindreading, but at this same time unable to share emotions with 
others. Empathic skills differ not only among people with disorders, but also 
among the general population – people are not equally empathic toward each 
other. The individual differences in empathy can be measured with standard 
empathy questionnaires such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 
1980) or Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004).  
 
1.4.5.1 Theories explaining empathy 
 
Social psychologists attempt to explain mechanisms underlying empathy in terms 
of unconscious simulation (Ward, 2012). At the neural level this would be 
supported by mirror system for action which together with other brain areas 
(Iacoboni, 2009). Carr et al. (2003) conducted a functional neuroimaging study, in 
which participants were asked to observe emotional facial expressions and imitate 
them. Authors found increased activation in the premotor cortex (part of mirror 
system) when participants were imitating facial expressions, and also in the 
amygdala and insula. On basis of that they hypothesised that imitation processes 
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activate representations that are shared by the self and other and then this 
information is transmitted to other parts of limbic system via insula. Ward (2012) 
argues that the action-to emotion model proposed by Carr et al. (2003) and 
Iacoboni (2009) is an over-simplification, as the concept of empathy is much 
broader than only imitation. This line of argument is also presented by Frederique 
de Vignemont and Tania Singer (2006) who argue that simulation of emotions in 
empathy does not require the mirror motor system activation, and can be 
explained within the general simulation approach (Ward, 2012).   Singer et al. 
(2004) tested subjects in an fMRI scanner as  they had a painful stimulation 
applied with an electrode or when they were watching an electric shock being 
applied  to their loved-ones. The authors found activations in the anterior 
cingulated cortex, bilateral insula, brainstem and cerebellum, but they did not find 
activations in the mirror system for actions. Consequently, the authors argued that 
the mirror motor system is not necessary for sharing emotions in empathy. 
Instead, empathy could rely on the emotional network shared between self and 
other independently of the classic mirror motor system (de Vignemont and Singer, 
2006). Furthermore, they proposed that neural responses to empathy are 
modulated by appraisal processes and also by information about emotional stimuli 
and their context as well as by one‘s empathy skills, and the relationship between 
empathizer and the target. Studies conducted by Bourgeois and Hess (2008), and 
van Baaren et al. (2009) provided empirical evidence that empathy is context-
sensitive and depends on the type of the relationship between the empathiser and 
the target. Although the initial studies on shared neural circuits between self and 
other in the domain of empathy identified overlapping neural activations between 
self and other only in the affective component of pain (for review see Singer and 
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Lamm, 2009), the latter investigations provided evidence that brain areas 
associated with somatosensory processing also activates while observing 
another‘s person pain, especially in situations where one‘s attention is explicitly 
directed on somatosensory aspects of the pain (Lamm et al., 2007). The primary 
somatosensory cortex displayed increased activation when subjects were 
observing another person being pierced on their hand, which overlapped with 
primary somatosensory representations for touch of the hand in scanned 
participants. Also secondary somatosensory cortex (Jackson et al., 2006; Singer et 
al., 2006) activations were shared for self/other pain. The bulk of research 
investigating shared neural circuits between self and other in domain of empathy 
has focussed on empathy for pain, but also some studies examined shared 
networks in the domains of taste and smell showing shared neural representations 
for the experience of disgust and the observation of disgust in the anterior parts of 
insular cortex together with the frontal opercular taste cortex (Wicker et al., 2003). 
This same pattern of activation was observed when subjects were looking at the 
facial expressions displaying disgust (Jabbi et al., 2007), suggesting that these 
brain regions may be involved in translation of observed facial expressions into 
visceral states when self-simulating these expressions (Critchley et al., 2005), 
making them accessible for understanding emotional states observed in others 
(Keysers and Gazzola, 2007).   
In conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests that the shared neural activations 
constitute a mechanism implementing empathic feelings and sensations, however 
additional research is needed to establish what aspect of empathy is actually 
shared - affective, somatosensory, or both.  
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1.4.6   Summary 
 
This chapter provided a general overview of current state of knowledge on 
understanding the contents of minds of others. Two main theoretical approaches – 
theory theories and simulation theories have been discussed, together with the 
neural underpinnings of ‗social brain‘ and empathy. Reviewed studies on 
anthropomorphism show that people attribute mental lives not only to other 
humans, but also to non-human entities, providing evidence of shared ‗social 
brain‘ activations for anthropomorphism and general social cognition. Mirroring 
and self-projection are mechanisms proposed within the simulation theory 
framework suggested for mentalising with and without behavioural, perceptual 
cues about inferred mental states. Humans have the capacity not only to infer 
affective and cognitive contents of one another‘s minds, but also the capacity to 
share affective responses with others. Empathy and mentalising appear to be 
interconnected, since the observed imbalance between the level of empathic and 
mentalising skills is frequently present in such psychopathological disorders as 
psychopathic disorder or Williams‘ syndrome. Contemporary neuroimaging 
research on mentalising attempts to explain empathy using the simulation 
approach, suggesting that empathy could be explained in terms of unconscious 
simulation in brain mirror system or shared neural activations in somatosensory 
and/or affective component of empathy.   
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1.5 Motivation for the research in this thesis  
 
Sequence-personality synaesthesia is a special case of synaesthesia, in which 
concurrents do not belong to the cognitive perceptual systems (for example, 
visual, auditory, etc) but rather are related to the social cognition system by which 
we get to know other people‘s personality traits, mental states, intentions, attitudes 
and feelings.  
 
This work investigates the attribution of agency and mental states and other 
human-specific qualities to linguistic sequences and inanimate objects in 
sequence-personality synaesthesia. The phenomenon of attributing agency to 
inanimate things captured the interest of such prominent figures as Jean Piaget 
(1929) and Mary Calkins (1895), but has received limited attention since. Recent 
empirical investigations into personification in synaesthesia (Simner and 
Holenstein, 2007; Smilek, 2007; Amin et al., 2011) provided compelling evidence 
for its consistency over time and automaticity in experienced inducer-concurrent 
pairings, suggesting that personification can be considered as a type of 
synaesthesia.    
 
The broad aim of this thesis is to provide a more detailed account for the 
phenomenology of personification, its underlying neural and cognitive 
mechanisms. First, a systematic study of the frequency of various categories of 
inducers and concurrents in synaesthetic personification will be carried out based 
on synaesthetes‘ self-reports. The categories of inducers considered will include 
weekdays and months of the year in addition to graphemes, whereas categories of 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
55 
 
concurrents will include gender, personality traits and moods, human-like 
appearance, social role and relationships. Additionally, functional neuroimaging 
studies will be carried out to establish the neural correlates of grapheme 
personification and inanimate object personification. For inanimate object 
personification, the investigation will also include a behavioural study, utilising a 
variation of the Stroop paradigm, which will examine the automaticity of this 
phenomenon. In the final study, the relationship between personification, social 
cognitive abilities (including empathy and mentalising) as well as loneliness will 
be examined in synaesthetes.  
 
There are a number of issues that need to be addressed in order to better 
understand this phenomenon. First of all, it is necessary to establish how frequent 
social and affective descriptions of graphemes and inanimate objects are among 
personifiers. From the case studies described in the literature (Simner and 
Holenstein, 2007; Smilek et al., 2007) it cannot be determined. The only study 
that examined the frequency of synaesthetic concurrents in personification (Amin 
et al., 2011) focussed only on gender and personality attribution and did not 
include other attributed characteristics such as moods, appearance, social roles 
and relationships.    
 
Accordingly, the aim of the first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) is to establish how 
common various categories of concurrents among synaesthetes are. For this 
purpose, a modified version of the semi-structured questionnaire designed by 
Amin et al (2011) will be used. The modified version includes more categories of 
concurrents (personality traits and moods, appearance, social role and 
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relationship), and an extended number of categories of inducers - weekdays, 
months and various subcategories of inanimate objects are now included.   
The benefits of collecting and analysing subjective reports provided by 
synaesthetes lie in acquiring better understanding of the complex picture of 
synaesthetic personification, which in turn is helpful in framing appropriate 
research questions about the processes underlying it in the following studies.     
 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) examines the functional neuroanatomy 
of grapheme personification. To date, the findings of the only published case 
study exploring neural correlates of this particular phenomenon showed that self-
referential processes are likely to be involved in personification. In view of the 
fact that there may be links between synaesthetic personification and general 
social cognition, it is hypothetised in this chapter that personification in 
synaesthesia shares functional neuroanatomy with general social cognitive 
processes, specifically mentalising processes when other people are absent 
(namely, a self-projection mechanism; Waytz and Mitchell, 2011). 
 
Based on the review of literature of studies on mentalising processes, Waytz and 
Mitchell (2011) suggested that self-projection for mentalising is linked with the 
following brain areas: the precuneus, lateral parietal cortex, the posterior 
cingulated cortex, the superior temporal sulcus, the temporo-parietal junction and 
medial prefrontal cortex. Given that synaesthetes frequently report that intensities 
of grapheme personification differ for various letters and numbers, an additional 
aim of Chapter 3 is to establish whether these subjectively perceived differences 
are correlated with the changes in strength of the activation in the precuneus, as 
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hypothetised by Amin et al (2011). The investigations carried out in Chapter 3 
will make it possible to determine whether the precuneus activation observed in 
AA in that study for synaesthetic grapheme-gender pairings is specific only to that 
particular synaesthete or is true for other synaesthetes. Furthermore, the findings 
could provide additional evidence for the not fully voluntary character of 
personification  and the reality of synaesthetic experience in  personification, if 
the observed neural changes reflect the human-like aspects  of concurrents by 
engaging regions from the ‗social brain‘, even when synaesthetes are engaged in 
an unrelated task. 
 
The issue of voluntary versus involuntary control is the focus of Chapter 4. The 
current synaesthesia literature provides only limited evidence that synaesthetic 
personification of inanimate objects is involuntary, from the case study of TE 
(Smilek et al., 2007). Accordingly, the purpose of the study in Chapter 4 is to seek 
evidence for the automaticity of synaesthetic personification of inanimate objects. 
This is important in two ways: Firstly, establishing the involuntary character of 
object personification in synaesthesia will provide empirical evidence that objects 
personification fulfils the automaticity criterion for possible inclusion of this 
phenomenon into the spectrum of synaesthesia. Secondly, comparison of these 
processes in synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic personification will enable to 
determine whether the same mechanisms underlie non-synaesthetic 
personification.    
 
Chapter 5 utilises a similar methodology to that used in Chapter 3. It aims to 
examine the neural correlates of inanimate object personification. It is 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
58 
 
hypothetised that neural mechanisms involved in personification of inanimate 
objects in synaesthesia overlap with those involved in general social cognition. 
However, the study in Chapter 5 additionally tests a group of non-synaesthetes, 
since personification of objects also occurs in the general population albeit in a 
milder form. This study aims to examine whether the neural correlates of 
synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic personification of inanimate objects are similar. 
It is hypothetised that social brain regions will be activated even when 
synaesthetes are naïve to the real purpose of the study and are engaged in an 
unrelated task. It is expected that, under the same set of conditions, there will be 
no activations in regions involved in social cognition in the control group. 
However, it is expected that in the second phase of the study (when all 
participants are asked to focus their attention on the mental contents of ‗lonely 
objects‘, the brain responses in both groups will include activations in social brain 
areas, but they will be greater and more extensive in synaesthetes. The importance 
of the findings about neural correlates of synaesthetic personification can provide 
new insights into the functional organisation of the neural mechanisms underlying 
social cognition and help us to determine whether mechanisms underlying 
personification are common to all of us or are specific to synaesthetes. 
 
The last study in this thesis (Chapter 6) will complement the previous analysis of 
neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying synaesthetic personification by 
examining the relationship between seeing graphemes or inanimate objects as 
endowed with mental lives and empathic and mentalising abilities of synaesthetes. 
This will be examined using the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004) and the Mind in the Eyes Test (Eyes Test; Baron-Cohen et 
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al., 2001). Mentalising abilities have not been yet studied in personifying 
synaesthetes and initial investigations of empathic abilities in personifiers did not 
provide a definite answer whether synaesthetes exhibit heightened empathy 
(Amin et al., 2011). Based on the finding that synaesthesia is associated with 
enhanced sensory processing in modalities of the concurrent (Bannisy et al., 
2009), it is hypothetised that synaesthetes will show increased empathic and 
mentalising abilities compared to the general population. Additionally, the study 
in the Chapter 6 examines the possibility of increased loneliness in personifiers; 
this hypothesis stems from the observation that enhanced loneliness is associated 
with a tendency to see non-human entities as living agents co-occurs in the 
general population (Epley et al., 2008). Examining aspects of social functioning in 
synaesthetes and environmental factors (e.g. loneliness and social withdrawal) 
may help to shed light on the developmental processes underlying synaesthesia 
and also provide new insights into the developmental social cognition.   
 
In sum, the research in this thesis will primarily enhance the understanding of 
synaesthetic personification and its cognitive and neural basis and investigate any 
relationship between personification and such psychological dispositions as 
empathy, mentalising and loneliness.  Knowledge about the functional anatomy of 
personification may help to shed light not only on processes engaged in decoding 
and encoding mental states, but additionally on clinical conditions, such as 
schizophrenia or autistic spectrum disorder, in which mentalising appears to be 
crucial to the core clinical symptoms. It is hoped that greater understanding of the 
symptoms in these clinical conditions will improve the quality of care and 
treatment.
Chapter 2    Phenomenology of synaesthetic personification 
60 
 
CHAPTER 2   Phenomenology of synaesthetic 
personification 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The first psychological investigations into personification in synaesthesia were 
mostly explorative and descriptive, aiming to provide a greater understanding of 
synaesthetic personification and to discover common features in sequence-
personality synaesthesia (Calkins, 1893; Flournoy, 1893).  
Calkins (1893) noticed that different linguistic sequences are personified with 
different frequency. She established that personality traits were two times more 
frequently attributed to numbers than to letters. Additionally, Calkins pointed out 
that synaesthetes have affective attitudes towards numbers: they tend to like more 
easily divisible numbers rather than prime numbers. A contemporary of Calkins, 
Flournoy (1893), also highlights that the subjective experience of synaesthetes 
may influence their likes and dislikes of particular letters and numbers, suggesting 
that the biographical experiences of synaesthetes can influence the 
personifications
4
.  
Flournoy‘s descriptions of the phenomenology of personification in synaesthesia 
included several types of inducers. The author provided descriptions of a few 
synaesthetes who personified graphemes, weekdays and inanimate objects.  
                                                          
4 I am grateful to Lucille Lecoutre for translating from French into English Chapter VII from Flournoy‘s Des 
Phenomenes de Synopsie   
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Flournoy (1893) provided also interesting observations regarding concurrents in 
synaesthetic personification. Specifically, he noticed that qualities attributed to 
inanimate objects are not limited to genders and personalities, but also include 
aspects of human-like appearance. For example, to J.A., a 53 year old female 
synaesthete, flowers had facial expressions of babies. In a similar way as with 
objects, linguistic sequences were also were endowed with appearances 
resembling people. Flournoy (1893) mentioned a 21 year old, male synaesthete, to 
whom many letters and numbers have human-like bodies and faces and a 10 year 
old girl who thought of Saturday as a man dressed in red, Friday as a woman 
dressed in blue, Thursday as a man dressed like a Scotsman and so on.   
Another interesting aspect of the concurring experience in sequence-personality 
synaesthesia mentioned by Flournoy indicated that some personalities of 
graphemes may shift focus from one negative trait to another over time. He 
illustrated this with an example of synaesthete who as a child thought of number 7 
as a mean man, whereas once she grew up, the perceived personality of this 
number changed and 7 became an immoral man with a dissolute lifestyle.  This 
may represent maturation processing with numbers acquiring more subtle 
descriptions, appropriate for an adult understanding of social norms.  
Flournoy (1893) also suggested that personalities attributed to graphemes may be 
influenced by their shape. In his book, he describes a 16 year old synaesthete who 
classified personalities of graphemes according to their shapes (for example,  to 
him G, D, and B were heavy, obese and dull letters, N, C, I, F, 1, 3, and 7 were 
elegant, whereas H, Z, M, R, 2, 5, and 8 were solemn and sombre).   
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More recently, Amin et al (2011) carried out a study exploring characteristics of 
personification in synaesthesia. They e-mailed semi-structured questionnaires to 
81 synaesthetes from a synaesthesia database who reported personification of 
graphemes. The responses were collected from 34 synaesthetes who replied and 
completed the questionnaires. The questionnaire had three major sections – in the 
first of them subjects were asked to describe genders and personality traits they 
experienced for letters and numbers and in the second they were requested to 
provide answers about the general characteristics of personification in 
synaesthesia, such as the circumstances under which personification occurs, its 
frequency, age of onset, and whether or not personification occurs for letters in 
different languages. The third section consisted of questions on the personification 
of inanimate objects and related forms of synaesthesia including mirror-touch 
synaesthesia.  
In their study Amin et al (2011) found that synaesthetes report personification not 
only for linguistic constructs such as letters and numerals, but also for inanimate 
objects, such as household objects, fruit and vegetables and other objects. Letters 
and numbers were personified with similar frequency. Nearly all of the 
synaesthetes reported the onset of personification in childhood (between as early 
as they can remember and seven years old) and experience it on a daily basis. 
Graphemes are personified the most frequently when they are imagined, thought 
of or seen (in more than eighty percent of subjects), and a little less frequently 
when they are heard (seventy percent of subjects).   
Most of the tested synaesthetes noticed that certain aspects of graphemes 
influence the genders and personality traits attributed to graphemes. Among them, 
Chapter 2    Phenomenology of synaesthetic personification 
63 
 
a determinant of gender or personality most often was listed the synaesthetic 
colour of a letter or a number. Less frequently participants thought that the shape, 
sound or number parity influenced gender or personality trait attributions to 
graphemes. Synaesthetes also reported experiencing personification in foreign 
languages they spoke.  
The study conducted by Amin et al. (2011) is to date the only systematic group 
study that used a semi-structured questionnaire to explore in detail the 
phenomenology of personification in synaesthesia.   
 
2.2 Aim of the study 
 
The present study aims to verify previously published results on characteristics of 
personification in synaesthesia (Amin et al., 2011) and also to explore further the 
phenomenology of personification in synaesthesia.  
To date, the study of Amin et al (2011) provides the only detailed account on the 
characteristics of personification in synaesthesia. In the study described in this 
work some of their questionnaire items are replicated, but the scope of 
investigation is extended by including additional sets of inducers (days of the 
week, months of the year, objects categories) and additional categories of 
concurrents include, such as personality traits, moods, human-like appearances, 
social roles and relationships. Therefore, the current study investigates a wider 
range of inducers than Amin et al (2011). Additionally, more concurrent 
categories are included in the scope of research of the current study  In the 
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previous investigation of Amin et al (2011), these were limited to two main 
categories only – gender and personality.  
The study is motivated by the fact that, in the recent synaesthesia literature 
descriptions of personification of weekdays, months and objects are mentioned, 
but systematic investigation of those categories of inducers has yet not been 
carried out. Moreover, in further stages of this work, the neural correlates of 
synaesthetic gender, as well as personification of objects will be explored; 
therefore it is important to gain a detailed account of these phenomena.  
 
2.3 Participants 
 
27 participants were recruited Sean Day‘s The Synesthesia List, an internet based 
Google group for synaesthetes and synaesthesia researchers, from the 
Synaesthesia Database and also via advertisements on the Brunel University 
Campus and Royal Holloway Campus. Among the participants were 23 women 
and 4 men. Twenty-four subjects were native English speakers; two were Italian 
speakers and one was a native Japanese speaker. All participants not only 
personified graphemes, but also experienced coloured graphemes synaesthesia.   
Participants gave a written consent. Subjects volunteered in the study and were 
not paid for their time.  
 
2.4 Procedure 
 
The structured questionnaire on sequence-personality synaesthesia was emailed to 
all synaesthetes who contacted us reporting experiencing this type of synaesthesia. 
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The questionnaire was emailed (posted) in two parts: one investigated 
personification of graphemes and inanimate objects and the second part explored 
phenomenology of month and weekday personification.  
Completed questionnaires were returned by 27 participants by post or via e-mail. 
In the questionnaire subjects were asked to describe personified letters, numbers, 
objects, weekdays and months. They were also asked how frequently they 
experience personification, what influences pairings inducer-concurrent, whether 
attributed personalities change over the time and depend on the mood of 
personifying synaesthete. For more details on the questions asked see 
questionnaire in Appendix.   
 
2.5 Results  
 
2.5.1 What gets personified?  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Frequency of gender or personality attribution to different sequences and 
objects 
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All subjects who completed the questionnaire also experience grapheme-colour 
synaesthesia. All of them attributed personality and/or gender to numbers and 
71% attributed personality and/or gender to letters. Gender or personality was 
attributed to days of the week by 74% of synaesthetes, and to months of the year 
by 67%. About half of synaesthetes (52%) personified objects (see Figure 2.1). 
Individual participants also mentioned personification of violin strings, colours, 
spatial concepts (left-right) and musical notes.  
 
2.5.1.1 Grapheme personification 
 
Synaesthetes were asked to describe the personal characteristics and gender of 
graphemes. Personality description was divided into following subcategories: 
personality traits and moods, appearance, social role and relationships. 
Synaesthetes were also required to indicate whether or not they liked or disliked 
particular graphemes.  
52% of synaesthetes reported that they attribute both personality and gender to 
graphemes. Only gender but not personality was attributed to letters and numbers 
by 3%. None of tested subjects reported experiencing only personality in response 
to letters and numbers. However, out of the participants who attributed gender 
only, letters and numbers were personified similarly frequently as inducers, as 
shown in Table 2.1, whereas, of those participants who attributed personality 
only, numbers were the inducer in all cases. 
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Table 2.1 Type of personification and class of stimuli 
 
  Letters Numbers Both 
Personality + Gender 14 (52%) 22 (78%) 14 (52%) 
Gender 4 (14%) 3 (11%) 1 (3%) 
Personality 0 (0%) 3 (11%) 0 (0%) 
 
The description of subcategories of personality (see Table 2.2) shows that among 
synaesthetes who declared experiencing personality for graphemes, all of them 
think of letters and numbers as having personality traits. They also very frequently 
attribute to graphemes social roles and relationship (78% to letters; 68% to 
numbers). For 64% of synaesthetes letters have some sort of human-like 
appearance. In case of numbers, human-like appearance is attributed to them by 
54% of the synaesthetes.   
Table 2.2 Subcategories of synaesthetic personality for letters (N= 14 synaesthetes) and 
numbers (N=25 synaesthetes) 
 Personality Traits  
& Moods 
Appearance Social Role  
& Relationship 
Letters 14 (100%) 9 (64%) 11 (78%) 
Number 25 (100%) 14 (56%) 17 (68%) 
 
Descriptions of concurrents provided by synaesthetes were frequently very 
detailed and elaborate. The personality traits and moods of graphemes reported 
by individual synaesthetes included not only personality traits (―introversive‖, 
―shy‖, ―optimistic‖, ―sociable‖, ―sensitive‖, ―hyperactive‖), but also cognitive 
abilities (―smart‖, ―intelligent‖, ―great at planning and getting the job done‖), 
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moods (―apathetic‖, ―sad‖, ―rather jolly‖, ―happy‖), attitudes (―helpful‖, ―pushy‖, 
―bullying‖, ―arrogant‖, ―optimistic‖), and references to specific mental states 
(―stressed‖, ―knows when to stop or say no‖, ―likes to be a centre of attention‖, 
―thinks a lot about himself‖).  
Human-like appearance of graphemes was reported by synaesthetes in terms of 
age (old woman, a child), height (tall, short), race (African decent, black woman, 
―Moroccan or Indian‖), facial features (blue eyes, grey-eyed, has a beard, wear 
glasses), hair (blond), body-build (chubby, slender, athletic), clothes (wears blue 
jackets, wears suit, jeans and shirt),   
Social roles attributed to graphemes included work-related descriptions  
( ―secretary‖, ―and technical field ‖,― professor ‖,― teacher‖) and also education-
related descriptions (―undergraduate‖, ―someone who just finished studies‖), 
whereas perceived relationships between graphemes were described in terms of 
attitudes towards each other (―others like him‖, ―others rather frighten by her‖, 
―not very liked by others‖, ―gives good advice to others‖), the relation of power 
and leadership between them (―the others let him lead without objection‖, ―good 
leader‖, ―led by N‖), and also familial and non-familial relationships (―A‘s child‖, 
―I‘s girlfriend‖, ―mother to all numbers‖).  
 
2.5.1.2 Weekdays and months 
 
74% of all synaesthetes who personify graphemes reported gender or personality 
for days of the week and 67% for months of the year. Almost all of these (94%) 
reported experiencing genders for days and months, whereas personality traits for 
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months and weekdays were reported by 70% and 65%, respectively, as shown in 
Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3 The frequency of gender and personality attribution for weekdays and months 
 Gender Personality 
Months 16 (94%) 12 (70%) 
Weekdays 16 (94%) 11 (65%) 
 
Among the group of synaesthetes who personify weekdays and months, the 
majority of personifiers were English native speakers and two of the synaesthetes 
were Italian. English does not have grammatical gender, but Italian has masculine 
and feminine gender for nouns; genders of days and months are all masculine. The 
comparison of synaesthetic and grammatical genders shown that synaesthetic and 
grammatical genders for months and weekdays are in some cases incongruent (see 
Table 2.4).  
 
Table 2.4 The frequency of synaesthetic gender congruent with grammatical gender 
for months and weekdays. 
 Gender Congruent with 
Grammatical Gender for 
Days (N=7) 
Gender Congruent with 
Grammatical Gender For 
Months (N=12) 
Synaesthete 1 3 (43%) 6 (50%) 
Synaesthete 2 4 (57%) 10 (83%) 
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2.5.1.3 Inanimate objects 
 
Figure 2.2 Types of concurrents attributed to inanimate objects 
 
52% of all synaesthetes who personify graphemes also personify objects. All of 
them thought that objects have personalities, 93% attributed genders to objects. 
86% of synaesthetes perceived inanimate objects as having personalities and 78% 
ascribed attitudes to them, as shown in the Figure 2.2. 
Table 2.5 Categories of objects eliciting synaesthesia 
Object category N=14 
Personal objects (including toys) 13 (92%) 
Body parts 10 (71%) 
Clothes 8 (57%) 
Vehicles 7 (50%) 
Furniture 10 (71%) 
Tools  6 (43%) 
Buildings 7 (50%) 
Plants 10 (71%) 
Food 4 (28%) 
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Natural objects 11 (78%) 
Simple shapes 10 (71%) 
 
The comparison of different categories of objects within this subgroup (see Table 
2.5) shows that most of the synaesthetes (92%) personify personal objects, such as 
mobile phone, toys, pen, door key, paint brush, violin and so on. More than three 
quarters of synaesthetes who personify objects, thought of natural objects (e.g., 
rocks, sea) as having personalities, feelings or genders. For 71% of personifiers 
plants (trees, herb plants, flowers), furniture (e.g, armchair, chair, bed), body parts 
(e.g., hands, fingers, teeth, feet) and also simple shapes (e.g., triangle, square, 
circle) were inducing synaesthetic personification. 57% of synaesthetes 
personified clothes. Among personified clothing items were scarf, trousers, t-shirt. 
Vehicles (e.g., car, bike, truck) and buildings (e.g., house, university, library) 
were personified by 50% of synaesthetes, whereas buildings and vehicles were 
perceived as having gender or personality by half of the synaesthetes within this 
subgroup. Tools, such as cake mixer, scissors and vacuum cleaners were 
personified by 43% of all synaesthetes personifying inanimate objects. One of the 
synaesthetes described personification of vacuum cleaners as follow: 
“I have a family of three vacuum cleaners. One is called Toby. He 
has somewhat portly character, very helpful but is forever falling 
over and bumping into things, so he is a bit accident prone. He can 
also, like both the other cleaners be prone to sudden vicious 
attacks on me. This is always from the hose to attachments which 
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have a mind on their own, they trip me up, turn round and hit me 
and can be generally nasty and I get very cross!” 
 
Food was the least personified category of inanimate objects; only 28% of 
synaesthetes thought of food (e.g., broccoli, onion, carrots) as having personalities 
and/or genders.  
Synaesthetes were asked to indicate whether they associate more or less 
frequently personalities and genders with familiar objects. 71% of all synaesthetes 
who personify objects reported genders and personalities for more familiar rather 
than unfamiliar objects. The remaining 29% of synaesthetes indicated that the 
familiarity of the object does not impact their personification – they personify 
familiar and unfamiliar objects with similarly frequency.  
 
2.5.2 When does personification occur? 
 
All of the synaesthetes tested experienced personification of graphemes from 
childhood. A majority of them (59%) personified graphemes from a very early 
age, as long as they can remember (less than 5 years old).  A further 26% reported 
experiencing synaesthetic personification from between the ages of 5 – 8 years, 
and 15% from when they were between 9 and 11 years old. For the majority of 
synaesthetes (74%), the personalities of letters and numbers have not changed 
over time, but for some (26%), the personalities of graphemes became more 
complex and more mature.  
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The vast majority of tested synaesthetes stated that they experience 
personification on a daily basis (85%).  The remaining 15% personify letters and 
numbers sometimes, usually when they think about letters or numbers or when 
doing calculations.  
For the majority of synaesthetes (67%) the strength of synaesthetic association of 
personification has remained unchanged during their lifetime, for 22% the 
experience of grapheme personification increased, whereas for 11% has 
decreased.  
All of synaesthetes reported experiencing personification when graphemes are 
presented visually, 96% of participants personified when thinking about 
graphemes (see Table 2.6).  74% of synaesthetes were likely to experience 
personification when they hear a grapheme. 56% experienced gender or 
personality for letters when they are presented with a word, and 70% when seeing 
multi-digit numerals.   
Table 2.6 Overview of conditions under which synaesthetes personify graphemes 
N=27 Strongly 
Agree 
Moderately  
or Mildly 
 Agree 
Moderately  
or Mildly 
 Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
When I see a (single 
digit) number/letter 
19 (70%) 8 (30%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
When I hear a (single 
digit) number/letter 
8 (30%) 12 (44%) 5 (19%) 2 (7%) 
When I think about 
particular number/letter 
23 (85%) 3 (11%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
When I see a word 7 (26%) 8 (30%) 7 (26%) 5 (18%) 
When I see a multi-digit 
number 
5 (18%) 14 (52%) 4 (15%) 4 (15%) 
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Synaesthetes answering an open ended question asking about regularities that in 
their opinion influence personalities or genders of graphemes listed shape (41%), 
font size (18%), biographical experience (15%), colour (4%) and also whether or 
not number was odd or even (4%) as factors that can influence personalities of 
letters or numbers (see Table 2.7) 
Table 2.7 Characteristics influencing synaesthetic personification 
Qualities influencing personification (self-reported) Number  
of synaesthetes 
Colour 1 (4%) 
Shape or form of grapheme (e.g., roundedness, angularity) 11 (41%) 
Biographical experience (e.g., friend‘s name/date of birth ) 4 (15%) 
For numbers, whether they are odd or even 1 (4%) 
Font case (capital versus lower letters) 5 (18%) 
 
Individual synaesthetes reported that shape influenced the personality and gender 
of given grapheme describing it as follows: ―If a number that doesn't have a 
definite gender is written fancy or in a ‗girly‘ font, it might take a form of a girl, 
or if it is in big bold masculine font it might take a form of a boy‖, ―more rounded 
numbers are more likely to be female‖, ―different personalities for handwriting‖, 
―personalities change slightly when with different fonts‖.  
Biographical experience that was also listed by synaesthetes as a factor having 
impact on personalities and genders of graphemes was expressed in following 
statements: ―My birthday is on the second of August, so I came to love 8 and 2. 8 
has similar personality to mine‖, ―genders and personality traits are associated 
with most common first names‖.  
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One of the tested synaesthetes suggested that colour influences the personalities 
attributed to graphemes reporting: ―If they are written in different colour, I will 
associate the personality of the colour to the personality of the letter. If, for 
example A is written in yellow, it will be happier.‖ 
Another tested participant noticed that the knowledge of the mathematical rules 
also has impact on personality traits attributed to numbers: ―Even numbers have 
receptive personalities because they can be divided by 2, whereas odd numbers 
are self-centered and independent.‖ 
 
2.6 Discussion 
 
The aim of the current study was to explore the phenomenology of personification 
in synaesthesia, including personification of graphemes, days of the week, months 
and objects. To date, there was only one group study that systematically examined 
characteristics of personification among synaesthetes (Amin et al. 2011), but it 
was limited to personification of graphemes and objects only.  
The semi-structured questionnaire used in this study included many of the items 
previously included in the study by Amin et al (2011), but also comprised 
additional items investigating categories of concurrents attributed to graphemes. 
In the questionnaire linguistic sequences as graphemes, days and months were 
explored. Non-linguistic inducers of personification, such as different categories 
of inanimate objects, were also investigated.   
The overall results show that most synaesthetes experience sequence-personality 
synaesthesia from childhood and on a daily basis. This is consistent with results of 
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the previous questionnaire by Amin et al (2011), and provides additional evidence 
for classifying sequence-personality as a congenital variant of synaesthesia.  
Furthermore, it was found that some linguistic inducers elicit personification more 
often and others less frequently: Synaesthetes with sequence-personality 
synaesthesia most frequently attribute gender or personality to numbers; nearly 
three quarters of them personifies weekdays and somewhat fewer attribute 
personality or gender to letters and months. Interestingly, the finding that numbers 
tend to be personified more frequently than any other linguistic sequences may be 
related to the fact that counting sequences are acquired early in life (usually earlier 
than the alphabet or months and days) and most children, when they are three 
years old, can count up to ten objects (Siegler, Deloache, and Eisenberg, 2003). 
Similar results were previously reported by Calkins (1893). She noticed that 
numbers are more frequently personified than letters, but in her study numbers 
were personified twice as frequently as letters, whereas in our sample this 
difference is much smaller.  
However, the results reported by Amin et al (2011) are inconsistent with these 
findings. In their study, the authors found that numbers and letters were 
personified with similar frequency. Additionally, there is also inconsistency 
regarding the proportion of synaesthetes who in addition to linguistic sequences 
also personified objects. In our sample, about half of the tested synaesthetes 
personified inanimate objects, whereas in the group studied by Amin et al. (2011), 
inanimate objects were personified by more than three quarters of all tested 
synaesthetes. 
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Further disparity between the results of the current study and Amin et al (2011) 
relates to the factors perceived by synaesthetes to influence personification. 
Colour of graphemes was reported to influence personalities the most frequently 
(Amin et al., 2011), whereas our study does not indicate that. Instead, shape of 
graphemes and autobiographical experiences appear to influence personalities 
more than colour, which is also in inconsistent with results reported by Amin et al 
(2011). Additionally, more synaesthetes tested by Amin et al (2011) than in our 
sample thought of numbers parity and sound of grapheme as shaping their 
personifications of graphemes.  
The differences in results described above may be related to the rather limited 
sample size (27 and 34 synaesthetes in each of the studies), therefore in future 
studies it would be necessary to conduct a larger scale investigation comparing the 
types of personification in synaesthesia and their frequencies.  
Analyses of various types of concurrents in synaesthetic personification show that 
gender and broadly-defined personalities were attributed equally frequently to 
numbers, whereas letters were more often perceived as having genders than 
personalities. Among synaesthetes who attributed personality to letters or 
numbers, all of them experienced graphemes as having personality traits and 
moods and about three quarters thought of letters and numbers as having social 
role, familial and non-familial, affective and power-based relationships between 
personified items within sequences. Additionally, more than half of the 
participants in the present study experienced graphemes as having human-like 
appearance, describing their age, facial features, body build, clothing and cultural 
origin. These social characteristics of graphemes have been previously mentioned 
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in single case studies (Flournoy, 1893; Simner & Holenstein, 2007; Smilek et al, 
2007), but this is first study to demonstrate this in a group of personifiers.  
Social descriptions of graphemes provided by synaesthetes are not only culturally 
dependent, but are also shaped by their personal experience. Personalities of 
graphemes may sometimes alter, depending on the mood of a synaesthete. 
Moreover, the descriptions of graphemes‘ personalities sometimes include 
autobiographical experiences of synaesthetes, such as having similar personality 
to their friends or themselves. This supports a claim that personification 
synaesthesia could result from the misattribution of self-referential processing 
(Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, in press), at least in some cases.  
The results obtained show that not only numbers and letters are frequently 
personified, but also weekdays and months. Among the personifiers tested here, 
nearly three quarters of them experienced the days of the week as having 
personality or gender. Most of them attributed gender to the weekdays and 
slightly less than three quarters thought of days as having personalities.  
A similar effect was observed among those synaesthetes who personified months: 
gender was attributed to months more often than personality. The higher 
frequency in attribution of gender than personality to days and months may be 
related to the fact that in many languages these sequences (and other nouns) have 
grammatical genders. Could it be the case that synaesthetic gender is only a 
linguistic construct similar to grammatical gender? In our study, we tested not 
only native English speakers, but also two Italian native speakers. Italian has 
grammatical genders for nouns, including weekdays and months. The Italian 
speakers tested attributed to days of the week and months both personality and 
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genders. Interestingly, their synaesthetic and grammatical genders differed in 
some cases. When asked about it in an interview, the tested synaesthetes 
explained that they know what the grammatical genders of days and months are, 
but at the same time, their synaesthetic gender is different, suggesting that the 
synaesthetic and grammatical genders of linguistic nouns are distinct phenomena 
that co-exist, even if their origin may be similar. For example, one of the tested 
Italian speakers noted that although Monday in Italian has a masculine gender, she 
‗experiences‘ it as a reflective, active and tidy woman. A similar disparity 
between grammatical and synaesthetic gender of some of the weekdays and 
months was observed in the second of tested Italian synaesthete. For example, she 
described the month of April as a proud woman and Sunday as a quiet girl. This 
phenomenon is analogous to ‗alien colour effect‘. Alien colour effect occurs when 
in response to names of colours synaesthetes experience colours that are different 
from those that they named (Gray et al. 2006). Considering that similar effect 
occurs in sequence-personality synaesthesia for gender when synaesthetic and 
linguistic genders of sequences are in conflict, this phenomenon could be named 
‗alien gender effect‘.    
Not only linguistic sequences are personified by synaesthetes, but also inanimate 
objects.  About half of all personifiers reported personification of objects, which is 
about one third less than found by Amin et al. (2011). Synaesthetes attributed not 
only personalities and genders to objects, but personified also feelings and 
attitudes. Some of descriptions of personification of inanimate objects resemble 
animistic thought present in an early childhood, in which objects and other entities 
are imbued with life and consciousness. Similarly as in the developmental variant 
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of personification (childhood animistic thought), in synaesthesia personified 
objects appear as alive, having not only distinctive personality traits but also 
attitudes, feelings and interactions with each other, as depicted in the description 
of the mushroom family (Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, in press) or the vacuum 
cleaners (Section 2.5.1.3).   
2.7. Conclusion 
 
In sum, the main conclusions are that: 
 Personification in synaesthesia includes a variety of different inducers, 
which for the vast majority are linguistic (graphemes, weekdays, months, 
seasons, musical notes), but also non-linguistic, such as body parts and 
inanimate objects. Out of all linguistic sequences, numbers are likely to be 
the most frequently personified which may be linked with the early age of 
number acquisition. However, this hypothesis requires further 
investigation, considering lack of consistency with previous group study 
investigating the frequency of personified sequences.   
 Co-occurring synaesthetic experiences include elaborate social and 
affective characteristics, such as personality traits, moods, human-like 
appearances, social roles and relationships. Concurrents are influenced not 
only by the physical qualities of graphemes but also by autobiographical 
experiences of synaesthetes. This means that the personality of a letter or 
number sometimes depends on the synaesthete‘s previous experiences. For 
example, they may think of the personality of particular letter as similar to 
someone‘s whose name starts with that particular letter. This implies that 
in synaesthetic personification social perceptions/concepts of the self and 
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others are (at least in some cases) attributed to graphemes, which provide 
support for the theoretical account explaining personification in 
synaesthesia as a result of misattribution of agency (Sobczak-Edmans and 
Sagiv, in press).    
 Genders are more frequently attributed to days and months than 
personalities, which may be associated with the fact that in many 
languages these sequences have grammatical gender. However, 
synaesthetic and grammatical genders sometimes may be in conflict 
(‗alien gender effect‘), which suggests that synaesthetic and grammatical 
genders of linguistic nouns are distinct phenomena.
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CHAPTER 3    Neural correlates of grapheme 
personification  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In sequence-personality synaesthesia, linguistic sequences such as letters, 
numbers, weekdays and months have not only synaesthetic colour, but also rich 
and elaborate social characteristics, such as genders and personality traits, 
professions and relationships between them. For a synaesthete who personifies 
letters, the letter ‗X‘ can be a young smart doctor, whereas ‗T‘ can be a 
conservative, 20 year old male student who looks up to ‗K‘ and ‗H‘ (for more 
examples see Table 3.1). Since these biographical and social characteristics of 
letters and numbers are just like the descriptions used in everyday life to depict 
other people, is it possible that there are interactions between the mechanisms 
invovled in processing graphemes and general social cognition mechanisms for 
understanding others? Could it be the case that in sequence-personality 
synaesthesia, representations of mental states can be activated not only when 
interacting with or thinking about humans but also when perceiving non-human 
concepts such as grapheme? This would certainly be consistent with the extended 
version of the cross-activation theory of synaesthesia (Hubbard, Brang, and 
Ramachandran, 2011). The aim of this chapter is to evaluate these suggestions by 
examining the functional neuroanatomy of sequence-personality synaesthesia. To 
date, there has been only one case study which examined neural correlates of 
gender attribution to letters (Amin et al., 2011). AA is a synaesthete for whom 
some of the letters in alphabet have genders and others do not. She does not 
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attribute personalities to letters, neither to numbers; therefore in the experimental 
design entailed a comparison of the responses to letters with gender and without 
gender. The synaesthetic gender of letters was irrelevant to the task (AA‘s task 
was to detect the presence of grapheme repetition) and it was therefore predicted 
that any changes in brain activation should result from automatic processing 
associated with synaesthetic personification. Increased activation in the precuneus 
was found when the participant viewed letters with genders. Based on this finding, 
Amin and her colleagues concluded that the precuneus activation in sequence-
personality personification may be associated with the mental imagery thought to 
underlie grapheme personification; they also hypothesised that this activation may 
be related to the projection of one‘s own feelings onto graphemes. 
 
Table 3.1 Example of letter inducer-concurrent associations in sequence-personality 
synaesthesia 
A f Serious, dominating, tall. Looks 
after B 
N f Tries to get along, middle age 
woman, M‘s wife 
B m Playful, childish, chubby, A‘s child O f Spiritual, in her twenties 
C f Playful, short, D‘s child  Q f Middle aged woman 
D k Serious, determined, tall, C‘s mother P m Tall, formally dressed, scientific and 
highly educated  
E m One of the boys, youthful, teen, F‘s 
brother 
R m Boring, middle aged 
F m Goal orientated, wears jeans and 
shirt, E‘s brother 
S m Party animal, in his twenties, disco 
DJ 
G m Charismatic and individual, wears 
suit from 70‘s 
T m Student, looks up to H and K, 20 
years old, conservative 
H m Teacher, knowledgeable, old U m Get‘s along with everyone, dancer 
I m L‘s boyfriend, loner V m Host, greater, in his 30‘s, neatly 
dressed 
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J m Cheerful, African decent, individual W m Funny old man, uses cratches to 
walk 
K - Wise old man, related to H X m Young doctor, smart 
L f More sociable than I. Girly, I‘s 
girlfriend 
Y f Diva 
M m Crowd pleaser, middle age man Z m Story teller 
 
 
Taking into account the extend of social and affective qualities of concurrents (see 
Chapter 2), in the current study we test a group of sequence-personality 
synaesthetes who endow graphemes not only with genders (as  in  AA‘s case), but 
often also personality, physical appearance, cognitive abilities, occupation, mental 
states, moods, attitudes, interests, inclinations, familial and non familial 
relationships, emotive and behavioural responses to other personified items 
(Simner and Holenstein, 2007; Amin et al., 2011; Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, in 
press). Comparison of social attributes to graphemes in the historical and 
contemporary literature and reports given by synaesthetes (for example, while 
describing the personality of ‗Monday‘, one of tested synaesthetes noted that it ‗is 
like a doctor I met in childhood‘) suggest that even though synaesthesia is 
congenital, autobiographical experiences can influence the social characteristics 
attributed to graphemes (Simner and Holenstein, 2007; Sobczak-Edmans and 
Sagiv, in press). The social and autobiographical specificity of the features 
attributed to letters and numbers imply a possible functional overlap between the 
cognitive streams involved in the perception of graphemes and in processing 
information concerning other people.  
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To understand the mental states of others, people use different social-cognitive 
mechanisms. Simulation theory is currently one of the most investigated 
theoretical frameworks for understanding the minds of others (Buckner and 
Caroll, 2006; Goldman, 2008; Waytz and Mitchell, 2011). One of the theoretical 
approaches within simulation theory suggests that people use a self-projection 
mechanism to understand the mental states of others (in the absence of perceptual 
cues of another person‘s experience). This mechanism is also employed when 
judging another person‘s stable personality traits and dispositions. According to 
this theory, to understand the mental state of another person, one has to imagine 
(simulate) that mental state and after that assign (project) the re-created mental 
state to that person (Waytz and Mitchell, 2011). Self-projection is defined as a 
mechanism of switching perspectives between the immediate (self-centred) and an 
alternative one. In the context of understanding other minds, self-projection is 
understood as a mechanism that enables mental exploration of alternative 
perspectives by referencing them to one‘s own past experiences (Buckner and 
Caroll, 2006). The self-projection mechanism assumes that representations of 
one‘s own mental states that are stored in central nervous system can be activated 
by imagining one‘s own mental state or the mental state of another person. The 
crucial part of the process is to ascertain whether the mental state perceived in the 
other person is an observed state or a state imagined by the mind of the 
―perceiver‖, which requires understanding that the source of the mental state is in 
oneself and not in another, whether observed person or an imagined one. Hence it 
is necessary to correctly distinguish between the self and the other as the source of 
the simulated mental state. Otherwise, if an error occurs, it may lead to problems 
with attribution of the correct source of the mental state, and confusion between 
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the creations of one‘s own mind and one‘s knowledge of other minds may occur. 
This may be the case in synaesthetic personification of linguistic and non-
linguistic sequences.  
 
The self-projection mechanism was investigated in neuroimaging studies of the 
general population with such testing paradigms as trait adjectives/statement 
judgment as to whether the trait or statement presented to the subject applies to 
the self or other (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Saxe and 
Powell, 2006; Mitchell, 2008). Other studies looked at mental state attribution to 
randomly moving shapes or fictitious characters in cartoons (Castelli et al. 2000, 
2002; Gallagher et al., 2000; Tavares, Lawrence and Barnard, 2008) and online 
games, which require simulation of another‘s person perspective (Gallagher et al., 
2002; Cabe, K et al, 2001). Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) tested twenty five subjects 
using fMRI for the neural correlates of understanding minds of others, using 
theory of mind story judgment tasks. The mental inference stories were compared 
with mechanical inference stories and showed activations in regions of the default 
brain network, such as the precuneus and lateral parietal cortex. Tavares, 
Lawrence and Barnard (2008) used the animated shapes paradigm to investigate 
the functional neuroanatomy underlying the attribution of mental states to moving 
geometric shapes. They asked participants to focus their attention either on the 
spatial aspects of the moving shapes or on the social behaviour underlying the 
movement. Brain activity in response to social interactions between moving 
shapes also activated the default network regions – the lateral parietal cortex, 
posterior cingulated cortex and superior temporal sulcus. ―Online‖ simulation of 
the mental states of others was tested by Gallagher and others (2002) by observing 
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subjects playing a computerised version of the ―stone, paper, scissors‖ game in the 
scanner. In the mentalising condition subjects believed that they played against 
the experimenter, and in the control condition, participants were let to believe that 
they were playing against the computer. But in fact, in both conditions, 
participants played against random sequences generated by computer. When the 
fMRI results of conditions for playing against the experimenter versus against 
computer were compared, activation of the anterior paracingulate cortex and right 
inferior frontal cortex was found.   
 
Considering this body of research and other work into mentalising processes, 
Waytz and Mitchell (2011) argue that at the neural level this mechanism is 
processed by the regions of the brain‘s default network (Raichle et al., 2001) that 
include the posterior cingulate cortex (retrosplenial cortex), the precuneus, ventral 
and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, the lateral temporal cortex, the inferior 
parietal lobule and the hippocampal formation. The regions of the human default 
network have been implicated in self-reflective processes together with imagery 
processes related to the self, as well as in recalling past experiences (Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter, 2008). Besides the default network, the paralimbic 
regions implicated in processing internal states such as the insula may be crucial 
for processing self-reflective information in personification (Craig, 2009; 
Modinos, Ormel, and Aleman, 2009). Increased insula activation has been 
reported in many studies examining self-reference (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Fossati 
et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2005; Kircher et al., 2000; Ruby and Decety, 2001; 
Takahashi et al., 2008) and its role in self-reflection has been emphasized by 
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recent reviews and meta-analyses (Schmitz and Johnson, 2007; van der Meer et 
al., 2010).  
 
3.2 Aims and hypotheses 
 
The broad aim of the present study is to identify the neural correlates of grapheme 
personification using functional MRI in synaesthetes who attribute mental states 
not only to other people, but also to linguistic sequences and inanimate objects. It 
is assumed that automatic neural response in synaesthetes will be observed when 
presented with graphemes reported as having socially relevant characteristics (as 
was shown by Amin et al., 2011).  
Could grapheme personification represent a kind of over-activation of mentalising 
processes co-occurs with misattribution of agency? It is hypothesized that the 
activations in response to graphemes in sequence-personality synaesthesia will 
overlap with the neural circuits underlying everyday mentalising. Specifically, I 
aim to establish whether involvement of the precuneus is a common occurrence in 
synaesthetes who personify graphemes (or was it peculiar to synaesthete AA; 
Amin et al., 2011)? 
Finally, it is hypothesized that the activity in precuneus will increase with the 
increased intensity of reported grapheme personification, as suggested by Amin 
and her colleagues in their case study. 
 
 
Chapter 3 Neural correlated of grapheme personification 
89 
 
3.3 Method 
 
 
3.3.1 Subjects 
 
Five synaesthetes were recruited via advertisements on university campus and 
from the Synaesthesia Participants Database
5
 who took part in the study for 
payment. Among the synaesthetes tested were 2 female and 3 male participants 
with a mean age of 28.4 years (SD = 4.16 years). Subjects reported no abnormal 
neurological condition, were right-handed and had normal or corrected vision. 
The study was approved by Brunel Ethics Committee and all participants 
provided written consent.  
Variants of the inducers triggering genders and/or personality for tested subjects 
are described in Table 3.3. Four out of five participants reported that letters of the 
alphabet, numerals, days of the week, months of the year trigger experience of 
personalities and genders. One of the participants reported experiencing genders 
but not personalities for a few letters of alphabet and all numbers. Subjects stated 
that they have had these synaesthetic experiences as long as they can remember. 
In this study, following Amin et al. (2011) consistency scores were collected for 
sequence-personality synaesthesia and coloured graphemes synaesthesia as shown 
in Table 3.2.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Synaesthesia Participants Database is a database of self-referred synaesthetes via synaesthesia research 
websites (www.syn.psy.ed.ac.uk; www.syn.sussex.ac.uk)  
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Table 3.2 Personification types and consistency scores of tested synaesthetes 
Synaesthete Sex Type of 
personification 
Gender 
consistency 
Personality 
consistency 
Colour 
consistency 
CS F Gender only 100% - 100% 
GF F Gender + 
personality 
85% 100% 100% 
MF M Gender + 
personality 
81% 88% 100% 
SJ M Gender + 
personality 
85% 73% 100% 
OE M Gender + 
personality 
85% 88% 100% 
Mean - - 87% 87% 100% 
 
 
Table 3.3 Summary of inducers triggering personality and gender among tested 
synaesthetes 
Inducer Concurrent CS GF MF SJ OE 
Letters gender x x x x x 
personality  x x x x 
Numerals gender x x x x x 
personality  x x x x 
Days gender  x x x x 
personality  x x x x 
Months gender  x x x x 
personality  x x x x 
 
3.3.2 Stimuli 
 
Participants were presented with letters or numbers from the Roman alphabet. 
They also were presented with Hebrew letters, with which participants were 
unfamiliar and they attributed neither gender nor personality to them. A sample of 
these graphemes is as shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1 Example of the stimuli used in the experiment 
 
All participants were presented with six different Roman letters or numerals and 
two Hebrew letters. These letters were previously rated by synaesthetes. 
Graphemes were written in black, in upper case and presented on a grey 
background. In the questionnaire completed by synaesthetes, they were asked to 
provide descriptions of the genders and personalities they associated with letters 
of alphabet and numbers and to rate the strength of these experiences. 
Synaesthetes indicated that some letters give more intensive experiences of 
personality traits and genders than others. Therefore, before going into the 
scanner, subjects were asked to rate the intensity of the perceived personification 
for each grapheme on a scale from 0 to 10. Graphemes rated as 0 were assigned to 
the group of non-personified graphemes; graphemes rated between 1 and 3 were 
designated weak personification, those rated between 4 and 6 designated medium 
personification and between rated from 7 and 10 were designated strong 
personification. Then graphemes chosen from each category were presented to 
participant while in the scanner. Participants were presented with two graphemes 
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from each personification category. The set of graphemes used for each of the 
participants is shown in Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4 Graphemes used in each experimental condition for each synaesthete 
PARTICIPANT 
STRONG 
PERSONIFICATION 
MEDIUM 
PERSONIFICATION 
WEAK 
PERSONIFICATION 
CS 9, 1 4, 7 6,3 
GF E,A V,J G,W 
MF N,X G,B K,I 
SJ N,C A,E L,U 
OE Y,T N,M A,B 
 
3.3.3 Experimental design  
 
The experimental task employed a simple block design. Each experimental block 
with personified letters was 12 seconds long (6 repetition of letters presented for 1 
second on and 1 second off). Each baseline block was 15 seconds long, to allow 
the haemodynamic response to recover. In the baseline blocks, participants were 
presented with fixation cross in appearing the middle of the screen. The 
experiment had four experimental conditions: Strong personification, medium 
personification, weak personification and non-personified graphemes.   
 
Figure 3.2 Schematic representation of experimental design. This pattern was repeated 
twice during the experiment. The baseline lasted for 15 seconds, followed by the 
experimental conditions, including: S0 (non-personified graphemes), S1 (weak 
personification), S2 (medium personification) and S3 (strong personification).  
Chapter 3 Neural correlated of grapheme personification 
93 
 
During the experimental task participants passively viewed pictures of personified 
letters and non-personified letters as shown in Figure 3.2. To maintain 
participants‘ attention, subjects were required to detect the presence of grapheme 
repetition and indicate it by pressing a button (one back task). 
 
3.3.4 Imaging procedure 
 
FMRI data was collected using a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio scanner. Firstly, the 
localising scans were performed. Then the experimental, functional images were 
acquired using a gradient-echo, echo-planar sequence (TR = 3s; TE = 33 ms; ip 
angle = 90; voxel size = 3*3*3 mm). Functional volumes were acquired 
continuously during each experimental run, which lasted about 6.5 min (8 blocks 
per condition of 12 seconds long). The functional run was followed by a high 
resolution T1-weighted structural scan. The Cogent 2000 toolbox for Matlab 
developed at the ICN
6
 was used to project stimuli onto the screen, which 
participants saw via a mirror mounted above the head coil. The fMRI data was 
processed using SPM 8 (Wellcome Department of cognitive Neurology, London; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) with Matlab software (MathWorks, Natick, 
Massachusetts). Images were realigned to correct for head movement and 
transformed into a standard anatomical space based on the ICBM 152 brain 
template (Montreal Neurological Institute). Then, the normalised images were 
spatially smoothed (8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum [FWHM]) using a 
Gaussian kernel function.  
 
                                                          
6 http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php  
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3.3.5 FMRI analysis 
 
Two types of statistical analyses of data were performed based on the linear 
general model. In both analyses, trials were modelled using a canonical 
hemodynamic response function. Firstly, a conjunction analysis was conducted, in 
which whole-brain statistical maps were created. This was done by comparing the 
strong personification conditions with no personification condition. This analysis 
aimed to detect regions responsible for synaesthetic personification of graphemes. 
Secondly, a parametric analysis with the personification intensity ratings as the 
modulation parameter was utilised. The aim of this analysis was to examine 
whether the activity of the precuneus increases as the personification of 
graphemes intensity became higher. In this analysis, we constructed the 
personification intensity regressor and assigned the values: 0, 1, 2, 3 to indicate 
strong personification trials, medium personification trials, weak personification 
trials and no personification trials respectively. 
 
The analyses were performed individually for each participant. Then contrast 
images for each participant were utilised in a second-level analyses that employed 
the random-effects model (significance was assessed at the threshold of p<0.001, 
uncorrected) for parametric analysis and the fixed-effects model and significance 
was assessed at the threshold of p<0.05, FWE corrected.  
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3.4 FMRI results 
 
3.4.1 Categorical analysis 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Brain regions with increased activation in response to all personified 
graphemes versus non-personified ones. Whole-brain, fixed-effects analyses (p<0.05, 
corrected) revealed increased activations for insula (top left), the precuneus (top right) 
and the medial prefrontal cortex (bottom left) and temporoparietal junction (bottom 
right). 
 
 
In the whole-brain analysis, in the comparison of personified graphemes with no-
personified graphemes we found significant clusters of activations in the 
mentalising network bilaterally, including: the precuneus, the insula, the medial 
prefrontal cortex and the right temporoparietal junction (Figure 3.3, Table 3.5). 
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We also observe the activation in the postcentral gyrus, the precentral gyrus, the 
lingual gyrus, the declive (a cerebellar region), cuneus, the inferior and middle 
occipital cortex. All activations are family-wise corrected at the threshold of 
p<0.05.  
 
 
Table 3.5 Brain areas activated during personified letters conditions compared to non-
personified letters condition (p<0.05; FWE corrected). 
Anatomical  
Location 
Side Cluster 
size 
t-
value 
Coordinates 
Precuneus L 40 6 -21 -64 55 
Precuneus R 2 5.14 30 -70 28 
Precuneus R 4 4.95 27 -49 55 
Precuneus R 1 4.87 36 -43 55 
Temporo-parietal junction R 274 6.98 48 -37 43 
Temporo-parietal junction R 1 4.74 60 -40 16 
Inferior parietal lobule R 5 5.22 42 -46 58 
Insula L 32 5.49 -42 -4 13 
Insula L 12 5.19 -33 11 13 
Medial prefrontal cortex R 84 7.96 36 41 28 
Medial prefrontal cortex L 9 5.63 -39 32 25 
Medial frontal gyrus L 452 7.8 -6 -7 58 
Inferior frontal gyrus R 4 5.22 57 17 -5 
Postcentral gyrus/TPJ L 775 8.03 -45 -19 55 
Postcentral gyrus R 28 6.16 57 -19 55 
Precentral gyrus/insula R 184 6.39 60 5 16 
Precentral gyrus L 5 5.2 -54 11 -2 
Precentral gyrus L 1 4.78 -57 2 40 
Cuneus L 564 9.88 -9 -100 10 
Culmen L 41 5.79 -33 -49 -32 
Culmen R 7 5.1 9 -58 -8 
Declive R 71 6.18 39 -61 -17 
Declive L 1 4.72 -33 -64 -14 
Inferior occipital gyrus L 43 6.87 -45 -82 -2 
Lingual gyrus L 56 8.07 -21 -79 -2 
Lingual gyrus R 6 5.79 18 -82 -2 
Lingual gyrus R 1 4.82 36 -76 -5 
Middle occipital gyrus R 10 5.47 42 -82 1 
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Figure 3.4 Brain regions with increased activation in response to the contrast comparing 
non-personified graphemes with personified ones (p<0.05, corrected) 
 
In the opposite contrast, comparing brain activation in the response to non-
personified graphemes versus personified graphemes, significant changes in brain 
activation were observed in the bilateral angular gyrus, the anterior cingulate, the 
inferior occipital gyrus and in the lingual gyrus as shown in Table 3.6 and Figure 
3.4.   
 
Table 3.6 Brain regions activated during non-personified letters conditions compared to 
all personified letters condition (p<0.05; FWE corrected) 
Anatomical  
Location 
Hemis
phere 
Cluster 
size 
t-
value 
Coordinates 
Angular gyrus 
 
L 64 6.35 -39 -70 34 
Angular gyrus R 12 5.37 48 -67 37 
Anterior cingulate L 11 5.33 -3 50 -5 
Inferior occipital gyrus L 3 5.23 -24 -97 -5 
Lingual gyrus R 2 4.96 24 -94 1 
 
 
3.4.2 Parametric analysis  
 
To determine whether activity in precuneus increases with the increased intensity 
of reported letter personification, the parametric modulation analyses were 
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conducted next. The results of parametric analysis with the personification 
strength ratings as the modulation parameter are shown in Table 3.7 and Figure 
3.5. The brain regions where activity increased when personification became 
stronger include the middle temporal gyrus and middle frontal gyrus, but not the 
precuneus.  
With the decrease of the subjective intensities in experienced grapheme 
personification, no changes in the brain activity were observed.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Changes in brain activity parametrically modulated by changes in intensity of 
grapheme personification reported by synaesthetes 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 Brain regions parametrically modulated by the synaesthetic personification 
intensity (p<0.001; uncorrected; extent threshold: k=10 voxels) 
 
Anatomical location Side Cluster size t-value Coordinates 
Middle frontal gyrus R 19 15.72 45 
 
2 
 
49 
Middle temporal gyrus L 10 14.10 
12.48 
-60 
-60 
-67 
-61 
 
4 
10 
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3.5. Discussion 
 
In synaesthetic personification, letters and numbers are perceived as having such 
human qualities as personality traits, gender, profession, mental states and 
relationships between each other. Given the predominance of social characteristics 
attributed to graphemes and their similarity to everyday mentalising descriptions, 
this study aimed to assess whether the underlying neural mechanisms for 
personification in these synaesthetes are shared with general social cognition 
mechanisms for understanding other people. Specifically, the objective of the 
current study was to determine whether brain regions from the social cognition 
network - specifically, those implicated in the self-projection mechanism for 
understanding mental states of other people - are activated in synaesthetic 
personification. Since the subjects were not explicitly focusing their attention on 
the experienced synaesthetic personifications, but rather on the letter repetition 
task, these data also provide neural evidence of the reality and the involuntary 
nature of synaesthetic personification. Additionally, the study also investigated 
whether together with the increased intensity of reported grapheme 
personification, the activity in precuneus will increase, but the results obtained did 
not show that the strength of perceived personalities and genders of graphemes is 
associated with the activation of the precuneus, but instead with the changes in 
activation of the middle frontal and middle temporal gyros. However, in a group 
of five synaesthetes with grapheme personification, we found that brain areas 
associated with social cognition such as the precuneus, the temporoparietal 
junction, the insula and the prefrontal medial cortex were more active when 
synaesthetes saw personified graphemes in comparison with non-personified ones 
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from the foreign alphabet, suggesting that in this group synaesthetic 
personification of graphemes is linked with universal mechanisms for social 
cognition. The precuneus, the temporoparietal junction and the prefrontal medial 
cortex have been previously identified as regions of default brain network and 
proposed by Waytz and Mitchell (2011) as mediating mentalising processes when 
other people are not physically present, namely when thinking about other 
people‘s mental states, predicting their moods and so on. Activation of the insula 
has been previously observed in mirror-touch synaesthesia (Blakemore et al., 
2005), in which synaesthete C experienced touch on her own body while watching 
a video of person being touched. Based on this, it was suggested that this increase 
in the activation of insula is associated with the error of the misattribution of the 
source of the tactile sensation to the synaesthete‘s own body (Banissy, in press). It 
is possible that the increase in insula activation observed in the current study 
reflects an error in selecting the source of mental simulation of the personal 
characteristics, feelings and mental states that are attributed to graphemes. 
Additionally, insula activation has also been previously reported in grapheme-
colour synaesthesia (e.g. Sperling, 2006). Given that all the tested synaesthetes in 
the current study experience grapheme-colour synaesthesia in addition to 
grapheme-personification synaesthesia, the observed activation in the insula could 
reflect the former. However, it should also be considered that studies examining 
brain function in grapheme-colour synaesthesia did not control for personification, 
therefore it is similarly possible that in that studies the observed activation of 
insula was induced by personification co-occurring with coloured graphemes.  
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Brain responses to non-personified graphemes were greater than to personified 
graphemes in the angular gyrus. It is possible that this effect is due to processing 
of spatial associations (number forms and alphabet form) that synaesthetes have 
greater ability to pay attention to when there is no personification to ―distract‖ 
them.  
In the study, it was predicted that increased intensity of grapheme personification 
will be associated with stronger activation of the precuneus. However, this effect 
was not observed in the precuneus, but instead in the middle frontal gyrus and 
middle temporal gyrus. Middle frontal cortex activation has been previously 
linked with self-related processing (Morita et al., 2008) and it is possible that in 
synaesthetic personification, self-related processing increases together with the 
subjectively perceived strength of grapheme personification. Changes in the 
middle temporal gyrus may reflect increased memory processing during self-
projection in personification. This suggests that perception of strongly personified 
graphemes may involve retrieving more memory details from a synaesthete‘s 
personal past than perception of graphemes that are personified less strongly or 
not at all. The greater involvement of memory processes in strongly personified 
graphemes is reflected in phenomenological descriptions of these graphemes – 
they tend to have more elaborate and rich biographical descriptions than weakly 
personified graphemes, where descriptions may be limited to gender only.  
 
The correspondence we observe between the social cognition network and 
personification in synaesthesia of graphemes is consistent with previous findings 
investigating personification of graphemes and inanimate objects (Amin et al., 
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2011; Sobczak, Sagiv and Williams, 2011). The social characteristics attributed to 
both graphemes and to objects in synaesthesia activate brain areas from the social 
network. Amin and colleagues (2011) tested a single synaesthete AA and found 
precuneus activation in response to personified graphemes when compared with 
non-personified ones, which is also the case in the current study. This confirms 
the importance of the precuneus in the implementation of personification in 
synaesthesia. In the case study of AA, her personification of letters was limited to 
the attribution of gender only, excluding other social characteristics. In the current 
study we also find increased activation in additional social brain regions (apart 
from the precuneus activation), which may be associated with the more elaborate 
personification features attributed to graphemes by participants.  
A tentative explanation of these results might be that the changes observed in 
brain activation in response to personified graphemes (in areas involved in social 
cognition, self-reflective processes and autobiographical memory), are co-
activated by the representations of graphemes resulting in the activation of self-
related social processing that leads to subjective experiences of grapheme 
personification, including one‘s own mental state representations, personality 
traits and other biographical experiences. These self-related mental contents are 
not recognised as one‘s own, but rather they are projected onto graphemes and 
attributed to them. If this is true, the perceptual error occurs on the level of the 
selection of the source (agent) of mental states, personality traits and so on. This 
assumption is particularly relevant to the developmental explanation for 
personification in synaesthesia proposed by Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (in press) 
maintaining that personification may represent a universal human tendency to 
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perceive the social reality using the self as a model (the roots of which are present 
in early childhood and manifests in animistic thought). Support for this 
interpretation comes from functional neuroimaging research and from 
neuropsychological studies. In social brain research, the insula, temporoparietal 
junction, the precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex have been implicated in 
mentalising, self-referential processing (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Fink et al., 1996; 
Fossati et al., 2004; Ruby and Decety, 2001; Takahashi et al., 2008), and in self-
reflection (for review see Schmitz and Johnson, 2007; van der Meer et al., 2010). 
The medial prefrontal cortex is a crucial brain region for perceiving other people 
and understanding of the social aspects of other mental agents, such as other 
people and domesticated animals, but not inanimate objects (Mitchell et al., 
2005).The insula is associated with processing involved in self-awareness. The 
increase in insula activation occurs during the rubber hand illusion, in which the 
participant experiences the artificial hand as their own (Tsakiris, 2008). This 
indicates the insula‘s importance in integrating information from diverse 
functional systems, including subjective emotions related to the body and 
emotional experiences (Craig, 2009; Kurth et al., 2010). Additionally, the 
temporo-parietal junction has been proposed to be a necessary brain structure for 
taking someone else‘s perspective, which was shown by, for example, Ruby and 
Decety (2004), who observed the increased activation in the temporo-parietal 
junction when comparing brain responses in subjects imagining how participants 
would feel in certain everyday social situations with imagining how another 
person would feel in similar situations. Moreover, Samson et al (2004) tested the 
capabilities for inferring mental states of others in patients with brain lesions in 
the left temporo-parietal junction and observed the impairment of these processes. 
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This cognitive capability was impaired in patients suggesting the necessity of the 
temporo-parietal junction for representing someone else‘s mental states. 
Furthermore, evidence from neuropsychology suggests that lesions of the right 
(and sometimes left) parietal cortex may produce misattributions of agency that 
itself sometimes involve animistic attributions. In particular, patients with parietal 
lesions are frequently characterised by delusional misidentifications of body parts. 
These patients think that their arm or leg does not belong to them and often 
attribute their limbs to other people - examiner, or their friend or family member. 
More importantly, some patients also attribute personalities to their limbs and give 
misidentified arms or legs nicknames such as ―George‖, ―Toby‖, ―Silly Billy‖, 
―Floppy Joe‖ (Critchley 1955, p. 286), which has certain similarities with body 
parts personification in sequence-personality synaesthesia. 
Although we provide supporting evidence for the conjecture that personification 
in the tested synaesthetes shares neural mechanisms with mentalising in general 
social cognition, the extent to which obtained results reflect the engagement of 
simulation processes and self-projection is unclear as we examine it only at the 
neural level. In sequence-personality synaesthesia, synaesthetes feel compelled to 
think of letters and numbers as if they were humans, but they know that this is not 
the case. A synaesthete can think that the letter ‗B‘ is ‗a playful chubby child‘ and 
be aware of distinction between ‗real‘ experience and synaesthetic experience, but 
at the same time (s)he does attribute these qualities to the letter ‗B‘. However 
synaesthetes frequently remain unaware that social representations activated by 
graphemes reflect self-referential processes and autobiographical experiences. It is 
important to note that synaesthetes are not delusional: synaesthetic experiences of 
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the social worlds of letters and numbers do not conflict with their understanding 
of the conventional meaning of graphemes and their linguistic/mathematical 
function; however it may ease or hinder it. This is analogous to colour-grapheme 
synaesthesia, in which synaesthetes see letters in both, printed and synaesthetic 
colour at the same time. Indeed, in grapheme personification, synaesthetes 
maintain conventional meanings of graphemes and attributed to them human-like 
qualities simultaneously.   
This study raises a number of questions for future research. First of all, having 
gained supporting evidence for the involvement of the social brain regions in the 
implementation of synaesthetic personification in the tested group, it is important 
to find out whether this effect applies to the population of sequence-personality 
synaesthetes. Secondly, an intriguing avenue for future systematic investigation 
would be to explore the structural brain specificity of synaesthetes who personify 
graphemes, since the scope of the present study was limited only to functional 
neuroanatomy. Nevertheless, the current study is the first to provide insights into 
functional neuroanatomy for personification of graphemes showing that brain 
regions processing synaesthetic personification and mentalising in general social 
cognition partially overlap. While the initial findings are promising, it is important 
to remember that this is (apart from AA‘s case study) the only study examining 
neural correlates of grapheme personification and has a limited number of 
participants (five). For this reason future studies involving testing more 
synaesthetes for neural mechanisms of grapheme personification are necessary.  
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3.6 Conclusions  
 
The present study examined the functional neuroanatomy of grapheme 
personification in synaesthesia and showed that: 
1) Given that the synaesthetes‘ task was to detect letter repetition and 
grapheme personification which was task-irrelevant during the imaging 
procedure, the observed neural differences in response to personified and 
non-personified graphemes provide indirect evidence for the reality of 
synaesthetic experience.   
2) The underlying mechanism for personification in synaesthesia and 
universal mechanisms for understanding other minds may be shared at the 
neural level, since the social brain areas such as precuneus, right 
temporoparietal junction, and insula are activated in response to 
personified but not non-personified graphemes.  
3) Consequently, it is likely that the self-projection mechanism is activated 
when synaesthetes think about graphemes or perceive them. If this is the 
case, then misidentification of the source of the mental state and the 
personality traits perceived may underlie the attribution of human-like 
characteristics observed in sequence-personality synaesthesia. 
4) The intensity of the subjectively perceived experienced is not associated 
with the strength of precuneus activation. However, it is associated with 
activations in the right middle frontal and the left middle temporal gyrus.
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Chapter 4   Behavioural correlates of object 
personification 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Synaesthetes personify not only graphemes, but also attribute personalities and 
genders to inanimate objects, including fruit and vegetables, computers, 
household objects, body parts and other items as previously described in Chapters 
1 and  2. For example, a synaesthete may think of a scarf as being a reliable, 
focused and good natured female, whereas a pair of  trousers may be a young and 
childish, but cooperative man (for more examples of inanimate objects 
personification see Table 4.1). This phenomenon has been referred to in the 
synaesthesia literature as personification of inanimate objects (Amin et al., 2011; 
Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, in press) or object-personality synaesthesia (Smilek 
et al, 2007). Similarly to grapheme personification and other variants of 
synaesthesia, inanimate objects are reported to be personified on a daily basis 
from an early childhood (Amin et al., 2011; Smilek et al, 2007). 
Table 4.1 An example of gender, personality traits and feelings attributions to various 
categories of inanimate objects (GF) 
Object 
Category 
m/f Personified 
Object 
Personality Traits & Feelings 
Body Parts f 
m 
 
 
skin 
brain 
 
 
Sensitive, moody 
My brain (which I call ―Brain‖) is completely 
independent from me, like another person living in my 
head. He is cynical, attentive, curious, and sarcastic. 
At the same time, though, he is also wise and caring 
toward me. He is honest, and tries to warn me anytime 
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m 
 
 
 
 
 
f 
 
 
m 
 
feet 
 
 
 
 
 
Hands 
 
 
Fingers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
teeth 
he can. Unfortunately, I don't always listen to him. 
My feet are ugly – but totally unaware of that. In 
particular, they look different from each other. They 
are curious, funny, childish and shy. They don't like to 
be looked at by other people, but at the same time they 
can be very gregarious when they find someone they 
trust (i.e. someone that will not mind them being so 
asymmetric). Furthermore, they are clumsy: they are 
so busy looking around when I walk that make me fall 
all the time. 
Left hand is more feminine and creative than right 
hand. Right hand is like a peasant, I write with it, so it 
is practical one (never would wear rings on the right 
one).    
Fingers are supportive, not very curious, and obedient. 
A thumb is older than the rest of them, and the little 
finger is the youngest – is childish and playful. The 
middle finger and the ring finger are brothers – the 
ring finger is romantic, whereas the middle one is 
practical and responsible. Forefinger is younger than 
middle and ring fingers, is more cheerful and 
intellectual than others. I would have different 
reactions depending on which finger got hurt – if it 
was thumb I will curse, but if it was the little one I will 
behave as a mother and say: ‗oh cutie‘ 
We have only functional relationship, sometimes they 
betray me, for example they plan to decay.  
 
Clothes 
 
f 
m 
 
scarf 
my light 
brown 
trousers 
 
 
Reliable, focused, good-natured, calm 
My trousers are young, childish and quite vain. They 
don't care about what's going on, unless it is something 
serious – in which care they shut up and stay at their 
place, without being as smiley as usual. 
Despite their young age, they are very cooperative 
whenever I need them to behave and let me climb 
stairs or hike hills. 
Other 
everyday 
objects 
m 
 
Swiss knife 
 
My Swiss knife is steady, serious and cooperative. He 
is helpful, reliable, focused, calm, and trustworthy. He 
doesn't complaint if I don't use him for a while or if I 
forget him somewhere. He's not vindictive and he 
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m 
f 
f 
 
 
My ipod 
Bed 
Bike 
never lets me down. He's like a perfect soldier, which 
can take initiative when needed but also carefully obey 
orders. 
Punctual, reliable, cheerful, happy 
Reliable, stable, cooperative 
Cheerful, happy, reliable 
Buildings f my house 
 
 
university 
building 
 
library 
My house is like an old, patient – but at times tired and 
absent-minded – lady. She takes care of me as much as 
she can. She tried to shelter me, but her old body 
cannot keep the cold outside or prevent wind and rain 
from falling in during the rainy season. 
Not very friendly 
 
Very snobbish, has a lot of knowledge but does not 
interact with it 
Plants f 
 
m 
my plant 
 
broccoli 
I'm not sure about the name, but I call her ―Priscilla‖. 
She is good-natured, humorous, vain, moody 
Trustworthy, cheerful, happy 
Simple 
Shapes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f 
m 
 
 
 
 
 
m 
 
m 
 
fm 
circle 
trapezium 
 
 
 
square 
 
equilateral 
triangle 
acute-angled 
triangle 
 
rectangle 
Effective, consistent, professional, happy 
Trapezium is a middle-age, steady, moustached shape. 
He is patient and humble, and well tolerates the vanity 
of the other shapes (e.g. triangles, rounds, squares). He 
knows he's not the most popular among students, but 
does not complaint about it. Narrow-minded.  
Similar to triangle, cool guy, handsome but quieter and 
more friendly 
 
Handsome, smart, young 
 
Older woman, not ugly, smart 
 
Younger, more naïve than trapezium 
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Previous investigations into personification in synaesthesia focussed mostly on 
graphemes (for a review of these studies, see Section 1.3). To date the 
personification of inanimate objects has been examined empirically in only one 
study conducted by Smilek et al (2007). In this study, researchers aimed to 
provide empirical evidence of the reality of object–personality associations by 
studying the consistency of object-personality pairings in TE, a 17 year old female 
synaesthete experiencing personification of inanimate object. The first experiment 
consisted of initial test, intervening session and retest and included two types of 
images: object displays and test displays. Firstly, TE and control participants were 
presented with 32 images containing familiar objects (letter and number), or a 
novel object (shapes described as fribbles, geerbels and geons) and were asked to 
describe the personalities of those objects. Control participants were informed 
additionally about TE‘s experiences and presented with an example of her 
experiences, which they were expected to mimic. The intervening session, in 
which the testing procedure was repeated with new set of familiar and unfamiliar 
objects, was intended to disrupt memory based on the assumption that additional 
descriptions retroactively interfered with associations made in the initial testing 
session. In the re-test session, participants were shown images of the objects 
shown in the initial testing session together with four personality descriptions, 
unique for each subject. In each trial, one or two of the personality descriptions 
were previously given by subjects in the initial testing session. The study provided 
evidence that personality-object pairings for both familiar and novel objects are 
highly consistent over time in case of TE (91% consistency for familiar objects 
and 88% for non-familiar objects), but not in case of controls, whose average 
consistency score was 50%.  
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In the second experiment carried out by Smilek et al (2007) an eye tracker was 
used to test how the personalities attributed (positive versus negative) influenced 
TE‘s overt behaviour. TE claimed that she disliked seeing objects with negative 
personalities, but once she looks at them it is difficult for her to disengage her 
attention from these objects. For this reason, in the study the eye movements of 
TE‘s and 6 controls were monitored during free viewing of displays containing 12 
graphemes rated by TE as either liked or disliked. Smilek and colleagues (2007) 
established that TE fixated more frequently on positive than negative graphemes, 
but the duration of her fixations was longer for negative than positive graphemes. 
This effect was not observed in non-synaesthetes. Therefore, besides providing 
evidence for the reality of personification of objects, Smilek et al (2007) showed 
empirically that the personification in synaesthesia is not limited to graphemes 
only and also includes inanimate objects. Although the researchers in the study 
described above noted that TE reports that personification of inanimate objects is 
involuntary, there is limited evidence to support it.   
Personification of inanimate objects is present not only in synaesthesia, but also 
can be found in the general population, however more frequently among non-
synaesthetic children than non-synaesthetic adults. Accordingly to Piaget (1929) 
children think of nearly all surrounding them entities as having human-like 
qualities, but the extent and strength of this tendency decreases with the age, 
although it still remains present among adults. People in everyday situations tend 
to personify non-randomly moving shapes (Heider and Simmel, 1944), computers 
(Nass et al., 1995), pets and gadgets (Epley et al., 2008), but also nationalities 
(e.g., mother Russia for Russia, Uncle Sam and Columbia for United States). 
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Personification occurs in metaphors, myths and religion (Guthrie, 1993). An 
interesting example of personification among non-synaesthetic adult is the 
propensity to personify body parts (Cornog, 1986; Ernster, 1975). For example, 
among adults tested by Martha Cornog (1986), sexual organs were named ‗Little 
Willy‘, ‗Little Guy‘ (designating male sexual organ) and ‗Little Joanie‘, ‗Miss 
Muff‘, ‗Myra and Myrtle‘ (designating female sexual organs). Interestingly, some 
of the names given to sexual organs were variations of ‗owner‘s‘ names, such as 
in case of ‗Litle Willy‘, where the owner‘s name was Billy. Other names 
attributed to sexual organs include other unrelated human names (‗Myra and 
Myrtle‘) or human designation (‗Guy‘), but also variations of other words, such as 
in case of ‗Miss Muff‘ (Cornog, 1986). Not only sexual body parts, but also 
sexually related body functions are personified, such as menstruation, which is 
frequently personified. Virginia Ernster (1975) conducted a study of American 
menstrual expression and found that personification designating menstruation can 
be found among various categories. The personification of menstruation often 
included references to a female visiting relative (e.g. ‗Aunt Sylvia is visiting me‘, 
‗Granny‘s visit‘, ‗my aunt from Redwood City‘, etc.) or references to a male 
(‗Charlie just came to the door‘, ‗Herbie is over‘, ‗George monthly‘, etc.). In the 
non-academic literature one can find examples of personification not only of 
sexual organs, but also personifications of different body parts. For example, f 
ingers that are commonly known by their names include traces of personification. 
For example, the ring finger in Polish is called the warm-hearted finger. 
Additionally, personification can be found in disorders, such as alien hand 
syndrome or Alzheimer‘s disease (Zaitchik and Solomon, 2008). In alien hand 
syndrome patients do not recognise their own arms as belonging to them and 
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report their involuntary movements.  They also give their ‗alien hands‘ names 
(Critchley, 1955), attributing to them intentions, thoughts and feelings. 
Personification of body parts is also observed in synaesthesia. However, 
personifications reported by synaesthetes appear to be imbued with rich and 
elaborate human-like qualities (e.g. mental states, feelings, moods, etc.) that 
interact and have relationships within each other, whereas non-synaesthetic 
personification of body parts is much less elaborate and often limited to giving 
them human-like names (for main differences between synaesthetic and non-
synaesthetic personification of inanimate objects see Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2 Comparison of synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic personification 
 SYNAESTHETIC 
PERSONIFICATION 
NON-SYNAESTHETIC 
PERSONIFICATION 
Types of personified 
objects 
Inanimate objects; sequences 
(Amin et al., 2011) 
Inanimate and animate objects; 
specific patterns of motion 
(Epley et al., 2008; Morewedg 
et al., 2007) 
Type of description Rich and elaborate 
descriptions (Smilek, 2007; 
Simner, Gartner and Taylor, 
2011) 
Short descriptions (Smilek, 
2007; Simner, Gartner and 
Taylor, 2011) 
Consistency Stable over time (Smilek, 
2007; Simner, Gartner and 
Taylor, 2011) 
Tend to change over time 
(Smilek, 2007; Simner, Gartner 
and Taylor, 2011) 
 
Given that personification is also commonly observed in general population, why 
should the personification of inanimate objects be considered a type of 
synaesthesia? As was previously established in synaesthesia research, cross-
domain pairings that are specific for various types of synaesthesia are also present 
in the general population (Sagiv and Ward, 2006). For example, similarly as in 
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colour-sound synaesthesia in which synaesthetes associate sounds with colours, 
non-synaesthetes associate high pitch sounds with bright colours and low pitch 
sounds with dark colours (Ward, Huckstep, and Tsakanikos, 2006). However, the 
observed cross-domain correspondences in non-synaesthetes do not fall under the 
definitional criteria of synaesthesia, broadly understood (e.g. Day, 2005; Rich and 
Mattingley, 2002). Broad definitions of synaesthesia require cross-domain 
pairings to be consistent over time, involuntary, automatic and idiosyncratic, 
which should be demonstrated by objective behavioural and/or physiological 
correlates that are not observed in the general population. Thereupon, it is 
necessary to determine if synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic personification of 
inanimate objects differ by comparing the cognitive processes underlying these 
phenomena. Limited information can be found in the synaesthesia literature on 
this question in relation to personification of inanimate objects. Smilek et al 
(2007) showed that synaesthetic personification of inanimate objects is more 
consistent over time than non-synaesthetic personification and that the 
synaesthetic descriptions of personifications are richer and more elaborated than 
in the general population. The personification of inanimate objects in synaesthesia 
sometimes co-occurs with a strong emotional component (Smilek et al., 2007; 
Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, in press), which can be illustrated with an anecdotal 
report. One of the synaesthetes tested in this study reported a past experience, in 
which she presented a very strong affective reaction - became sad and started 
crying loudly - after her mother made mushroom soup adding the ‗mushroom 
family‘ (as personified by her) she was looking after when they were growing in a 
tray. Smilek et al (2007) also suggested that synaesthetic personification of 
inanimate objects is automatic and involuntary, however this was inferred from 
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subjective synaesthetic reports and objective evidence to support this claim was 
limited. 
4.2 Aim and hypotheses  
 
The purpose of this study is twofold. Firstly, it aims to investigate empirically the 
involuntary character of object-personification synaesthesia, since to date there 
have been only one case study published confirming the lack of firm attentional 
control of inanimate object personification. The second aim of this study is to 
establish whether the same cognitive mechanisms underlie personification of 
inanimate objects in synaesthesia and in the general population. To test this, a 
behavioural Stroop-like paradigm was used in the experimental design. Stroop 
reaction time paradigms consist of tasks in which information processed in one 
cognitive dimension interfere with information processing in another dimension, 
for example, a subject asked to report the colours of words presented to them will 
give less accurate responses when the word presented is the name of a colour 
different from the colour in which the word is rendered (Stroop, 1935). In 
synaesthesia, the most frequently used variation of the Stroop paradigm 
manipulates the congruency of the synaesthetic pairings of inducer and 
concurrent. This paradigm was previously used in several investigations into 
synaesthesia, including synaesthetic personification of graphemes. In synaesthetic 
personification research using variations of Stroop-paradigm, it was shown that 
when synaesthetes who assign genders to letters are presented with faces preceded 
by a letter with congruent versus incongruent gender, they exhibit significantly 
slower reaction times than when responding to incongruent trials (Amin et al., 
2011).  
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Since the Stroop effect is widely considered to be the most effective tool available 
for measurement of automatic processing (Smilek et al., 2001; Mattingley, Rich, 
Yelland, and Bradshaw, 2001), a variation of the Stroop paradigm is employed in 
the current study to test for automaticity of inanimate object personification in 
synaesthetes and in the general population. In order to answer the question 
whether or not personification of objects relies on voluntary processing or lacks 
firm attentional control, the present study examines whether the ‗mood‘ of objects 
induces a Stroop effect in synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic subjects. This study 
differs from the previous investigation using Stroop-like paradigm into 
involuntary character of synaesthetic personification (Amin et al., 2011; Simner 
and Holenstein, 2007) in two ways. First of all, it examines different type of 
inducers – the previous investigations focused entirely on graphemes, whereas the 
current study examines personification of inanimate objects. Secondly, the current 
research involves inducing personification of objects by manipulating the setting 
in which objects are presented. The previous investigations into grapheme 
personification tested synaesthetic pairings between grapheme and gender which 
synaesthetes had experienced as co-occurring for a long time, in many cases as 
long as they can remember.      
4.3 Method 
 
4.3.1 Participants 
 
Participants who took part in the experiment included synaesthetes and a control 
group. Five synaesthetes were tested (3 male, 2 female) who all attribute human-
like qualities to objects. All of them also personify graphemes and report having 
grapheme-colour synaesthesia. Synaesthetic subjects were aged between 23 and 
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33 years old with the mean group age of 26.8 (SD=5.6) and all were enrolled as 
students at university. 
 
The control group7 included 44 participants that were drawn from a student 
participants pool (mean age: 19.9 years, SD = 3.1). Among them were 39 female 
and 5 male participants. Before undergoing the testing procedure, participants 
were screened for synaesthesia, to ensure that no participants in a control group 
had synaesthesia. Participants who gave any type of answers indicating 
synaesthesia were excluded from further testing in this experiment. All of the 
subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision and all gave written consent to 
participate in the study.  
 
 
4.3.2 Stimuli and procedure 
 
Stimuli used in the experiment consisted of images depicting household objects 
and images showing happy and sad facial expressions. Images of male and female 
faces with happy and sad facial expressions were created using an online 
application
8
.  
Images for presentation were created in two categories: those containing grouped 
objects and those containing ‗lonely‘ objects. In the grouped objects condition 
participants were presented with images of a few household objects placed next to 
each other in a line (see Figure 4.2). In the ‗lonely‘ objects condition, one object 
was placed on one side of the display, separated from the remaining of objects. 
                                                          
7 The author is grateful to Ms Grace Wilkins for her help in collecting the data 
8 The online application used for creating cartoon faces can be found on the following website: 
 http://www.magixl.com (Date last retrieved 29/09/2012). 
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This spatial separation was meant to induce personification of the separated 
objects, similarly as in a social situation where one person is separated from the 
others and feels lonely and isolated. The rationale behind using the ‗lonely‘ 
objects paradigm for inducing personification in synaesthetes who personify 
inanimate objects on an everyday basis, comes from synaesthetes‘ anecdotal 
subjective reports (in which they often described ‗feeling sorry‘ for the objects 
that were left alone for one reason or another). The images of grouped and 
socially excluded objects were used in the current experiment were the same as 
used in the neuroimaging study (for details see Chapter 5). 
During the experimental procedure, participants were seated in front of a 
computer running E-Prime software (Psychological Software Toolbox, 2002) at a 
distance of 50 cm away from a computer screen. The images with objects and 
faces were presented centrally. The subjects‘ task was to press ‗Z‘ whenever they 
saw a sad target face or ‗M‘ whenever they saw a happy face. The task was 
exactly the same for both groups. The experiment consisted of 128 experimental 
trials and 8 practice trials. Half of all trials were incongruent and half congruent. 
In the congruent condition the ‗happy face‘ followed a prime of ‗grouped objects‘, 
whereas in the incongruent condition, the ‗happy face‘ was presented after a 
‗socially excluded object‘ prime. Analogous trials were presented using images of 
sad facial expressions. 
During each trial a fixation cross was presented for 400 ms, followed by the 
grouped object‘ prime for 250ms and finally by a target face appeared on the 
screen until a response was made or for maximum 3000 ms (see Figure 4.1). The 
target face had either a happy expression or a sad expression.  
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Figure 4.1 Trial structure used in the study of personification of inanimate objects 
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Figure 4.2 Examples of images used in the study displaying 'lonely' objects (top) and 
'grouped' objects (bottom) 
 
 
A similar Stroop-like paradigm to the one employed in the current study, was used 
in testing synaesthetes with grapheme-gender personification (Amin et al., 2011):  
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The tested participants were presented with a fixation cross, a prime (letter with 
synaesthetic gender) and a target face. However, their task was different than in 
the present study – instead of determining the ‗mood‘ of the face their task was to 
decide on the gender of the face. Furthermore, a different type of prime was used 
in the study of Amin et al. (2011) who used well established synaesthetic 
grapheme-gender pairings (pairings which synaesthetes reported experiencing as 
long as they can remember). In the current study, priming images designed to 
induce personification during the experimental procedure were in fact novel 
stimuli for all participants.   
 
 
4.4   Results 
 
4.4.1 Comparison of differences between mean results in the congruent and 
incongruent trials in personification of inanimate objects 
 
Before data was analysed, all errors (incorrect answers about facial expression 
displayed on an image) and outliers (scores that were higher or lower than 3SD 
from the mean) were excluded. The resultant mean values of reaction times in 
congruent and incongruent conditions in synaesthetes and control group are 
shown in Figure 4.3.  
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Figure 4.3 Mean reaction times in milliseconds for congruent and incongruent trials  
in both groups – synaesthetes and controls 
 
Congruent and incongruent mean reaction times in the control group were 
analysed using a repeated measures t-test, which showed that on average, 
participants did not perform significantly better with  the congruent condition (M 
= 573.29, SE = 15.85) than with the incongruent condition (M = 570.76, SE = 
15.24): t(43) = 0.56, n.s.  
In order to compare the difference between mean reaction times in congruent and 
incongruent trials in the group of synaesthetes, a nonparametric Wilcoxon test was 
employed for the reason that the group had only five subjects. It was found that on 
average, synaesthetes performed significantly faster in the tests with congruent (M 
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= 610, SE = 70.76) condition than in the tests with incongruent condition (M = 
687.4, SE = 110.27): z = 2.02, p <0.05.  
 
4.4.2 Analysis of interaction effect between groups and congruency effect  
In order to compare directly the reaction time congruity effect in synaesthetes and 
controls, a two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) test with congruency as 
a within-subject factor (congruent/incongruent) and group as a between-subject 
factor was carried out. The results of the Stroop paradigm for personification of 
inanimate objects for both groups (means shown in Figure 4.3) were entered into 
the analysis.  
A two-way mixed analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of 
Congruency, F (1, 47) = 15.2, p<0.001, but the main effect of Group did not 
approached significance, F (1, 47) = 2.04, n.s. This means that synaesthetes and 
non-synaesthetes do not differ in their average reaction times, but all of them on 
average performed slower on incongruent than congruent trials. ANOVA analysis 
also revealed significant interaction between Congruency and Group, F (1, 47) = 
17.3, p < 0.001. The interaction effect shows that synaesthetes performed faster on 
congruent trials (M = 610.00, SE = 70.76) in comparison with incongruent ones 
(M = 687.40, SE = 110.27), whereas the control group was not affected by this 
factor, since their congruent (M = 573.29, SE = 15.85) and incongruent (M = 
570.76, SE = 15.24) mean scores were similar (see Figure 4.3). I.e., the magnitude 
of the congruity effect is larger in synaesthetes.  
This suggests that the moods synaesthetes associate with objects produce reliable 
interference with subsequent mood judgments, even when the objects remain task-
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irrelevant. These results provide evidence that the attribution of human-like 
qualities, such as an object‘s emotion is involuntary in synaesthetes who personify 
inanimate objects. This effect is present in all five synaesthetic participants whose 
mean RT differences range from 22 to 253 ms).  
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
The current study was designed to examine whether the processes underlying 
personification of inanimate objects in synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes are 
automatic or voluntary. This was tested using a specially designed variant of a 
Stroop paradigm with images of faces and inanimate objects. 
The results obtained show that synaesthetes were slower in responding to 
incongruent stimuli than to congruent stimuli. This difference was not found in 
the non-synaesthetic group. This is consistent with the idea that there are 
qualitatively different processes underlying synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic 
personification of inanimate objects. People without synaesthesia sometimes do 
think of cars, computers and other objects as endowed with life, often call them 
names and attribute to them to human-like mental characteristics (e.g. Benfield et 
al., 2007), but it appears that non-synaesthetic personification of static objects is 
more voluntary and not automatic as in synaesthetic personification of inanimate 
objects, since the interference effect was observed only in synaesthetes and not in 
the controls.  
Support for this interpretation comes from the results of previous studies 
examining the automaticity of personification of graphemes (Simner and 
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Holenstein, 2007; Amin et al., 2011; Simner). Amin et al. (2011) conducted an 
analogous Stroop-like paradigm to the one used in the current study to examine 
the automaticity of gender-grapheme associations. The researchers presented to 
synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes a target face preceded by a letter prime and the 
experimental task was to determine the gender of face presented. In this study, 
synaesthetes were found to have significantly slower average reaction times in 
incongruent trials compared with congruent trials and this effect was not observed 
in non-synaesthetes, a result which is consistent with the results of the current 
study. Similarly, results consistent with those of the current study were obtained 
in the experiment by Simner and Holenstein (2007) which assessed the 
involuntary character of letter-gender pairings. The authors presented a 
synaesthete AP with female and male names, designed in such a way that the 
synaesthetic gender of the first letter of the English names used was congruent or 
incongruent with the semantic gender of the words. Simner and Holenstein (2007) 
found that reactions times were faster in congruent than in incongruent trials, 
suggesting that automatic processing underlies the personification of graphemes 
in synaesthesia. This difference was not found in the general population.  
Taken together, the previous studies in personification provide converging 
evidence that synaesthetic gender-grapheme pairings are involuntary and 
automatic, highlighting this as one of the traits defining synaesthesia and 
differentiating synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic personifications of graphemes. 
Consistent with this are the findings obtained in the current study. Synaesthetic 
personification of inanimate objects, similarly as personification of graphemes, is 
automatic and involuntary in a wider range of circumstances than those observed 
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in the general population. By showing the involuntary character of object-
personality sensations, this study provides new evidence for the reality of 
inanimate objects personification. Up to date, the empirical support for reality of 
inanimate object personification synaesthesia was limited to synaesthetic reports 
and the consistency over time of personality-inanimate objects pairings (Smilek et 
al., 2007), with limited empirical evidence to support the reports that these 
sensations are involuntary and automatic. The results of the current study, 
considered together with the previous findings provide objective evidence that 
personification of inanimate objects is a variant of synaesthesia, since it is 
automatic, idiosyncratic and relatively consistent over the time.  
Although the results of the current study support the claim that synaesthetic 
personification of inanimate objects is involuntary and automatic, several 
limitations of the study need to be acknowledged. Firstly, this is the first empirical 
investigation into automaticity of inanimate objects personification with limited 
sample size (five synaesthetes were tested), therefore future studies on this topic 
should be carried out. Secondly, one plausible possibility is that non-synaesthetic 
personification of inanimate objects is automatic, but weaker than in synaesthesia 
or arises in a more restricted set of circumstances, and the paradigm used in the 
study may not be sensitive enough for the non-synaesthetic population. Future 
studies could examine this using different paradigm, such as, for example, a 
paradigm that included inanimate objects or body parts chosen by tested 
participants themselves, similarly as in the alternative version of the paradigm 
used for gender-grapheme attributions in the study of Amin and colleagues 
(2011). A further important issue worth attention is that this study does not 
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examine the interactions between images of inanimate objects and the names of 
those objects.  This is an interesting question for the future studies, given that 
personification of inanimate objects and personification of graphemes often tend 
to co-occur. Lastly, the current study did not examine the relationship between 
synaesthetic gender of objects and gender of the target face, since focus of 
investigations was on the ‗mood‘ of presented objects and not their synaesthetic 
gender. A future extension of the current study should control not only for the 
objects‘ ‗mood‘, but also their synaesthetic gender.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, it was examined whether personification of inanimate object in 
synaesthesia is involuntary and automatic as observed in other variants of 
synaesthesia. The results obtained with a Stroop-like paradigm show that only 
synaesthetes displayed the behavioural priming effect in which ‗lonely‘ primed 
sad rather than happy facial expressions. This effect was not observed in non-
synaesthetes. This finding provide converging evidence that personification of 
inanimate objects is a genuine type of synaesthesia and is consistent with the fact 
that synaesthetes personified from static images whereas controls did not.
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Chapter 5  Neural correlates of object 
personification in synaesthesia 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Having established some of the behavioural correlates of synaesthetic 
personification of inanimate objects (Chapter 4), this chapter aims to examine the 
neural correlates of this phenomenon. As described in the previous chapters, 
personification of inanimate objects is not limited to synaesthesia only, but also 
occurs in the general population. Personification of non-human entities in the 
general population has sometimes been studied in psychology under the term 
anthropomorphism. Here, for clarity, the term personification will be used 
throughout the chapter
9
. 
Humans occasionally personify the entities surrounding them and this tendency 
appears to be much stronger in early childhood than in adulthood. Personification 
processes have been suggested to be an early, developmental mechanism 
reinforcing the development of theory of mind (Amin et al., 2011; Sobczak-
Edmans and Sagiv, in press), and personification could be considered as a basic 
psychological mechanism underlying social cognition (Sobczak, 2009). The 
strength of the general tendency to personify varies. In some people, like for 
example young children, this tendency is stronger, whereas in others it may be 
much weaker. For example, patients with Asperger‘s syndrome have difficulties 
in giving human-like descriptions while watching animated shapes, and also do 
                                                          
9 Term ‗personification‘ is more appropriate to use than ‗anthropomorphism‘ because the focus is on the 
attribution of mental states (such as feelings and attitudes), rather than any physical features or similarities.  
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not show activations in the brain areas involved in social cognition (Castelli, Frith, 
Happe and Frith, 2002). Similar deficits in the ability to personify are observed in 
patients with damaged amygdalas (Herberlein and Adolphs, 2004).  
Personification of inanimate objects among synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes 
appears to be qualitatively different (see Discussion in Chapter 4). The main 
difference is that synaesthetic experience is involuntarily induced and without 
conscious effort, whereas non-synaesthetic personification appears to be rather 
voluntary and non-automatic, at least in some instances, such as the 
personification of static objects. In non-synaesthetes, there are three major factors 
that could increase the tendency to perceive non-human entities as human-like. 
The first relates to the knowledge elicited by the agent. As young children first 
develop a concept of the self and only later in development acquire more complex 
knowledge about different agents, they consequently exhibit an egocentric bias in 
reasoning when explaining less well-known stimuli, which increases their 
propensity to personify. The egocentric/homocentric knowledge is more easily 
accessible when the perceived stimuli looks like a human morphologically. People 
frequently attribute their own beliefs and desires to others that seem to be similar 
to them (Epley et al., 2004). Considering that the self often serves as a pattern for 
reasoning about unfamiliar others, Waytz and colleges (2010) hypothesised that is 
more likely to occur when perceiving unfamiliar agents. Social motivation is the 
second of the factors increasing personification. Humans have a basic need to 
affiliate and create social connections with others. Lack of social connections and 
social isolation can be compensated by personifying animals, gadgets and 
religious agents (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, and Cacioppo, 2008). Effectance 
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motivation, defined as a need to understand, control and predict one‘s own 
environment has been proposed as a third cause of anthropomorphism. This 
account considers personification as a mechanism that enables fulfillment of the 
need to understand and control non-human, unpredictable agents by endowing 
them with human-like qualities (Waytz et al., 2010). Another important factor 
regulating the propensity to personify agents in the general population is 
movement, especially movement at a speed similar to human movement speed 
(Morewedge, Preston and Wenger, 2007), therefore many studies investigating 
personifying thought used stimuli in motion, like for example point-light videos of 
walking (e.g., Herberlain and Saxe, 2005) or classical moving geometrical shapes 
figures (e.g., Castelli, Happe, Frith and Frith, 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happe and 
Frith, 2002; Heider and Simmel, 1944;Tavares, Lawrence and Barnard, 2008). 
However, in synaesthesia, we see that even static objects can be personified. Also, 
in contrast to non-synaesthetes, many of the personifying synaesthetes perceive 
familiar objects as human-like with a greater frequency than they perceive non-
familiar objects in this way, but in some cases familiarity of objects does not 
influence their personifications as reported in Chapter 2. On the other hand, lack 
of social connections – loneliness - could be an important factor increasing the 
tendency to create rich and elaborate personalities attributed to objects in 
synaesthesia, as could the need to control the objects, but to date this has not been 
empirically tested. The issue of loneliness in synaesthetic personification will be 
addressed in a later part of this thesis (Chapter 6). In the current fMRI study a 
personifying synaesthete (GF) and a group of non-synaesthetes will be tested to 
investigate the neural correlates of personification elicited by seeing ‗lonely‘ 
inanimate objects. Testing a control group in addition to synaesthete GF - who 
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personifies graphemes and objects on a daily basis - will allow a comparison of 
her brain responses with the brain responses of non-synaesthetes and identify the 
pattern of brain activation specific to synaesthetic personification.   
The specificity of synaesthetic personification is highlighted by fact that it lacks 
firm attentional control, and synaesthetes report that throughout their life time 
they perceive inanimate objects and graphemes as endowed with social and 
affective characteristics, such as personality traits (e.g., a radiator is ‗an annoyed 
and frustrated moaner‘, an accordion is ‗reliable friend, trustworthy‘), genders 
(e.g., thin leaves are ‗young women‘ and broad leaves are ‗old and middle aged 
women‘), feelings (e.g., ‗sad‘ bus) and attitudes (e.g., ‗easy going‘ palm tree, ‗fun 
loving‘ foot). There are two alternative ways of explaining synaesthetic 
personification. One of them is cross-talk hypothesis suggesting existence 
functional (or structural) cross-activations between the left angular gyrus and 
temporo-parietal junction and other brain regions associated with mentalising, 
such as the amygdala, somatosensory cortex, frontal and parietal brain regions 
(Simner and Hubbard, 2006). The second model implies that personification may 
result from the misattribution of agency due to lower threshold for brain regions 
implicated in mentalising (Sagiv and Frith, in press; Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, 
in press). To date, a functional neuroimaging study of AA provides evidence that 
synaesthetic attribution of gender to graphemes activates the precuneus, a brain 
area associated with self reflection, agency and imaginary processes. The 
precuneus activation is also found in non-synaesthetic personification, when 
people think of gadgets as unpredictable and ‗having mind on their own‘ (Waytz 
et al., 2010), together with the preforontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, 
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posterior cingulate, superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles adjacent to the 
amygdala. These brain regions are also known to be associated with in 
mentalising (Spreng et al., 2009), self-projection and egocentric perspective 
taking (Buckner and Caroll, 2007). Could this be the case (as previously 
suggested in relation to synaesthetic personification of graphemes in Chapter 3) 
that the misattribution of agency underlies synaesthetic personification of 
inanimate objects? The discrimination between one‘s own feelings and mental 
states and the feelings and mental states that are simulated is considered one of the 
challenges for the self-projection mechanism for any perceiver, not only for 
synaesthetes. Usually people can determine rather easily whether or not a 
particular mental state or feeling is simulated, but in some situations source 
attribution error may occur. This could takes place when one is watching a movie 
and experiences the same feelings as the main character, for example when one is 
crying along with the main character in the movie. It could be considered that in 
this situation the perceiver simulates the mental states of the main character and 
instead of projecting them, attributes them to themselves.  In the case of imbuing 
letters with personalities and mental contents, one‘s own mental representations 
are attributed to entities outside the self - in this particular case - to graphemes. In 
accordance with this, personification would be understood here as a mode of 
thinking that is egocentrically biased by one‘s own mental contents that are 
projected onto non-human entities and attributed to them as feelings, intentions 
and beliefs etc. In this process of attribution of one‘s own mental contents to 
inanimate objects and other non-human entities the perceiver fails to monitor their 
own mental states, and misattribute them to externally located things.  
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5.2 Aim and hypotheses 
 
This study sought to examine the neural correlates of the attribution of human-like 
characteristics to inanimate objects in the synaesthete experiencing personification 
of inanimate objects. To test this empirically, the synaesthete and a control 
subjects participated in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
experiment, in which they were presented with a series of pictures of inanimate 
household objects. The specially designed stimuli included images created in such 
a way as to induce feelings of social exclusion and loneliness. In half of these 
images one object was shown separated from the rest (this was intended to trigger 
experience of the social attribute of loneliness). Given the specificity of the 
stimuli used, it was aimed to establish if personification of inanimate objects 
automatically induces changes in the brain regions implicated in self-projection, 
namely the precuneus, temporo-parietal junction, the prefrontal medial cortex, the 
posterior cingulated cortex, the lateral temporal cortex and the hippocampal 
formation. Since the same stimulus was seen twice by the participants and, given 
that during the second viewing of the same objects participants were explicitly 
asked to think of objects as if they were humans, it was aimed to isolate and 
examine the personification processes that are voluntary and under strategic 
control. It was hypothesised that the changes in activation will include the same 
brain areas that are involved in implicit, pre-reflective personification, but the 
activations observed will be extended to larger regions of the brain.  It was also 
expected to see differences in the neural responses to images presented between 
the synaesthete tested and a non-synaesthetic group and correspondingly to 
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subjective reports, it was hypothesise that those responses will be more extensive 
in a synaesthete in comparison to non-synaesthetes.  
 
5.3 Method 
 
The stimuli used in the study consist of sets of images that were processed in 
Photoshop to produce images according to experimental requirements. Only the 
images that were rated by non-synaesthetic volunteers in a pilot study as the `most 
lonely‘ were included in the experiment.  
In the experiment 90 pictures were used, 30 for each of the following groups (i) 
pictures of grouped objects (ii) picture where one object was separated from rest 
of objects, and (iii) scrambled images10 (see Figure 5.1). Correspondingly, the 
experiment had three conditions: (i) grouped objects (ii) lonely objects and (iii) 
scrambled. Scrambled images were presented after each experimental of 
conditions (‗lonely‘, ‗grouped‘) to allow haemodynamic response to recover. This 
procedure was repeated for the entire duration of the study.   
                                                          
10 Scrambled images were produced using a short Matlab code written by Dr Ben Edmans. 
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Figure 5.1 Example of stimuli used in the experiment: Top left – lonely object, top right – 
grouped objects and bottom – scrambled objects 
During each condition, subjects were presented visually with pictures of grouped 
domestic objects, objects separated from others, or a random assortment of 
squares. The software used for this was Cogent 2000
11
. 
5.3.1 Design of the study 
 
A block design was utilised in this experiment. Each block comprised of 4 images 
and every image was shown for 3 seconds. Participants were presented with 
images of objects placed together in a group, (the control condition) and similar 
images of the same objects where one of the objects was separated from the 
group. These formed the ‗lonely objects‘ – experimental condition.  
                                                          
11 The software used was developed by the Cogent 2000 team at the Functional Imaging Laboratory and the 
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience at University College of London. 
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Figure 5.2 Stimulus sequences used in the experimental design. Blocked images of 
scrambled objects were presented first, followed by blocked images of grouped objects, 
then again blocked images of scrambled objects and blocked images of lonely objects. 
This sequence was repeated 8 times in both parts of the experiment – before and after 
priming.  
 
During the experiment all subjects underwent the scanning procedure twice, 
without repositioning. In the initial part of the experiment, participants passively 
viewed the presented pictures. To maintain the participants‘ attention, subjects 
were asked to press a button every time they see an image in a green frame.  
Then, before repeating this procedure, participants were primed to personify the 
objects. They were asked to imagine that ―the objects they had just seen have 
feelings‖. Then subjects were told that ―some of the presented images show 
objects that have been excluded from the rest of the group and these objects may 
feel lonely and isolated‖.  
After the priming, participants were presented with exactly the same stimuli 
again. The participants‘ task remained the same as in the first part of the 
experiment (to press a button upon seeing an image with a green frame), but at the 
same time participants were instructed to try to imagine how the separated object 
from the other objects might feel. Therefore the key difference between the two 
parts of experiment is that in the second part the participants‘ attention was drawn 
to the possible interpretation of the stimuli as representing social relationship 
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(such as exclusion) and the associated emotions. The aim of priming (through the 
use of verbal instructions and context) was to influence the control‘s group 
tendency to mentalise the shown images. The same set of stimuli was used before 
and after priming to minimise cognitive differences between two parts of the 
experiment and instead to try to influence the participants‘ subjective perception 
of the viewed objects.  
 
5.3.2 Participants 
 
One synaesthete, GF, and twelve non-synaesthetic volunteers (mean age 27 years 
± 4.4 SD, range 18-33) participated in the experiment, among which were 6 
females and 6 males, all right-handed. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision and gave written consent to participate in the study. Before the 
scanning procedure, participants were screened in accordance with standard 
procedures and were informed that they can stop taking part in the experiment any 
time they wish. Participants also were reassured that their personal details will be 
kept confidential.   
GF is a 26 years old female, postgraduate student in humanities, who experiences 
sequence-personality synaesthesia, co-occurring with colour grapheme 
synaesthesia. GF attributes personalities and genders to letters, numbers, and days 
of the week, months, simple shapes, cardinal directions, body parts and inanimate 
objects. Personalities and genders associated with graphemes, months and 
weekdays are discussed further in Chapter 2. Personalities for inanimate objects, 
including body parts, clothes, plants, shapes and other everyday objects are shown 
in Table 4.1 in Chapter 4. 
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5.3.3 Data analysis 
 
Functional MRI data preprocessing and statistical analysis were implemented 
using SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Before the statistical analysis was carried out, 
the standard preprocessing steps were conducted: realignment to the mean 
functional image in each session, co-registration of the functional images with a 
high-resolution anatomical image, normalisation into standard anatomical space 
using the Montreal Neurological Institute template provided by SPM5 and spatial 
smoothing with 8 mm full-width half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.  
Whole brain statistical analysis was performed using the general linear model 
(GLM) and all trials were convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response 
function. A high-pass filter with a cut-off of 128 s was applied to remove the low 
frequency drift in the data. To obtain statistical parametric maps we computed a t-
test. In the group of non-synaesthetic controls, according to the random effects 
theory (Horowitz, Friston and Taylor, 2000), a second level analysis was 
conducted to analyse the data at a group level. All results (from a single 
synaesthete and a control group) were threshold at p<0.05, family-wise error 
(FWE) corrected. 
  
5.4 Results 
 
The first analysis evaluated the BOLD signal changes recorded during viewing of 
the ‗lonely objects‘ condition compared to the ‗grouped objects‘ condition in the 
synaesthete and the control group. Based on a previous study on the neural basis 
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of personification of graphemes in synaesthesia that observed precuneus 
activation in response to personified graphemes, it was hypothesised that 
precuneus activation will be also observed during the personification of inanimate 
objects in synaesthesia, together with other brain regions involved in social 
cognition. Whole brain analyses of the tested synaesthete in a condition 
comparing neural responses to images of ‗lonely‘ versus ‗grouped‘ objects before 
priming (L1>G1) are displayed in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1. As predicted, these 
results show a significant increase (FWE corrected) in activation in the precuneus, 
the temporo-parietal junction and the posterior cingulate gyrus, but not in the 
hippocampus, the prefrontal cortex and lateral temporal cortex. This effect was 
not observed in the control group, among whom we did not observed any FWE 
corrected activations. 
In the opposite contrast, comparing brain responses to ‗grouped‘ versus ‗lonely‘ 
objects before priming (G1>L1), there was not significant (FWE corrected) 
changes in brain activations observed neither in the tested synaesthete nor in 
control group.    
Next, we examined the differences in BOLD signal changes in response to 
viewing the same images, when subjects knew explicitly the ‗story behind the 
images‘ and were trying to imagine how the ‗lonely objects‘ could feel. This was 
done by comparing neural responses to images of ‗lonely‘ versus ‗grouped‘ 
objects after priming (L2>G2). This was meant to induce synaesthesia-like 
personification of inanimate objects in non-synaesthetic participants, but also it 
was also expected that the explicit focus of attention on imagining feelings of 
‗lonely objects‘ would increase the strength of previously observed activations in 
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the synaesthete. The results of whole brain analysis of the L2>G2 condition in the 
synaesthete revealed bilateral precuneus activation and right temporo-parietal 
junction activation and the prefrontal cortex activation as described in the Table 
5.2 and Figure 5.4. In the opposite contrast, comparing brain responses to 
‗grouped‘ objects versus ‗lonely‘ objects after priming (G2>L2), there was not 
significant (FWE corrected) changes in brain activations observed neither in GF 
nor in control group.    
In the control group, the analysis of the L2>G2 condition showed a significant 
increase in activity in the brain regions involved in social cognition and self-
reflection, such as the precuneus and the insula. All other brain areas displayed 
significantly increased BOLD signal when participants were viewing the 'lonely' 
objects after priming, compared to the control condition - 'grouped' objects. These 
results are shown in Figure 5.5 and Table 5.3, which provides anatomical 
locations, coordinates, and t values of the statistically most active voxels for those 
brain regions consistently activated across subjects .  
Table 5.1 Brain regions for L1>G1contrast, where viewing ‗lonely objects‘ elicited more 
activity than viewing ‗grouped objects‘ in the synaesthete GF before priming (FWE 
corrected) 
 
Anatomical location 
 
Cluster 
 Size 
t-value Coordinates 
Temporo-parietal junction 5 5.16 69 -36 27 
Precuneus  1 4.93 -18 -72 60 
Posterior cingulate cortex 2 5.57 -3 -42 30 
Fusiform gyrus 1 5.26 -45 -81 -9 
Precentral gyrus 2 5.00 33 -3 69 
Inferior occipital gyrus 9 5.71 -39 -87 -3 
Culmen 3 5.07 51 -51 -30 
Culmen 2 5.07 39 -54 -24 
Declive 2 5.13 -42 -75 -21 
Declive 9 5.59 45 -63 -18 
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Figure 5.3 Regions of significant changes in activation when the synaesthete GF viewed 
images of lonely objects compared to when viewing ‗grouped objects‘ before priming 
(L1>G1 contrast) 
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Table 5.2 Brain regions for L2>G2 contrast, where viewing ‗lonely objects‘ elicited more 
activity than viewing ‗grouped objects‘ in the synaesthete GF after priming (FWE 
corrected) 
 
Anatomical location 
 
Cluster  
size 
t-value Coordinates 
Precuneus 98 6.34 9 -75 60 
Precuneus 15 5.80 6 -51 51 
Precuneus 22 5.72 9 -51 78 
Precuneus 7 5.30 -3 -78 54 
Precuneus 1 4.92 6 -66 51 
Superior parietal lobule 143 6.45 30 -57 66 
Temporo-parietal junction  24 5.53 57 -39 36 
Temporo-parietal junction 2 5.17 48 -36 45 
Temporo-parietal junction 1 5.26 63 -36 21 
Mid temporal gyrus  70 6.59 42 -66 18 
Mid temporal gyrus 14 6.55 54 -69 12 
Inferior temporal gyrus 3 5.37 -45 -48 -21 
Superior frontal gyrus 15 6.02 30 -3 69 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital frontal) 8 5.73 51 21 -6 
Middle frontal gyrus 6 5.25 27 -12 54 
Prefrontal cortex 4 5.16 42 30 33 
Prefrontal cortex 1 5.02 36 30 54 
Precentral gyrus 7 5.34 51 6 42 
Precentral gyrus 1 4.95 -30 -15 57 
Fusiform gyrus  5 5.28 42 -27 -18 
Inferior occipital gyrus 39 7.39 -42 -87 0 
Inferior occipital gyrus 1 5.02 51 -72 -9 
Middle occipital gyrus 2 5.19 -36 -75 12 
Cuneus 11 5.94 -15 -87 36 
Culmen 16 5.86 48 -54 -27 
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Figure 5.4 Regions of significant changes in activation for L2>G2 contrast, when the 
synaesthete GF viewed images of lonely objects compared to when viewing ‗grouped 
objects‘ after priming 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Results for changes in brain activation for L2>G2 contrast, when non-
synaesthetic group was viewing ‗Lonely Objects‘ versus ‗Grouped Objects‘ after priming 
(FWE corrected) 
Anatomical location Cluster  
size 
t-value Coordinates 
Precuneus 9 14.75 -21 -60 54 
Insula 1 10.36 -33 24 3 
Insula 2 9.97 -33 9 3 
Middle occipital gyrus 1 9.91 -33 -84 24 
Culmen 1 9.23 -15 -60 -3 
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Figure 5.5 Regions of significant changes in activation when the non-synaesthetic group 
viewed images of lonely objects compared to when viewing ‗grouped objects‘ after 
priming (L2>G2 contrast) 
 
 
5.5. Discussion  
 
The objective of the present study was to examine the neural correlates of 
involuntary object personification experienced by the tested synaesthete, to whom 
certain objects appear as having feelings, personalities, genders and relationships 
with each other. Using the ‗lonely objects‘ paradigm, it was aimed to assess 
whether the objects presented can automatically induce personification, even 
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when attention of the synaesthete was directed towards a different task. It was 
hypothetised that viewing images of ‗lonely objects‘ will induce activation in the 
precuneus and other brain regions implicated in self-reflection and self-projection, 
including the temporo-parietal junction, prefrontal cortex and the posterior 
cingulated, the lateral temporal cortex and in the hippocampus. Additionally, the 
study was designed to examine whether similar patterns of activations will be 
observed in non-synaesthetic subjects in two different conditions - when they 
were naïve about the social meaning behind the pictures, and when they were 
prompted to focus their attention on the ‗social situations‘ represented in the 
pictures.  
The results of the study show significant changes in the brain areas implicated in 
social cognition and self-projection, such as the precuneus, the temporo-parietal 
junction and the posterior cingulate cortex, but not in the hippocampus and lateral 
temporal cortex when the synaesthete GF was naïve to the social context of 
presented images. This is consistent with previous studies on neural correlates of 
graphemes in sequence-personality synaesthesia (Amin et al., 2011; see also 
Chapter 3 of this thesis). In non-synaesthetes, no changes in activation were 
observed when participants were naïve about the ‗social situation‘ in the pictures. 
However, after priming, when they focused their attention on the feelings of 
‗lonely objects‘ and tried to imagine what the objects feel, significant changes in 
the activation in the precuneus and in the insula were observed. 
On the basis of these findings, could it be the case that the self-projection 
mechanism is activated in synaesthetic personification as previously proposed in 
Chapter 3? It is plausible that synaesthetic personification is due to a lower 
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threshold for activation of social brain regions normally activated when thinking 
or perceiving other people. Perhaps the lower threshold for activation of this 
system in the synaesthete GF induces simulation processes of social contents and 
the associated mental states, moods and feelings are assigned to the perceived 
objects. In most people, the ‗social brain‘ regions are usually activated when 
perceiving other people, but in synaesthesia it appears that these regions are 
activated not only by other people, but also by inanimate objects. This matches 
the phenomenology of the experience of the tested synaesthete, in which she 
reports that inanimate objects have social and affective characteristics. This 
suggests that she has increased sensitivity to perceive human-like qualities, not 
only in humans but also in objects, especially when they are arranged in the way 
that resembles social situations. Additionally, the results of the study provides 
converging evidence for the automaticity of social attributions to objects in 
synaesthesia, since the synaesthete GF was asked to focus her attention on an 
unrelated task and remained naïve about the social aspect of the images. 
The lack of the activations to presented images of ‗lonely‘ objects in non-
synaesthetes is in line with their subjective reports given after the experiment, in 
which none of them reported thinking of the objects presented as having feelings 
or any other human-like qualities before priming, and instead being surprise at the 
suggestion that the objects presented might have feelings. However, after priming, 
when non-synaesthetic participants focused their attention on the feelings of 
‗lonely objects‘ and tried to imagine what the objects feel, changes in activation of 
the brain regions associated with mentalising and self-reflection, namely in the 
precuneus and in the insula, were observed. These results slightly differ from the 
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previous neuroimaging studies into non-synaesthetic personification, in which 
personification processes activated prefrontal cortex, temporo-parietal junction, 
the precuneus,  superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles adjacent to the 
amygdale (Castelli, Happe, Frith and Frith, 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happe and Frith, 
2002; Herberlain and Saxe, 2005; Tavares, Lawrence and Barnard, 2008). This 
may be due to the fact that the current study differs from previous investigations 
into non-synaesthetic personification in several ways. Firstly, instead of testing 
personification induced by animate stimuli (e.g., point-walkers, moving shapes 
etc), the element of movement was excluded from the study to be able to examine 
attribution of human-like qualities to inanimate objects. Secondly, the social 
meaning of the images shown was not made clear to the tested subjects who, 
instead, were directed to focus their attention on a different, unrelated task 
(participants were asked to press a button after noticing a green frame appear) to 
investigate automatically occurring  personification. Thirdly, the stimuli used 
were primarily designed to investigate synaesthetic personification and therefore 
could be less effective in inducing personification in the general population.  
Nevertheless, the results of the current study suggest that the underlying neural 
mechanisms for automatic personification of objects in the synaesthete GF and for 
voluntary personification of inanimate objects in non-synaesthetes are not exactly 
the same. In non-synaesthetes, the voluntary personification of objects also 
activates the precuneus (similarly to the tested synaesthete) and additionally the 
insula, but not other brain regions implicated in mentalising. It is worth noting 
that the control participants reported greater difficulty in ‗inferring‘ personality 
traits of inanimate objects, in comparison with the tested synaesthete. This is 
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consistent with the behavioural results (see Chapter 4) showing that synaesthetes 
who personify objects, were significantly slower in responding to incongruent 
than congruent trials when presented with an image of a happy facial expression 
preceded by an image of ‗lonely objects‘ (incongruent trial) or the same image 
preceded by sad face (‗incongruent trial). Given that this effect was not observed 
in non-synaesthetes (see Chapter 4), it was suggested that that personification in 
synaesthesia is automatic, whereas personification in non-synaesthetes require a 
more deliberate effort. The relevance of this is noticeably supported by the current 
findings, since the changes in activations of the ‗social brain‘ regions (when 
subjects were naïve about the social aspect of presented images) were observed 
only in the synaesthete GF and not in non-synaesthetes. However, taking into 
account the fact that when non-synaesthetes voluntarily focused their attention on 
the feelings of ‗lonely objects‘, the observed changes we in the activation were in 
the precuneus and in the insula – brain regions implicated in self-reflection and 
thinking about other people. Therefore the possibility that personifications in 
synaesthesia and in general population are governed by the same self-projection 
mechanism cannot be excluded. The limitation of the current study is that 
personification in general population was not probed under conditions that are 
known to facilitate this process (in the situation of social isolation, when 
perceived entities are ambiguous and unpredictable and when they are showing 
movement resembling the speed of human movement; Epley et al., 2008; 
Morewedge et al., 2007; Waytz et al., 2010), when people are more likely to 
assign their own mental contents to the perceived entities. Future studies could 
seek to compare synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic personification under these 
conditions. Furthermore, the present study could be extended by adding additional 
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analysis providing a more detailed picture of the neural correlates of 
personification. For example, the brain areas identified in Chapter 3 as involved in 
grapheme-personification, could serve as functional ROIs for the current study to 
analyse changes in GF‘s brain activation for personification of inanimate objects. 
This would allow finding brain regions that mediate cognitive processing specific 
for synaesthetic personification that is independent of the type of inducer.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
 The present study has shown that images of inanimate objects can induce 
personification processes in a synaesthete experiencing sequence-
personality synaesthesia. In the tested synaesthete, viewing specially 
designed images revealed activations in the brain areas implicated in 
mentalising, such as the precuneus, the temporo-parietal junction and the 
posterior cingulate.  
 
 This effect is not observed in the general population, unless non-
synaesthetes explicitly focus their attention on the feelings of the 
inanimate objects. Then, similarly as in the tested synaesthete, the 
increased activation in the precuneus is observed.  
 
 Based on these results it is proposed that synaesthetic and non-synaesthetic 
personification utilises partially overlapping neural mechanisms with 
general social cognition; however control participants reported having a 
greater difficulty in attributing personality traits of inanimate objects, in 
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comparison with the synaesthete GF. A possible, but tentative explanation 
for this might be that the brain regions implicated in mentalising and self-
projection have a lower threshold for activation in subjects with sequence-
personality synaesthesia than in the general population and therefore 
inanimate objects and linguistic sequences are perceived as having social 
and affective characteristics.  
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Chapter 6  Psychological correlates of 
synaesthetic personification 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Considering the fact that in sequence-personality synaesthesia, synaesthetes 
perceive graphemes, weekdays, months, inanimate objects, body parts (among 
others) as being endowed with personalities, feelings, mental states and 
interactions with each other, it is important to ask what is the relationship between 
synaesthetic personification and such aspects of psychological functioning, as 
empathy and mentalising. Empathic and mentalising skills vary in general 
population. Given that synaesthetes appear to have increased sensitivity to social 
cues (see Chapter 5), think of graphemes in social categories and often feel 
sympathy for inanimate objects, is it possible that they exhibit increased ability to 
mentalise and empathise with other people? Amin and colleagues (2011) proposed 
two alternative answers to this question. Firstly, they suggested that 
personification could lower empathic abilities, given that the empathic resources 
are allocated not only to social interactions with other people, but also appear to 
be involved in thinking of graphemes and inanimate objects. Secondly, the 
authors proposed that personification may be limited to the domain of grapheme 
processing only and therefore may not affect the empathic abilities used in general 
social cognition. In their study, Amin and colleagues (2011) assessed empathy in 
ten personifying synaesthetes using the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004). Their findings suggested that synaesthetes do not differ in 
empathy from the general population; however they pointed out the variability in 
Chapter 6 Psychological correlates of synaesthetic personification  
152 
 
individual scores: a few participants scored very low, whereas one participant 
scored much higher than average. Therefore, they were unable to provide a 
definite answer concerning the relationship between synaesthetic personification 
and empathy. They concluded, however, that an increased ability to empathise is 
not necessary for synaesthetic personification. To investigate this relationship 
further, in the current study a group of personifying synaesthetes were also tested 
on their empathic abilities using the EQ test. In contrast to Amin et al (2011), in 
this study, the Eyes Test was also included. This is a test that requires the tested 
individual to recognise mental states from images of a person's eyes and 
surrounding areas was used to assess mentalising processes in synaesthetic 
personification. It is important to include mentalising processes in the current 
study given that empathy and mentalising processes are known linked with each 
other (de Vignemont and Singer, 2006). 
One interesting aspect of personification in synaesthesia is the difference in the 
types of inducers eliciting it. In some of the synaesthetes, only letters or numbers 
induce personification, whereas in others personification is elicited not only by 
letters, numbers and other linguistic sequences, but also by various inanimate 
objects, as well as body parts. Could it be the case that more widespread 
personification across various categories of linguistic and non-linguistic 
sequences is linked with lower empathy (as previously suggested by Amin et al; 
2011), whereas in case of more selective personification (e.g., limited to letters 
only), empathic skills are not affected by personification? Could this be also the 
case with mentalising processes? To date, this hypothesis has not yet been 
empirically investigated; this is the first study to test empirically for the presence 
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of differences in empathy/mentalising abilities between synaesthetes with a 
different extent of personification.   
It is important to note that objects are personified not only in synaesthetes, but 
also in the general population. One of the proposed explanations for 
personification among the general population emphasizes that humans have a 
strong need for social connections with others and that in situations of social 
isolation or loneliness people instinctively compensate for this and perceive non-
human-entities as human-like (Epley et al., 2008). In fact, Epley and colleagues 
(2008) induced experimentally subjective feelings of loneliness in tested 
participants by presenting to them life predictions, which participants were told 
were based on their personality profiles, but in fact were tailored to induce 
feelings of loneliness. To increase feelings of loneliness in the participant, they 
were told they will end up alone in life. In result, the induced feeling of loneliness 
led to a higher tendency to think of non-humans as they were human-like. Could 
feeling lonely or isolated be correlated with personification of objects in 
synaesthesia? If this were the case, it is possible that synaesthetic personification 
is also linked with loneliness.  
 
6.2 Aim and hypotheses 
 
The aim of the current study was to examine the relationship between synaesthetic 
personification and psychological dispositions such as empathy, mentalising and 
loneliness. It was expected that synaesthetes are more empathic and have higher 
than average mentalising skills, but also experience increased levels of loneliness. 
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These predictions were motivated by the fact that synaesthesia is associated with 
enhanced sensory processing in the modalities of the concurrent (Bannisy et al., 
2009). For example, synaesthetes who experience colour in response to grapheme 
are better at perceptual discrimination of colour in comparison to non-
synaesthetes (Yaro and Ward, 2007), whereas synaesthetes with mirror-touch 
synaesthesia are better than non-synaesthetes in recognising facial expressions 
(Bannisy et al., 2011) and also exhibit heightened empathic ability (Banissy and 
Ward, 2007). In the synaesthesia literature there has already been one attempt to 
establish a relationship between emphatic abilities and synaesthetic 
personification (Amin et al., 2011), but due to the small sample size and 
heterogeneous results the conducted study did not provide conclusive results. 
 
6.3 Method 
 
6.3.1 The UCLA Loneliness Scale 
 
The revised version of UCLA Loneliness Scale (University of California, Los 
Angeles) consists of 20 items measuring subjective feeling of loneliness and 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction with relationships with other people (Russel, Peplau 
and Cutrona, 1980). The participants are asked to indicate on a scale (ranging 
from 1 to 4) how often they feel in the way described by each of the given 
statements. In the current study, the electronic version of the UCLA Loneliness 
Scale was distributed using the online survey software Survey Monkey 
(http://www.survey monkey.com/). 
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6.3.2 Reading the ‘Mind in the Eyes’ Test 
 
Reading the ‗Mind in the Eyes‘ Test (referred to in this as the Eyes Test) is a 
measure of mentalising processes at the stage of recognition and attribution of 
mental states. The Eyes Testoriginates in autism research, but it also has been 
used in testing of social intelligence in the general population. The revised version 
of the test consists of 36 images illustrating human eyes obtained from images of 
actors‘ faces. Half of the faces are male and half are female. In the test there are 
also printed four descriptors of mental states: one correctly describes the 
expression depicted by the eyes, and three that are incorrect. This testrequires 
subjects to identify the mental state of the person in the photograph (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001). Participants are also provided with a glossary explaining all the 
mental state terms included in the task, to which they could refer while 
completing the test. In the current study, an online version of the test was used, an 
example of which is shown in Figure 6.1.
12
 
 
Figure 6.1An example of a question used in the online version of the Eyes Test 
 
6.3.3 The Empathy Quotient (EQ) 
 
The EQ was initially designed to test empathic skills in adults with high 
functioning autism and Asperger‘ s syndrome, but it can be also used to test 
empathy in the general population. The EQ is a self- report questionnaire that 
                                                          
12An online version of the Eyes Test can be found at  http:// glennrowe.net/BaronCohen/ Faces/EyesTest.aspx 
(Date last retrieved 14/11/2012). 
Chapter 6 Psychological correlates of synaesthetic personification  
156 
 
comprises 40 questions exploring empathy and 20 filter questions that are 
included to distract subjects from the overall focus on empathy (Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004).An online version of EQ test was used in this study.
13
 
6.4 Subjects 
Eleven synaesthetes (mean age 31.5, SD±13.9) who reported personifying 
graphemes participated in the study, 6 of whom were female and 5 male. Some of 
the participants reported personifying not only graphemes, but also inanimate 
objects, as shown in Table 6.1. Participants were not chosen randomly – they were 
self-selected. Participants were recruited via advertising on Brunel University 
campus and Royal Holloway campus, and also via the Synaesthesia Research 
Database. All participants completed the Personification Questionnaire described 
in Chapter 2.  
 
Table 6.1 List of synaesthetes with types of personification experienced 
Synaesthete Sex Grapheme 
Personification 
Object 
Personification 
RP M YES NO 
FM M YES YES 
SM F YES NO 
SJ M YES YES 
GF F YES YES 
CS F YES NO 
CG F YES YES 
UL F YES NO 
DL M YES NO 
YG M YES YES 
DL F YES NO 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 The EQ used test is located at http://glennrowe.net/baroncohen/empathyquotient/ empathyquotient.aspx 
(Date last retrieved 14/11/2012). 
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6.5 Procedure 
 
Participants who previously completed the Personification Questionnaire (see 
Chapter 4) were invited to participate in online study using the EQ, the Eyes Test 
and the UCLA Loneliness Scale to measure psychological aspects of 
personification in synaesthesia. The eleven participants who agreed to take part in 
the study were emailed links to online versions of the questionnaires. Once they 
completed EQ and the Eyes Test, resulting scores for individual participants were 
generated automatically and participants emailed them to the researcher. The 
results of UCLA Loneliness scale were directly accessed online.   
6.6 Results 
 
6.6.1 The Empathy Quotient  
 
Table 6.2 An overview of results from the EQ test 
Empathy Quotient  Mean EQ Score Min EQ Score Max EQ Score SD 
All 48 23 62 10.3 
Male 44 23 62 14.3 
Female 52 49 59 3.6 
 
Mean total EQ, standard deviation, minimum and maximum scores are presented 
for all synaesthetes, and for male and female synaesthetes separately in Table 6.2. 
Personifying synaesthetes scored an average of 48 points, which is above the 
average EQ score of 42.1 for the general population that was found in the study of 
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright et al (2004); however, this difference is not 
significant statistically (t(10) =2.01, n.s). 
Female participants scored on average 52 points, which is above the average EQ 
score of 47.2 found in females (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004), and this 
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difference is significant statistically (t(5) = 3.3 , p<0.05). The individual scores of 
all female participants (see Figure 6.2) give a consistent picture – all of the tested 
female synaesthetes scored above the female average score (scores ranged from 
49 to 59). 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Individual EQ scores for female synaesthetes 
 
 
Male participants scored on average 44 points, which is higher than the male 
average of 41.8 found by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004), but this 
difference is not statistically significant (t(4)=0.81, n.s). The individual male 
scores (see Figure 6.3) show that most of the tested male synaesthetes scored 
above the average male score (ranging from 23 to 62); however two of the tested 
male synaesthetes scored lower than average male score, one of them about 1.5 
SD below normal male average.  
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Figure 6.3 Individual EQ scores for male synaesthetes 
 
 
6.6.2  The Eyes Test 
 
 
Table 6.3 Mean scores, standard deviations, minimum and maximum scores in the Eyes 
Test for females, males and all synaesthetes 
 The Eyes Test Mean Min Max Std 
All synaesthetes 25.3 18 33 4.6 
Male 22.6 18 31 5.03 
Female 27.5 24 33 3.01 
 
The average scores for all synaesthetes and both genders separately, together with 
standard deviation, minimal and maximal scores are shown in Table 6.3. On 
average the synaesthetes scored 25.3, which is only slightly below the average 
Eyes Test score for the general population of 26 reported by Baron-Cohen et al., 
(2001). This difference is not statistically significant (t(10) =-0.67, n.s.). 
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Figure 6.4 Individual scores in the Eyes Test for male synaesthetes 
 
Male participants scored an average of 22.6, which is about 0.8 SD below the 
normal male average of 26 reported by Baron‐Cohen and colleagues (2001), but 
this difference is not statistically significant (t(4)= -1.5, n.s.). However, individual 
male scores do vary (the highest score being 31, which is 1.2 SD above the male 
average).  
 
 
Figure 6.5 Individual scores in the Eyes Test for female synaesthetes 
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In the case of female synaesthetes, their average score was 27.5, which is above 
the female average of 26.4 reported by Baron‐Cohen and colleagues (2001), but 
this difference is not statistically significant (t(5)=0.89, n.s.).  However, individual 
scores presented in Figure 6.5 show variability in results – four out of six tested 
female synaesthetes scored slightly below the normal female average with the 
lowest score being 24 (about 0.7 SD below the female average), whereas two 
synaesthetes scored higher than average with the highest score being 33 (about 2 
SD above the female average) .  
 
6.6.3 The relationship between synaesthetic personification and aspects of 
social functioning such as empathy and mentalising  
 
A non-paramteric test Mann-Whitney was carried out to investigate whether 
synaesthetes who personify linguistic sequences and inanimate objects differ in 
their empathic and mentalising skills from synaesthetes who personify linguistic 
sequences only but not inanimate objects. Synaesthetes were grouped according to 
the extent of their personification. Synaesthetes who personify graphemes or 
inanimate objects only were in a one group and synaesthetes who personify both 
graphemes and inanimate objects were in the second group. The results show that 
these two groups do not differ significantly in empathy (U=6.0; n.s.) and in 
mentalising (U=16.5; n.s.), suggesting that synaesthetes who personify graphemes 
and inanimate objects have similar empathy and mentalising skills as synaesthetes 
who personify graphemes only. 
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6.6.4  UCLA Loneliness Scale and synaesthetic personification 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Individual scores in the UCLA Loneliness Scale for all synaesthetes 
 
Personifying synaesthetes scored on ULCA Loneliness Scale on average 46.5, 
with minimum score 31 and maximum score 69 (for individual scores see Figure 
6.6). The average score of synaesthetes is above the normal female (36.06) and 
male (37.06) scores reported by Russel, Peplau and Cutrona (1980). To assess 
whether the average score of all synaesthetes was significantly different than 
average scores of the general population, relative loneliness scores were 
calculated by subtracting the average mean score for the participant‘s gender from 
the individual loneliness scores. Analysis of the relative scores using a one 
sampled t-test showed that there was statistically significant difference in the 
loneliness of synaesthetes and average loneliness in general population (t(10)=2.3, 
p<0.05). 
A non-parametrical test Mann-Whitman was used to test for differences in 
loneliness among personifiers. It was hypothetised that synaesthetes who 
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personify graphemes and inanimate objects feel lonelier and more socially 
isolated than synaesthetes who personify graphemes only. The results show that 
synaesthetes who personify more categories of inducers (linguistic sequences and 
inanimate objects) feel lonelier than synaesthetes who personify linguistic 
sequences only (U=25, p<0.05).  
 
6 .7 Discussion 
 
The aim of the current study was threefold: Firstly, I sought to investigate whether 
empathy and mentalising skills in synaesthetes who personify graphemes and 
inanimate objects differ from those in the general population. It was predicted that 
increased tendency to perceive objects as having human-like mental contents and 
feelings would be associated with heightened empathy and ability to recognise the 
mental states of other people. Secondly, the study aimed to assess the relationship 
between synaesthetic personification and social isolation, predicting that 
personification may be correlated with increased feelings of loneliness and social 
isolation. Thirdly, I sought to examine the relationship between the range of 
personification (i.e. whether synaesthetes personify graphemes only or both 
graphemes and inanimate objects) and degree of social skills shown, such as 
empathy and mentalising. Specifically, it was aimed to investigate whether 
empathy and mentalising skills decrease with more extensive personification. 
These investigations were carried out using following questionnaires - the EQ, the 
Eyes Test and the UCLA Loneliness Scale.  
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6.7.1 Is personification in synaesthesia associated with heightened empathy 
and heightened recognition of mental states? 
 
The results obtained in the study revealed that personifying synaesthetes do not 
have higher than average ability to recognise mental states from the information 
received from observing images of   the eyes and surrounding areas. However, the 
results support the prediction that synaesthesia is associated with heightened 
empathy, but only among female synaesthetes. Male synaesthetes do not differ on 
average from the general population. Interestingly, a similar trend was observed in 
the mental states recognition task: Female synaesthetes were slightly better than 
non-synaesthetic women at recognising mental states, whereas male synaesthetes 
performed slightly worse than the general male population on this task; however 
neither of these differences were statistically significant. The results of the current 
study are congruent with previous findings demonstrating that heightened 
empathy is not necessary for personifying in synaesthesia (Amin et al., 2011) and 
provide some additional evidence supporting their hypothesis that there may be 
two alternative mechanisms underlying personification. The first involves 
heightened sensitivity to social cues derived from a lower threshold for 
mentalising and detecting intentionality, which may result in the benign side-
effect of also personifying non-human things. The other involves inadequate 
mentalising processes resulting in a difficulty to read social cues in human 
interactions as well as application of the mentalising schema in inappropriate 
contexts (e.g., when thinking about graphemes and objects), perhaps due to 
reliance on superficial cues. One open question is whether these mechanisms are 
gender specific, given that the results observed in the current study shows that 
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synaesthetic women but not synaesthetic men have heightened empathic abilities 
and are slightly better than non-synaesthetic women at mental state recognition. 
Larger samples will be required in order to establish this, as well as careful 
control of sampling biases that plague many synaesthesia surveys (e.g., Simner et 
al, 2006). Another interesting question is why extent of inducers eliciting 
personification in synaesthesia varies. The results from the current study 
examined the differences between mentalising and empathy skills in synaesthetes 
with more and less widespread personification. The results show that these skills 
are similar in both groups of personifiers. This suggests that regardless of whether 
synaesthetes personify only graphemes or graphemes and inanimate objects, both 
groups are equally good at mentalising and sharing affective states with other 
people.  
 
6.7.2 Loneliness and personification 
 
The results of the current study indicate that synaesthetes who personify 
graphemes and inanimate objects feel lonelier and more withdrawn from social 
interactions than non-synaesthetes. Additionally, the findings provide evidence 
that the level of loneliness experienced increases with the extent of synaesthetic 
personification. This is consistent with previous findings on personification in 
non-synaesthetes, in which was shown that lonely individuals are more likely to 
think of surrounding entities in human-like categories, a tendency whose purpose 
has been explained as compensating for their lack of social connections with 
others (Epley et al., 2007; 2008). Presumably, having fewer social interactions 
gives synaesthetes time and opportunity to ‗interact‘ with perceived objects and to 
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endow them with personalities, mental lives, and also with social-like 
relationships. In fact, greater loneliness may encourage the creation of 
personalities and social-like relationships among graphemes and inanimate 
objects, a hypothesis supported by the findings of the current study, which show 
that the extent of synaesthetic personification increases with the experience of 
loneliness. The increased feeling of loneliness in personifying synaesthetes and 
the fact that lonely people react stronger to the negatives (Hawkley and Cacioppo, 
2010) corresponds with previous findings in this thesis (Chapter 4), in which the 
‗lonely objects‘ paradigm used sad rather than happy facial expressions as primes 
and was effective in inducing personification in synaesthetes. 
An important limitation of the measurement of loneliness in the current study is 
that loneliness was measured in personifying synaesthetes at the current time of 
their life and lack information about the childhood experiences of synaesthetes, 
i.e. whether as a child they felt lonely and isolated. To investigate this further, it 
would be important to determine whether feelings of loneliness is a relatively 
stable disposition in synaesthetes or rather related to more situational factors. 
Future studies on this topic could include investigations that would examine how 
satisfied/dissatisfied synaesthetes were from their social interactions in childhood 
and examine environmental factors facilitating social interactions, such as number 
of siblings, parental educational attitudes and so on. Importantly, the measure of 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction of social interactions in childhood should be supported 
by the measures of the time that synaesthetes used to spend with friends, 
attendance to various additional classes and participation in various peer 
activities.  
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6.8    Conclusion 
 
 Empathic abilities among female and male synaesthetes differ – female 
personifiers have heightened, whereas male personifiers have average 
emphatic abilities. However some of the male synaesthetes score very low 
on empathy measures, therefore it is suspected that there may be two 
different mechanisms underlying personification as previously suggested 
by Amin et al (2011) and that these mechanisms may be gender specific, 
but this hypothesis requires further testing. Furthermore, synaesthetes do 
not differ from the general population in mentalising skills, and 
mentalising skills in synaesthetes do not change with the increased range 
of personified inducers.  
 Loneliness is associated with personification in the general population, and 
this same is true for synaesthetes who personify graphemes and inanimate 
objects. Synaesthetes who feel more socially isolated exhibit a tendency to 
personify not only linguistic sequences such as graphemes, but also 
inanimate objects. The similarity between synaesthetes and non-
synaesthetes in increased levels of loneliness and tendency to personify 
suggests the possibility that personification of inanimate objects may be 
secondary to grapheme personification, arising from the increased need to 
create social connections with others from the genetic basis for grapheme 
personification.  
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Chapter 7  General discussion and conclusion 
 
 
All human individuals are embedded in the social worlds of others; in the same 
way other people are part of our social world. Being able to infer what other 
people think, feel and intend are fundamental social skills. In a variety of 
situations, mental attributes are ascribed not only to humans but also to inanimate 
objects and other non-human entities. This happens in sequence personality 
synaesthesia, a variant of synaesthesia in which mental states and other human 
qualities are attributed to letters, numbers, time units or inanimate objects.  
Examining brain function that occurs during synaesthetic personifications of 
graphemes, ordinal sequences and objects provides a promising means to test 
theories concerning the neural bases of social cognition, particularly mentalising. 
In this work, the more specific issue of the identification of the cognitive and 
neural mechanisms involved in synaesthetic personification and its relation to 
normal cognition is addressed. 
The investigations in this thesis began with an attempt to characterise and explore 
personification in synaesthesia using a structured questionnaire concerning the 
nature of experienced personification. Having established from the first study 
(Chapter 2) that synaesthetic concurrents include rich and elaborate human-like 
characteristics, in the second study it was aimed to examine whether neural 
changes in synaesthetes correspond to their subjective reports. This second study 
is described in Chapter 3. Given that synaesthetes perceive graphemes as if they 
were people, the results were expected to show changes in brain regions 
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associated with the processing of social stimuli that are usually active when 
people think of other people in their absence (mentalising system). This 
examination took the previous case study of neural correlates in synaesthetic 
personification (Amin et al., 2011) a step further by examining a group of 
synaesthetes rather than a single synaesthete, but also by testing  more elaborate 
forms of synaesthetic personification than grapheme-gender attribution only. 
Since the automaticity of synaesthetic pairings is considered to be one of criteria 
defining synaesthesia, an additional purpose of the study in Chapter 3 was to 
investigate the type of cognitive processing associated with these inducer-
concurrent pairings – whether their processing is under strategic control or lacks 
firm attentional control. Previous research examined the automaticity of 
grapheme-gender pairings only, whereas this study extended this investigation by 
including all social and affective characteristics attributed to graphemes. It was 
expected that the involuntary character of grapheme-personal characteristics 
pairings will be reflected in neural responses when synaesthetes focus their 
attention on an unrelated task. The same argument was employed in Chapter 5, in 
which the neural basis of object personification was investigated together with the 
type of processing (voluntary versus involuntary). However, before examining 
this at the neural level, a further behavioural study was conducted using a Stroop-
like paradigm (Chapter 4), in order to provide initial evidence for the lack of firm 
attentional control in processing of inanimate object personification in 
synaesthesia. In the final empirical study (Chapter 6), it was examined whether 
heightened empathy and mentalising skills (as well as social isolation and 
loneliness) also contribute to personification in synaesthesia (c.f., Epley et al. 
2008).  
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The findings suggest that processes regulating personification of graphemes 
(Chapter 3) and personification of inanimate objects (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) 
lack firm attentional control and appear to be involuntary. At the neural level, the 
brain regions involved in processing synaesthetic personification of graphemes 
(Chapter 3) and inanimate objects (Chapter 5) were found to partially overlap with 
functional anatomy known to be involved in mentalising and other aspects of 
social cognition, but not with all of them. At the psychological level, neither 
heightened empathy nor mentalising skills were found to be necessary for 
synaesthetic personification; however synaesthetes do feel lonelier than average 
person (Chapter 6). 
 
7.1 Should synaesthetic personification be considered as a type of 
synaesthesia?   
 
Given that attributions of personality to graphemes and objects do not take the 
form of simple sensations, but instead include rich biographical descriptions, can 
synaesthetic personification be considered a variant of synaesthesia? When 
synaesthetes talk about letters being in love with each other, having jobs, children 
or blue eyes, how can it be established that this is not purely metaphorical 
description? Previous studies into this phenomenon have provided some empirical 
support for classifying such personification as a new variant of synaesthesia. This 
thesis provides additional evidence showing that such personification satisfies a 
number of commonly cited criteria for synaesthesia, if not all. To verify the 
genuine character of synaesthetic personification, a variety of behavioural and 
neuroimaging methods were used.   
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In Chapter 3, by using a test-retest method, it was shown that grapheme-
personality and grapheme gender pairings in synaesthesia are relatively consistent 
over time, although in the questionnaire (Chapter 2) some of the synaesthetes 
reported that the personalities of graphemes may be influenced by factors such as 
shape, colour or biographical experience of the synaesthete. For example, one of 
the synaesthetes tested in this study reported that the personality of the letter ‗A‘ 
will be happier when written in yellow. These results are consistent with previous 
studies into personification in synaesthesia, which confirm that personal 
characteristics attributed to graphemes (Simner and Holenstein, 2007; Amin et al, 
2011; Simner, Gartner, and Taylor, 2011) and objects (Smilek et al., 2007) do not 
change over time.   
Even if consistency of reported inducer-concurrent pairings is treated as the gold 
standard in synaesthesia research, to be included in the spectrum of synaesthesia, 
the synaesthetic correspondences have to be not only consistent over time, but 
also involuntary and idiosyncratic (Cytowic, 1997; Cytowic and Eagleman, 2009). 
Previous studies on grapheme-personification established the automaticity of 
grapheme-gender attribution using Stroop-like interference paradigms, including 
name-gender discrimination (Simner and Holenstein, 2007) and face-gender 
discrimination (Amin et al., 2011). A cognitive process is considered automatic 
when it is goal-independent, non-conscious, load-sensitivity and fast (Moors and 
De Houwer, 2006). In this thesis, the experiments conducted provided evidence 
for two of these criteria for automatic processing – that the process is goal 
independent and non-conscious.  
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The involvement of attentional control of personal attributions to graphemes was 
investigated in the functional neuroimaging study reported in Chapter 3. In this 
study, personifying synaesthetes were visually presented with personified and 
non-personified graphemes. Participants were asked to press a button whenever 
they noticed the same letters being presented consecutively. The aim was to see if 
any personification-related changes in the brain could be observed, even when 
participants‘ attention was focused on aspects of presented letters other than their 
personalities (showing automaticity of personification). Since the stimuli involved 
in synaesthetic perception of graphemes include social and affective 
characteristics, the results were expected to show changes in brain regions that 
were previously reported to be implicated in thinking about mental contents of 
other people not physically present (Waytz and Mitchell, 2011), but also in 
anthropomorphic processing (Castelli et al., 2000) when non-synaesthetes think of 
non-human entities as if they were human. The findings of the study show that 
even when synaesthetes were instructed to engage in tasks other than focusing 
their attention on the personifications induced by graphemes, there are changes in 
brain activations in regions that overlap with the brain regions associated with 
mentalising and self-projection, including the temporo-parietal junction, 
precuneus, posterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex. This finding is consistent 
with the notion that specific synaesthetic inducer-concurrent pairs induce changes 
in the brain regions known to be involved in processing of those pairs. The results 
demonstrate that seeing grapheme induces personification even when synaesthetes 
are engaged a in different task, which implies that grapheme personification in 
synaesthesia is non-intentional.  
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In this thesis, it was proposed that inanimate object personification is involuntary; 
this was investigated in a functional neuroimaging experiment, as well as by using 
a variation of the Stroop paradigm.   
In Chapter 4, synaesthetes who personify inanimate objects and graphemes and a 
group of controls were presented with images of a ‗lonely‘ objects. The images 
presented showed several identical objects, the majority of which were positioned 
together in a group but one of which was separated from the rest (imitating a 
social situation of loneliness and/or rejection). This was followed in the 
presentation sequence by a target face expressing sadness (the congruent 
condition) or happiness (the incongruent condition). Synaesthetes also viewed 
images of grouped objects that were followed by a happy (congruent condition) or 
sad (incongruent condition) target face. This experiment was designed as a 
reaction time task, in which synaesthetes were required to decide whether the face 
presented was happy or sad. The results of the experiment showed  that 
synaesthetes were significantly slower in their responses to incongruent than to 
congruent trials, suggesting that the feelings attributed to inanimate objects 
interfere with the process of judging others people‘s feelings (at least those 
indicated by facial expressions). This congruency effect was not observed in 
controls.  
This finding demonstrates two aspects of automaticity in synaesthetic 
personification of inanimate objects: The observed congruency effect in 
synaesthetes occurred without conscious monitoring of presented letters moods.  
Secondly, the congruency effect occurred even though synaesthetes did not focus 
on similarities between face/object moods correspondences, but instead their task 
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involved discrimination of the facial expression. This strongly suggests that 
synaesthetes personify objects without intending to do so, but also that they 
cannot prevent personifying objects. Although the paradigm used did not examine 
the fastness criterion for automaticity (primes were displayed for 250ms) or load-
insensitivity criterion, this experiment provides converging evidence that 
synaesthetic personification of inanimate objects is, at least in some aspects, 
automatic and involuntary. It is important to note that in this experiment the 
personification of inanimate objects in synaesthetes was induced via subtle social 
cues contained in the separation of one object from the rest rather than being pre-
existing association, and synaesthetic attributions of human-like characteristics to 
inanimate objects formed during the study. This is consistent with the previous 
case study of TE in which was shown that personalities of objects can be formed 
following a single encounter with them (Smilek et al., 2007). The formation of 
new inducer-concurrent pairs is not specific to synaesthetic personification only, it 
also occurs in grapheme-colour synaesthesia when synaesthetes learn new 
language they report acquiring colours for new letters (Bergfeld Mills, 2002).  
Additional evidence for lack of firm voluntary control of inanimate object 
personification is provided in Chapter 5. In the functional neuroimaging 
experiment, a synaesthete and a control group were presented with the same two 
sets of images displaying the same objects that were used in the Stroop-like 
experiment conducted in Chapter 4: in some images one object was separated 
from the other objects, while in the other images all objects were presented 
grouped together. Initially, all participants were kept unaware as to the real aim of 
the experiment and were asked to perform an unrelated task (to press a button 
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when they saw a green frame around the images). This was meant to show 
whether a limited cue (spatial separation versus clusterring) could induce 
involuntary personification that is reflected in changes in neural activity in the 
brain areas associated with mentalising and anthropomorphic thought. Indeed, 
such changes were observed in the temporo-parietal junction, the precuneus and 
the posterior cingulate in the tested syanesthete GF, but not in the control group. It 
is important to note that even when control participants were asked to think of 
objects as if they had feelings, the observed activations in GF who was focusing 
her attention on unrelated task, were still greater than in controls. This provides 
additional evidence that the resulting activations in the tested synaesthete are 
likely to be due to processing that lacks firm attentional control rather than 
intentional or deliberate strategies.  
Furthermore, GF showed a similar pattern of activations and even more extended 
activations when asked specifically to consider the feelings of objects. It is 
possible that this pattern of activation was observed because GF focused her 
attention on the ‗social aspects‘ of the situation in the images. This is a reasonable 
conclusion, since GF was not engaged in performing any additional, unrelated 
task and she was allowed to focus her attention on the ‗feelings of objects‘. 
Therefore it is not surprising that the activations were larger than when GF was 
performing another cognitive task, unrelated to the objects personification task. 
This indicates that personification of inanimate objects can be modulated by 
attentional load, which is not uncommon in social cognition. For example, when 
we walk to work and pass other pedestrians, we do not necessarily think about 
their mental states, feelings or personality traits, and may only process the most 
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salient cues (e.g., an angry face, or loud laughter). However, when we decide to 
focus our attention on the mental contents of those people, then we are able to 
infer more about their mental states.    
In general, the findings obtained in this work provide converging evidence that 
personification can be considered as a variant of synaesthesia (or at the very least, 
share many features with other types of synaesthesia). The investigation showed 
that synaesthetic social and affective characteristics of graphemes are consistent 
over time, vary across synaesthetes and have involuntary character, thus fulfilling 
the definitional criteria of synaesthesia, according to which synaesthesia is a 
neurological phenomenon, in which a stimulus either evokes a perceptual 
experience in another sensory modality or triggers processing in another cognitive 
domain/stream and the inducer-concurrent pairings are consistent over time, 
involuntary and idiosyncratic (Hubbard, 2007).  
 
7.2 Synaesthetic personification and its relationship to normal 
cognition 
 
Two aspects of the relationship between normal cognition and synaesthetic 
personification were investigated. It was aimed to examine the neural correlates of 
synaesthetic personification and their relationship to brain functions, and also the 
relationship between development and synaesthetic personification. 
7.2.1 Neural correlates of synaesthetic personification and brain functions  
 
The functional neuroimaging studies described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 
investigated which brain regions are involved in personification of graphemes and 
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inanimate objects. The precuneus and temporo-parietal junction were found to be 
activated in synaesthetic personification of both graphemes and inanimate objects. 
Additional brain regions activated during grapheme personification included the 
insula and the medial prefrontal cortex, and for inanimate objects personification, 
the posterior cingulate cortex. These brain areas overlap with regions known to be 
involved in mentalising and self-reflection, suggesting that common mechanisms 
implement both synaesthetic personification and social cognition.  
The precuneus has been previously implicated in synaesthetic attribution of 
gender to graphemes (Amin et al., 2011). This brain region also is known to be 
involved in the processing of mental imagery (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006) and 
has been proposed to be a nodal structure for self-reference (Abu-Akel and 
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), given that it has functional connections with the inferior 
parietal lobule and medial prefrontal cortex. The precuneus, together with the 
posterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex, have been associated with 
explicit and implicit self-referential processing (Rameson, Satpute and Lieberman, 
2010). The medial prefrontal cortex is a crucial brain region for the perception of 
people and understanding of the social aspects of other mental agents (Mitchell et 
al., 2005). This area is active not only when participants listen to stories testing 
mentalising, for example, the ‗burglar story‘ (Happe, 1994), but also when they 
are shown a set of objects and asked to assess whether a particular person, for 
instance Christopher Columbus, would know how to use them (Goel et al., 1995). 
Studies that used purposefully moving shape stimuli (following Heider and 
Simmel, 1944) showed that viewing induces spontaneous attribution of intentions 
and other mental contents to those shapes and that this is associated with 
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activation in the medial prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction (Castelli 
et al., 2000). Similarly as with the medial prefrontal cortex, the temporo-parietal 
junction is considered to be a key brain region involved in mentalising (e.g., Frith, 
2007). The temporo-parietal junction has been proposed to be necessary in 
perspective taking (Ruby and Decety, 2004) and necessary for inferring the 
mental states of others since lesions in the left temporo-parietal junction impair 
this process (Samson et al., 2004). The insula is implicated in empathy, but is also 
active during the ‗rubber hand‘ illusion indicating the insula‘s importance in 
integrating information from diverse functional systems (Craig, 2009; Kurth et al., 
2010). Furthermore, evidence from neuropsychology suggests that lesions of the 
right (and sometimes left) parietal cortex may produce misattributions of agency 
that itself sometimes involves animistic attributions expressed in delusional 
misidentifications of body parts and attribution of personalities to limbs, giving 
the misidentified arms or legs nicknames names such as ―George‖ or ―Floppy 
Joe‖ (Critchley 1955, p. 286).  
Given that synaesthetic percepts in personification are not limited to the  ‗mental 
states‘ of graphemes (e.g., G likes to be in the centre of attention; 5 is stressed), 
but also include elaborate biographical information such as age, profession, 
gender, relationships, etc, can it be still claimed that common mechanisms 
implement synaesthetic personification and mentalising? The results of the studies 
described in this thesis suggest that all these various aspects of concurrents in 
personification rely on the same set of brain areas. In fact, these brain regions are 
implicated in the processing of episodic memory, which is known to have 
autobiographical reference (Tulving, 1983). This makes sense in the light of the 
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fact that some of the tested synaesthetes reported that their graphemes‘ 
personalities reminded them of people they knew in the past (for details, see 
Chapter 2), suggesting that even though synaesthesia is congenital, 
autobiographical experiences can influence characteristics attributed to 
graphemes. In this thesis, the brain changes observed to occur in response to 
synaesthetic personification are explained as being induced by the co-activation of 
self-related social processing that is not recognised as originating in one‘s self; 
rather they are projected onto graphemes or objects and attributed to them. This, 
in turn, leads to subjective experiences of personification of graphemes and 
objects that comprise of one‘s own mental state representations, personality traits 
and other biographical experiences. In view of the fact that, in most people, 
‗social brain‘ regions are activated generally rather than selectively in response to 
the perception of other people, it is reasonable to assume that synaesthetes have a 
lower threshold for activation of the social brain regions and this facilitates 
simulation processes of social contents in response not only to people, but also to 
graphemes and objects. This assumption is rooted in the simulation theory, 
particularly in its consideration of the self-projection mechanism - a type of 
simulation that is used to infer mental states of others when they are not 
physically present. This mechanism is used when people cannot rely on using 
observable perceptual cues, such as bodily movement or facial expressions to 
infer the mental states of others, and instead imagine themselves inhabiting the 
mind of another person (Mitchell, 2009). Its relevance for synaesthetic 
personification lies in fact that personification is induced by inanimate non-human 
things, which do not provide real observable social behaviour that would allow an 
observer to endow them with mental contents. Instead, the (induced by them) self-
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referential processing is not recognised as constructed by their own minds and 
attributed to graphemes and inanimate objects. Therefore, the misidentification of 
the source of the mental state and personality traits perceived may underlie the 
attribution of human-like characteristics that occurs in sequence-personality 
synaesthesia. This is consistent with the developmental explanation for 
personification in synaesthesia proposed by Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (in press) 
maintaining that personification may be an excessive manifestation of the general 
human tendency to perceive social reality using the self as a model.  
However, it is important to note that this interpretation of the neuroimaging 
results collected for personification of graphemes (Chapter 3) and inanimate 
objects (Chapter 5) is limited by the fact that the brain areas activated by 
synaesthetic personification are found to be activated not only in mentalising 
processes but also in the processing of various other functions. For example, the 
precuneus and temporo-parietal junction, the posterior cingulate and medial 
prefrontal cortex have been implicated in attentional processes (Small et al., 2003; 
Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Young, Dodell-Feder and Saxe, 2010). Therefore, it 
is possible that the observed activations are not only driven by the self-projective 
mentalising, but may be related to attentional processes (see Chapter 5), such as 
attentional shift towards more engaging stimuli, namely graphemes and objects 
endowed with personal attributes. This does not contradict the hypothesis 
developed in this thesis that the self-projection mechanism underlies synaesthetic 
personification. In fact, this supports the hypothesis, given that it was proposed 
that the distinction between the self and other in mentalising is mediated by 
attention systems (Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).  
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7.2.2 The relationship between synaesthtic personification and development 
 
Synaesthetic personification is similar to animistic thought in childhood, the 
phenomenon of children thinking of non-human things as endowed with life and 
consciousness. Similarly, to synaesthetes, graphemes are not only linguistic units 
but appear as alive, having various personality traits, racial backgrounds, body-
build and facial features, social roles, attitudes, mental states, moods and 
cognitive abilities. Moreover, as described in detail in Chapter 2, letters and 
numbers are perceived as being part of communities, having social roles (e.g. 
‗secretary‘, ‗teacher‘, ‗undergraguate student‘), various attitudes towards each 
other, power-based relationships (e.g., ‗the others led him lead without 
objection‘), belong to families (`A is mother to all numbers‘) and have romantic 
relationships (e.g., ‗G is I‘s girlfriend‘). Given that animistic thought has been 
suggested to be a type of indiscriminate mentalising, in which the source of 
mental states is attributed to external things and not to the self (Rappoport and 
Fritzler, 1969), it is possible that, analogously to animistic thought, 
personification in sequence personality synaesthesia manifested in indiscriminate 
mentalising is a residual expression of developmental animistic perception. This is 
in line with Meltzhoff‘s hypothesis that ―recognition of self–other equivalences is 
the foundation ….of social cognition‖ (2007, p.126), which, together with the 
recognition that the people are ‗like me‘, consitutes the basis for development of 
mentalising.  
In most children animistic thought diminishes in intensity when they become 
older, however, as shown in this thesis, synaesthetes (even in adulthood) still 
show a tendency to see non-human things as human-like, suggesting that 
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personification in synaesthetic adults is a tendency to perceive that other things 
are ‗like me‘ (Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, in press). This is in agreement with the 
results from the study in Chapter 3 showing overlapping brain activations for 
grapheme personification, mentalising and autobiographical memory. These 
results suggest that graphemes induce in synaesthetes self-related social 
processing (e.g. representations of one‘s own mental states, personality traits and 
biographical experiences) that is not recognised as one‘s own, and the outcome of 
this processing is projected onto graphemes and attributed to them. If this is true, 
this ‗like me‘ processing in synaesthetic personification results from 
misattribution of agency from the self to graphemes and objects, similarly as 
observed in developmental animism. The elaborate and detailed anthropomorphic 
descriptions of graphemes and inanimate objects presented in Chapter 2, together 
with findings of the functional experiments in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 provide 
converging evidence supporting the claim that synaesthetic personification 
constitues a residual expression of animistic thought observed in the development 
of social cognition (Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, in press). This is consistent with 
the neonatal hypothesis of synaesthesia, according to which all people are born as 
synaesthetes. Typically developing adults lose synaesthesia as result of increasing 
functional specialisation in the brain, whereas in synaesthetes this process is 
interrupted and leads to synaesthetic sensations (Maurer, 1997). 
 
7.3 Implications for synaesthesia research 
 
Implications for synaesthesia research that emerge from the studies on 
synaesthetic personification in this thesis are that synaesthesia includes not only 
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purely perceptual concurrents, but also concurrents from the social cognition 
domain. Synaesthetic inducer-concurrent pairs are not necessarily pure perceptual 
stimuli, but instead are higher-level concepts. They are constant over time, 
involuntary and idiosyncratic. Therefore, as previously suggested by Simner 
(2011), the definitional criteria of synaesthesia should be revised to include higher 
order concepts as possible inducers and concurrents in synaesthesia.  
Concurrents in sequence-personality synaesthesia are drawn from 
autobiographical experience, which demonstrates that synaesthesia is not 
completely genetically pre-determined and can be influenced by environmental 
factors. This explanation emphasizes the role of associative learning in acquiring 
synaesthesia during development; therefore future studies could investigate 
personification in children. These could try to establish what determines the initial 
genders and personal characteristics being attributed to graphemes and objects, 
whether they arise from the childhood‘s animistic thought and how they relate to 
the linguistic gender acquisitions.  
Personification in synaesthesia and mentalising share a neural basis and it is likely 
that they utilise the same self-projection mechanism. This suggests that 
personifying synaesthetes have increased sensitivity for noticing social cues in the 
environment than non-synaesthetes, which is manifested on phenomenological, 
behavioural and neural levels.    
 
7.4 Implications for social cognition 
 
One way of looking at the mentalising problem is examining anthropomorphic 
thought. Given that the tendency to perceive non-human entities as human-like is 
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much stronger in sequence-personality synaesthesia than in the general 
population, testing synaesthetes could provide clearer insight into these processes 
and also shed light on the relationships between social functions and 
anthropomorphic thought. As shown in this thesis, synaesthetic and non-
synaesthetic personifications differ. However, testing personifiers of different 
ages and comparing them with non-synaesthetes could potentially inform how we 
develop understanding of the minds of others.  This could be done by using age-
related social cognition tasks, together with a longitudinal investigation of 
functional neuroanatomy. Object personification seems to be more common and 
elaborate with familiar objects and personal belongings, rather than with novel 
objects. Similarly, reduplicative paramnesia often involves places, people, objects 
and body parts. Considering this similarity, it is suggested that further 
examination of synaesthetic personification could also shed light on these types of 
disorders and help us to understand better why people with brain dysfunction 
reduplicate only things ‗belonging‘ to the patient.   
 
7.5 General limitations and future research 
 
One major limitation of the studies in this thesis is the limited number of 
participants, which is mainly due to the fact that personification in synaesthesia is 
not very frequent in the population (about 1.4%; Simner and Holenstein, 2007). 
Despite this limitation it is still possible to gain increased understanding of the 
cognitive and neural processes underlying this phenomenon. However, the small 
number of synaesthetes tested gives rise to the question of whether these findings 
can be generalised to other synaesthetes. The best way of determining this will be 
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to test more personifying synaesthetes in the future using the same or similar 
paradigms.  
Further limitations of the studies testing the involuntary character of graphemes 
and inanimate objects were that only two aspects of automaticity were tested: goal 
independence and non-conscious character, but not fastness and load-insensitivity. 
Despite the fact that the findings of the studies provide enough evidence to draw a 
clear conclusion for automaticity of personification in synaesthesia, it would be 
interesting to see whether or not all of these criteria are satisfied. Future 
experiments could include testing of additional conditions, in which primes will 
be displayed for shorter times (e.g., 80 ms, 60ms) to examine whether 
synaesthetic personification affects the very early stages of information 
processing. To test whether personification is insensitive to the cognitive load, 
neuroimaging studies could include conditions in which unrelated to 
personification tasks have an increasing level of difficulty (e.g., 1, 2 and 3 back 
task).   
 
Finally, the scope of the current study did not include many important aspects of 
general social cognition in synaesthetes. This was due to the fact that priority was 
given to the examination of the cognitive and neural processes underlying 
synaesthetic personification, since empirical investigations into sequence-
personality synaesthesia have to date been rare. Nonetheless, drawing on the 
findings from this thesis indicating the involvement of mentalising processes in 
sequence-personality synaesthesia, future investigation could probe the various 
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aspects of social cognition, including perspective taking and self-other processing 
in personifying synaesthetes.  
 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
 
The work presented in this thesis has provided evidence that synaesthetic 
experience goes beyond the exclusively perceptual inducer-concurrent pairings. 
Instead, synaesthesia can include conceptual concurrents, such as social 
characteristics of graphemes and objects. This has predictable behavioural 
consequences and identifiable neural correlates consistent with the 
phenomenology, as in classical synaesthesia variants. This provides a broader 
perspective of how synaesthesia can be understood and poses new questions about 
the criteria accordingly to which synaesthesia should be defined.  
Given that this peculiar phenomenon of graphemes having ‗mental lives and 
relationships‘ shares some of the underlying neural mechanisms with ordinary 
social cognition, it is proposed that the tendency to personify non-human agents 
may reflect a developmental process that facilitates the acquisition and practice of 
the skills necessary for understanding the minds of other people. Thus, the study 
of synaesthetic personification provides scientists with a window into normal 
social cognition. 
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Appendix A: Consent Form 
 
 
 
Synaesthesia, cross-modal correspondences and individual differences in 
perception and imagery 
 
What is synaesthesia?  
We rarely stop to think about it and typically assume that everyone sees the world 
just like we do, but some people‘s mental imagery is richer than others‘. People 
with synaesthesia experience a ‗mixing‘ of the senses. For example some people 
think about numbers of time as having a particular pattern in space or have other 
associations (e.g., thinking about odd numbers as male and even numbers female). 
Synaesthesia is not harmful or disruptive and seems to be more common that 
previously assumed. About 1 in 10 individuals reports one variant of such 
phenomena but many do not realise it is unusual in any way. 
What are the aims of the research? 
The aim of the research is to understand the cognitive, developmental and 
biological basis of synaesthesia. This might also tell us more about ordinary 
perceptual experiences and its relationship to thinking, memory and language. 
What is involved with taking part?  
First of all, you will be asked to fill in a general questionnaire and to describe 
synaesthetic experiences that you may have.  We would appreciate your 
participation even if you don‘t think you may have synaesthesia. We also ask 
about other individual differences and will try to find out if such differences are 
more common in synaesthetes than in non-synaesthetes. 
You do not have to answer all the questions if you feel uncomfortable about it. 
However, it is useful for our research to gain as complete a picture as possible and 
all information you give will be treated in confidence.  Following this, we may 
contact you again (by either phone, e-mail or letter) to invite you to take part in 
further behavioural and neuroimaging studies. These will involve basic tests of 
memory or perception.  None of the tasks are harmful or stressful. You are under 
no obligation to take part, and you may refuse to take part for whatever reason and 
without giving any explanation. 
CONTACT DETAILS: 
r. Monika Sobczak, PhD Student, Centre for Cognition and Neuroimaging, Brunel 
University,  Uxbridge  UB8 3PH,  e-mail: monika.sobczak@brunel.ac.uk 
s. Dr Noam Sagiv, Centre for Cognition and Neuroimaging, Brunel University,  Uxbridge  
UB8 3PH.  Tel: +44 (0)1895 265341, e-mail:    
 
 
t.  
Dr.  
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Will my data be kept confidential?  
Your personal details (name, address, etc.) will not be passed on to anybody else 
outside of our research group without first gaining your written consent. You will 
be referred to in our records and in any publications by your initials (or another 
code such as participant number), in accordance with the data protection act. 
Please fill in the following :  
Name of participant : 
______________________________________________________ 
Address : 
_______________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Telephone number : 
_______________________________________________________ 
E-mail : 
_________________________________________________________________ 
I have read the information above and I agree to take part in the study.  I 
understand that I may withdraw at any point in the future.  
 
Signed (by participant) : __________________________ Date : 
__________________ 
 
 
If I have any concerns or complaints regarding the way in which the research is or 
has been conducted I may contact Professor Taeko Wydell, Chair of the 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee, at taeko.wydell@brunel.ac.uk 
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Appendix B: DEBRIEFING FORM 
 
 
 
 
Synaesthesia, cross-modal correspondences and individual differences in 
perception and imagery: 
 
Information for participants 
We rarely stop to think about it and typically assume that everyone sees the world just like we do. 
However, we may be wrong about this. There are substantial individual differences in mental 
imagery. Such differences are not immediately apparent because we hardly ever talk about it. 
Perhaps the most striking phenomenon is synaesthesia. People with synaesthesia experience a 
‘mixing’ of the senses. For example, visualising colours when thinking about letters of the alphabet, 
days of the week or when listening to music. Other sensory combinations are possible (e.g., 
involving taste, smell or touch). Some people think about numbers or time as having a particular 
pattern in space or more rarely people may have other associations (e.g., thinking about odd 
numbers as male and even numbers as female). Synaesthesia is not harmful or disruptive and 
seems to be more common than previously assumed. About 1 in 10 individuals reports one variant 
of such phenomena but many do not realise it is unusual in any way. The spatial associations are 
most common, followed by colour associations. 
The aim of our research is to understand the cognitive, developmental and biological basis of 
synaesthesia.  This might also tell us more about ordinary perceptual experiences and its 
relationship to thinking, memory and language.We are also interested in other individual differences 
in mental imagery and whether they are more common in individuals who have synaesthesia than 
in the rest of us. Thus, even if you don’t have synaesthesia, we are interested in your responses.  
If you would like to hear more about our finding or you have synaesthesia and would like to 
participate in future studies, please feel free to contact us (see contact details above; in the subject 
line of your e-mail please state: SYNAESTHESIA RESEARCH). The following information sources 
may be of interest: 
Internet resources 
Synesthesia Resource Center (including audio/video links)   http://www.bluecatsandchartreusekittens.com/   
Dr. Noam Sagiv’s homepage   http://people.brunel.ac.uk/~hsstnns/     
Journal articles on synaesthesia 
Sagiv N & Ward J (2006). Cross-modal interactions: Lessons from synesthesia. Progress in Brain Research 
155, 263-275. Available online at: http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/224/  
Martino, G. & Marks, L.E. (2001). Synesthesia: Strong and weak. Current Directions in Psychological Science 
10, 61-65. Available online at: http://www.psychologicalscience.org/members/journal_issues/cd/CDIR1027.pdf  
Books on synaesthesia 
Ward J (2008).  The Frog Who Croaked Blue: Synesthesia and the Mixing of the Senses. Routledge  
Patricia Lynne Duffy (2001). Blue Cats and Chartreuse Kittens: How Synesthetes Color Their Worlds. New 
York: Henry Holt.  
 
 CONTACT DETAILS: 
u. Monika Sobczak, PhD Student, Centre for Cognition and Neuroimaging, Brunel 
University,  Uxbridge  UB8 3PH,  e-mail: monika.sobczak@brunel.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor of this experiment: 
Dr Noam Sagiv, Centre for Cognition and Neuroimaging, Brunel University,  Uxbridge  
UB8 3PH.  Tel: +44 (0)1895 265341, e-mail:    
 
v.  
w.  
Dr.  
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Appendix C: Personifications Questionnaire 
 
 
SECTION1 
1. Do you think about letters and/or numbers as having personalities, moods, 
genders, appearance or social interactions/functions? (please circle or 
underline) 
 
Letters: 
genders     yes     no  personalities yes no      feelings      yes      
no 
Numbers:  
genders     yes     no  personalities yes no      feelings      yes      
no 
 In the column marked ‘Gender’, we would like you to write the gender of the 
letter/number, as either m (= male) or f (= female) or leave a dash if you don’t feel 
strongly either way. 
 In the columns marked ‘0-9’, please indicate how confident do you feel about each 
letter’s (number’s) gender, personality, physical appearance, and/or social role on a 0 to 
9 scale (where 0 = no feelings, and 9 = a very strong feeling). You can use the entire 
range of numbers (if some feelings are stronger than others) or repeat the same numbers 
(if the intensity doesn’t vary much).  
 In the columns marked ‘Personality Traits & Moods’, ‘Appearance’ and ‘Social Role 
& Relationships’  we would like you to describe succinctly and to the best of your ability 
the personality traits (e.g. bossy),  physical appearance (e.g. tall, old), social role (e.g. 
brother, king, leader)  of any of the letters and numbers below, and 
relationships/interactions between them. If you don’t experience anything at all then just 
put a dash in the column. 
 In the column marked ‘Liked/Disliked’, please indicate whether you like or don’t like 
particular letter/number. Write either (+) when you like or (-) when you don’t like 
number/letter. Leave space when letter/number is neutral to you.  
Letter Gender 
(f/m) 
0-
9 
Personality 
Traits & 
Moods 
0-
9 
Appearance 0-
9 
Social Role & 
Relationships  
0-
9 
Liked/ 
Disliked 
A          
B          
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C          
D          
E          
F          
G          
H          
I          
J          
K          
L          
M          
N          
O          
P          
Q          
R          
S          
T          
U          
V          
W          
X          
Y          
Z          
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No Gender 
(f/m) 
0-
9 
Personality 
Traits & 
Moods 
0-
9 
Appearance 0-
9 
Social Role & 
Relationships 
0-
9 
Liked/ 
Disliked 
0          
1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
6          
7          
8          
9          
 
2. Are these properties stable? Do they ever change? For example, if you are 
feeling sad, do the moods exhibited by letter and/or number reflect that or 
change a bit? Please explain 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
3. Do you think about OBJECTS as having personalities, genders, human-like 
appearance or social interactions/functions? (please circle or underline)  
 
Objects: 
genders yes no   personalities  yes no 
 
attitudes yes no   feelings  yes no 
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  In the column marked ‘Personified Object’, we would like you to write an example of 
particular object from each category to which you attribute genders and/or personalities 
(e.g. your mobile in the category ‘personal objects’). N B ‘Personal Objects’ refer to small 
objects that you use every day e.g. personal mug at work etc.    
 In the column marked ‘Gender’, we would like you to write the gender of the object. 
Write either m (= male) or f (= female) or leave a dash if you don’t feel strongly either 
way. 
 In the columns marked ‘0-9’, please indicate how confident do you feel about each 
object’s example gender, personality, physical appearance, and/or social role on a 0 to 9 
scale (where 0 = no feelings, and 9 = a very strong feeling). You can use the entire range 
of numbers (if some feelings are stronger than others) or repeat the same numbers (if the 
intensity doesn’t vary much).  
 In the columns marked ‘Personality Traits & Moods’, ‘Appearance’ and ‘Social Role 
& Relationships’  we would like you to describe succinctly and to the best of your ability 
the personality (e.g. bossy),  physical appearance (e.g. tall, old), social role (e.g. brother, 
king, leader)  of any of the numbers and objects below, and relationships/interactions 
between them. If you don’t experience anything at all then just put a dash in the column. 
 
Please see an example below… 
 
Object 
Categor
y 
Personifie
d Object 
m/
f 
0
-
9 
Personality 
Traits & 
Feelings 
0
-
9 
Appearanc
e 
0
-
9 
Social Role 
& 
Relationship
s 
0
-
9 
Personal 
Objects 
my 
mobile 
f 4 Cooperativ
e, sad etc 
8 Girly, 
young 
9 Like an 
elder sister 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
Table3 
Object 
Category 
Personified 
Object 
m/f 0-
9 
Personality 
Traits & 
Feelings 
0-
9 
Appearance 0-
9 
Social Role & 
Relationships 
0-
9 
Personal 
Objects 
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Body 
Parts 
         
Clothes          
Vehicles          
Furniture          
Tools          
Buildings          
Plants          
Food          
Natural 
Objects 
(e.g. rocks) 
         
Toys          
Simple 
Shapes 
 
 
        
 
 
 
SECTION 2 
1. Do certain numbers and letters have characteristics that influence 
your personification, and have you noticed any patterns?  (something that 
makes it more likely for you to personify the form, or assign a gender to 
the form, for example the shape of a letter, it’s position in the alphabet, 
it’s the first letter in a familiar person’s name, the sound it evokes, it’s 
colour etc.) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………… 
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2. Under what conditions do you feel alphanumeric forms and objects have 
genders and/or personalities? (If yes to a condition, please indicate how 
strong this feeling is on a 6 point scale) 
 
      
 Strongly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Mildly  
Agree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree 
 
When I see a 
number/ letter/ 
object 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
When I hear a 
number/ 
letter/object’s name
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
When I think about 
particular 
letter/number/ 
object 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
When I see a word 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
When I see a multi-
digit number  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
When I see a group 
of objects  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
When I see an 
object for the first 
time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Other (please give details) 
…..………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….......
......................................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3. How often do you experience this type of synaesthesia? (circle or 
underline) 
 
(a) On a daily basis…       
(b) On a weekly/monthly basis…       
(c) Sometimes…         
(d) Rarely…          
(e) Other (please give details) ……………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
4. Please complete this item if you speak more than one language or read 
more than one alphabet. Do you personify letters in all 
languages/alphabets? Please list languages below and circle (underline) the 
appropriate number. 
 
LANGUAGE Strongly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Mildly 
agree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
1st=_________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2nd=_________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3rd=_________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4th=_________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Similarly looking letters in different alphabets have the same personality/gender 
(e.g., P in English and Russian)                YES    NO 
 
Similarly sounding letters in different alphabets have the same 
personality/gender (e.g., R in English and P in Russian)         YES    NO 
 
Further details: ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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5. Do you personify other symbols, e.g., Greek letters, Roman numerals 
etc…?         
Yes  No 
 
If yes, please give details 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
6. Do your personifications of letters/numbers change with a size/style or 
colour of the font? 
Yes  No 
 
If yes, please give details 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………. 
 
7. Do you associate genders and/or personalities with objects depending on 
the familiarity of the particular object to you (e.g. you associate 
personality/gender to your personal pen but not to every pen).  Please circle (or 
underline): 
 
[personal object = unfamiliar object]    
 [personal object>unfamiliar object]      
[personal object<unfamiliar object]  
 
8. How old were you when you first began feeling that letters, numbers 
and/or objects had genders and/or personalities?  …………. 
 
Has this feeling become stronger or weaker with age? ………………………….. 
 
9.     Have letters, numbers and/or objects personalities changed since, for 
example matured a bit?   Did they behave more like children?  
 
Please explain……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..  
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SECTION 3 – ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
 
We are very interested in synaesthetes subjective experiences.  Please use this 
section to give us any further information about your experience of genders and/or 
personalities that is not covered above  (e.g. for moths or the days of the week), or 
to add more detail to your answers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Week Days & Months  
Do you think about week-days as having personalities or genders? (please circle) 
Genders?  YES NO  Personalities?  YES NO 
Do you think about months of the year as having personalities or genders? 
(please circle) 
Genders?  YES NO  Personalities?  YES NO 
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 under  ‘m/f’ write the gender of the week day, month, as either m (= male) or f (= 
female) or leave a dash if you don’t feel strongly either way. 
 under  ‘0-9’, please indicate confident you feel about each gender or personality 
on a 0 to 9 scale (where 0 = no feelings, and 9 = a very strong feeling).  
 under  ‘personality’, please  describe succinctly and to the best of your ability the 
personality of any of the week days and months 
 
 
 m/f 0-9 personality 0-9 
Monday     
Tuesday     
Wednesday     
Thursday     
Friday     
Saturday     
Sunday     
 
 m/f 0-9 personality 0-9 
  January     
  February     
March     
April     
      May     
June     
July     
August     
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September     
October     
November     
December     
 
Thank you very much for your time! 
 
Please Note:  Your personal details will not be passed onto anybody else outside of our research 
group without first gaining your written consent.  You will be referred to in our records and in any 
publications by your initials (or other code), in accordance with the data protection act.  You are 
under no obligation to take part, and you may refuse to take part at any point for whatever reason 
and without giving any explanation.  
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Appendix D: INITIAL SCREENING FORM 
 
 
